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1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1. General Introduction 2
This thesis can be split into two parts, containing the following papers:
Part I Fricke, D., Lux, T. (2012), The Eﬀects of a Financial Transaction
Tax in an Artiﬁcial Financial Market, unpublished manuscript
Part II Finger, K., Fricke, D., Lux, T. (2012), Network Analysis of the
e-MID Overnight Money Market: The Informational Value of Dif-
ferent Aggregation Levels for Intrinsic Dynamic Processes, Kiel
Working Paper 1782, Kiel Institute for the World Economy
Fricke, D., Lux, T. (2013), On the Distribution of Links in the
Interbank Network: Evidence from the e-MID Overnight Money
Market, unpublished manuscript
Fricke, D., Lux, T. (2012), Core-Periphery Structure of the Overnight
Money Market: Evidence from the e-MID Trading Platform, Kiel
Working Paper 1759, Kiel Institute for the World Economy
Fricke, D. (2012), Trading Strategies in the Overnight Money Mar-
ket: Correlations and Clustering on the e-MID Trading Platform,
Physica A, 391 (24), pp. 6528-6542
Section 1.2.3 contains a description of my contribution to each of those pa-
pers.
In the ﬁrst part (chapter 2) I present a detailed artiﬁcial ﬁnancial market
with a large number of heterogeneous interacting agents. The model is used
to assess the eﬀects of a ﬁnancial transaction tax (FTT). The second part
(chapters 3-6) is concerned with the properties and the topological structure
of the Italian interbank market. The contents of both parts are, at least
on ﬁrst sight, not connected to each other, as they provide contributions to
very diﬀerent areas of the literature. In this introduction, I mainly aim at
motivating the work in the two parts and providing some background. I will
also point out that the two parts are not as disconnected as it may seem,
since both essentially aim at tackling the complexity of ﬁnancial markets by
taking into account the heterogeneity of agents and their interactions.
1.1 Motivation
Financial markets are prototypes of complex systems1: they consist of
a large number of heterogenous components (e.g. households, ﬁrms, and ﬁ-
nancial institutions), with each component interacting with a subset of all
1 I should stress that there exists no workable rigorous deﬁnition of complex systems so
far. Similarly, the term ﬁnancial market covers a wide range of diﬀerent segments of the
global ﬁnancial system.
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components. These interactions are not limited to trading in the market-
place, but also include connections between individual components. Thus,
individual components do not act autonomously in general and their actions
may induce feedbacks by others. At the macro-level, these interactions lead
to collective market dynamics which are, as usual in complex systems, very
hard to predict. This is even more so, since ﬁnancial markets are only a
subsystem, albeit one with a large and increasing importance, of the global
economy. There is no doubt that well-functioning ﬁnancial markets are cru-
cial for the working of the economy, and their instability has signiﬁcant eﬀects
on the `real' sector.
It has been shown that components following rather simple rules may,
by their very interactions, be the source of complicated aggregate dynam-
ics.2 Applying this insight to ﬁnancial markets makes clear that higher-level
aggregates e.g. market prices, cannot be understood on the basis of their con-
stituent units.3 The aggregate is not simply the sum of the individual parts
and it is crucial to understand the links between the micro- and macro-level.
For the economy in general, and ﬁnancial markets in particular, this raises
the necessity of understanding and modelling the system from bottom-up.
This thesis aims at describing and tackling the complexity of certain ﬁnan-
cial market segments.
In order to frame the work in this thesis, at this point it seems necessary
to brieﬂy explain how mainstream economists, in particular from macroeco-
nomics and ﬁnance, tend to cope with the complexity of the economy.4 Mod-
ern mainstream macroeconomics, most prominently the so-called dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, tells us that the macroe-
conomic equilibrium can be found by maximizing the present value of the
expected utility of a rational, representative individual (`homo oeconomi-
cus'). In this view, deriving the optimal behavior of the representative agent
is already suﬃcient for understanding the dynamics of the whole economy.
However, as Sonnenschein (1972), Mantel (1974), and Debreu (1974) have
shown 40 years ago, aggregate demand is not as well behaved as individ-
ual demand. Obviously, the linear aggregation of individual behavior misses
the interactions between individuals, which are crucial for understanding the
system's dynamics. The aggregate behavior is fundamentally diﬀerent from
that of the `average' individual.5 Related thoughts can be found in ﬁnance:
2 See for example Schelling's (1969) model of racial segregation.
3 See Lux (2011). This has important implications for the regulation of ﬁnancial insti-
tutions, as I will explain below.
4 See e.g. Kirman (1992), Bouchaud (2008), Colander et al. (2009), and Lux and
Westerhoﬀ (2009) for detailed discussions of the topic.
5 See Anderson (1972).
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the eﬃcient market hypothesis (EMH) states that non-rational traders can
be neglected, since they would have to leave markets after continuously los-
ing to rational traders.6 From this viewpoint, it again suﬃces to consider a
representative, rational individual for analyzing the complete system. Hence,
standard macro and ﬁnance models fail to account for the complexity of the
economy. In addition, many of the very basic assumptions, such as perfect
rationality, have been rejected spectacularly.7
It is easy to imagine the potential dangers of predictions from such overly
simplistic models. For example, perfect rationality implies eﬃcient, and
therefore incredibly stable, ﬁnancial markets. Prices will always equal fun-
damental values, and the only source for ﬁnancial crises is due to exogenous
(fundamental) shocks. This explains why ﬁnancial markets are practically
absent from modern macro-models: there is simply no reason why a perfectly
functioning market should have substantial impact on the economy. For a
large part, the opacity of many market segments, among them the absence
of real-time data for the interbank linkages, is to some extent favored by
the broad disinterest in the structure of the ﬁnancial system. Once again,
the global ﬁnancial crisis (GFC) of 2007-08 made painfully clear that such
approaches are inadequate. Financial markets profoundly aﬀect the stability
of the entire economy. It is likely that the general trend of `ﬁnancialization',8
involving a larger share of ﬁnancial institutions proﬁts' among all corporate
proﬁts9 and an exponential growth of ﬁnancial markets around the world,10
signiﬁcantly increases the impact of ﬁnancial markets on the stability of the
global economy.11 The sheer size of ﬁnancial markets is worrying by itself,
but even more threatening appears the increasing level of interconnectedness
and concentration in the global ﬁnancial system.12 In the end, a substantial
6 See e.g. Fama (1965, 1970).
7 See e.g. Kahneman and Tversky (1973) and Tversky and Kahneman (1974). The
booming research ﬁelds of behavioral and experimental economics continuously add new
evidence against the rationality of agents, see e.g. Shiller (2003).
8 See Dore (2008).
9 For the US for example, the fraction of ﬁnancial institutions' proﬁts among all corpo-
rate proﬁts was roughly 35% at the beginning of 2012. In the 1950s (2002) the same ﬁgure
read 9.5% (45%). See section 6 of the National Income and Product Accounts Tables,
available online: http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm.
10 According to statistics from the Bank of International Settlements (2011), the notional
amount of outstanding over-the-counter derivative contracts was 648 trillion US Dollars
in December 2011. Compare this with the world domestic product of roughly 70 trillion
US Dollars in 2011, i.e roughly one tenth of the derivative contracts and these are just
estimates for the OTC derivative market.
11 Of course, part of that growth can be attributed to globalization and the growth of
world trade.
12 See Haldane (2009) and Kubelec and Sa (2010).
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fraction of ﬁnancial market growth is likely to be favored by moral hazard:
when losses are socialized, while gains are not, ﬁnancial institutions have
incentives to become `systemically important' by increasing their risk expo-
sures. Unfortunately, it took the recent crisis for policymakers to realize that
the absence of very basic real-time information, such as maps of interbank
exposures and a quantitative deﬁnition of systemic importance, creates ad-
ditional uncertainty.13 In hindsight, it seems unlikely that Lehman Brothers
would have been allowed to fail in September 2008, if policymakers had been
aware of the scale of Lehman's systemic importance. However, not only the
lack of data, but also the lack of appropriate models for assessing the systemic
importance of individual institutions, is striking.
The two parts of this thesis cope with some of these issues in detail, always
acknowledging the complexity of the system. In the ﬁrst part, I present a
detailed agent-based model of an asset market, where a large number of het-
erogenous agents compete against each other. The model is used to analyze
the eﬀects of a ﬁnancial transaction tax (FTT), which aims at reducing ﬁ-
nancial market ﬂuctuations and generating tax revenues by imposing a small
transaction tax. In the second part, I present basic work on the intercon-
nectedness of the Italian interbank network, i.e. a network of banks which
are connected to each other through overnight loans. Haldane (2009) argues
that the ﬁrst step for eﬃcient regulation and crisis prevention in ﬁnancial
systems consists of mapping the network. Only then, after understanding its
structure and dynamics, can we move on to improve regulations and possibly
restructure the system. In a series of papers, my co-authors and I follow this
proposal by analyzing the (dynamical) structure of this particular network.
It is of utmost importance to take the next steps in the future.
In the next section, I will present a brief overview of the individual chap-
ters. I will give a separate motivation for both parts and outline possible
areas of future research.
1.2 Background and Overview
1.2.1 Financial Transaction Tax and Agent-Based Modelling
The original idea that a general FTT might curb ﬁnancial market volatil-
ity goes back to John Maynard Keynes (1936), ch. 12. James Tobin (1978)
transferred this idea to currency markets (Tobin-tax). Only recently, given
the surging government deﬁcits from responses to the crisis, policymakers
started realizing that such a tax might actually generate substantial mone-
13 See e.g. Trichet (2011).
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tary revenues.14
FTTs theoretical appeal stems from its potential to limit short-term spec-
ulative behavior, and thus transaction volumes, on ﬁnancial markets due to
the rise in transaction costs. The hypothesis is that there is a U-shaped re-
lationship between the tax rate and volatility: for small tax rates, volatility
decreases, but increases for larger values. In the light of the previously men-
tioned explosion of ﬁnancial market activity, and the corresponding decou-
pling from `real' activity, restricting the turnover appears to be a reasonable
aim. Note also that the increasing level of activity goes along with a higher
level of liquidity.15 From a naive point of view, one would expect more liquid
markets to be more resilient. However, there is some evidence that higher
liquidity coincided with higher fragility in the sense that ﬁnancial crises, i.e.
the bursting of speculative bubbles, became more likely.16 FTTs, by harming
short-term investments overproportionally, should have the potential to re-
unite ﬁnancial market and real activity. Additionally, besides generating tax
revenues, it frees-up economic resources from the ﬁnancial sector for more
productive uses.17 However, empirical evidence on the expected U-shaped
relationship between FTTs and volatility is rather mixed: some studies ﬁnd
that volatility decreases, increases or does not react at all in response to a
tax increase.18 Given these contradicting empirical results, it becomes nec-
essary to analyze the eﬀects of the FTT in a diﬀerent way. In the light of
the complexity of ﬁnancial markets, agent-based models (ABM) are a very
promising approach, which allow to non-invasively evaluate the eﬀects of
regulatory measures in general.
More detailed (realistic) models are usually hard to tackle analytically,
so numerical simulations are needed. ABMs are such computerized simu-
lations, containing a number of components (agents) interacting with each
other through prescribed rules.19 As such, they take all the necessary ingre-
dients for modelling complex systems (heterogeneity and interactions) into
14 These revenues are estimated to range between 1 and 3% of national GDPs. See, e.g.
Pollin et al. (2003).
15 Liquidity is the ability to trade large size quickly, at low costs, see Harris (2003).
16 See Shiller (1981) and Bordo et al. (2001). Additionally, the arrival of high-frequency
trading is likely to have increased the speed to the market dynamics, see e.g. Sornette and
der Becke (2009), which increases the probability of micro-crashes as seen in the Flash
crash of 2010.
17 For example, Dore (2008) reports that in 2006 22% of the British labor force was
employed in the ﬁnancial industry. Among them you will ﬁnd a large number physicists,
mathematicians, and engineers, designing clever trading algorithms.
18 See, e.g. Jones and Seguin (1997), Hau (2006) and Roll (1989), respectively.
19 See LeBaron and Tesfatsion (2008), Farmer and Foley (2009), and Helbing (2012), ch.
2.
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account.20 ABMs have guided policymakers in other areas such as epidemi-
ology and traﬃc control, and there is no reason why economic systems could
not be modeled similarly. A major challenge consists of specifying how agents
behave and interact, due to the inﬁnite number of ways to model deviations
from perfect rationality. The degrees of freedom can be partly reduced using
results from behavioral and experimental economics, serving as a guideline
for agent behavior in many cases. Obviously, attempting to model all the
details of a realistic problem can rapidly lead to a `black box' where it is
diﬃcult to determine what causes what. Without empirical guidelines, it is
clearly necessary to test diﬀerent behavioral strategies and evaluate their de-
gree of realism. Validation is commonly done with regard to the replication
of certain well-known `stylized facts'. A model that replicates more of these,
is likely to be more favorable compared to others.
There is a long list of ABMs of ﬁnancial markets, usually within the
chartist-fundamentalist framework as in e.g. Kirman (1991, 1993) and Lux
(1995), that are able to replicate many of the stylized facts apparent in ﬁ-
nancial market data.21 Important insights can be gained from many of such
models, but when it comes to evaluating regulatory policies, crucial (oversim-
plifying) assumptions concerning agents' behavior and market microstructure
are likely to aﬀect the results. For example, many authors assume that a
market-maker provides inﬁnite liquidity, in which case FTTs are potentially
stabilizing for small tax rates.22 More realistic approaches take the endogene-
ity of liquidity into account, usually based on order-driven continuous double
auctions (CDA). However, many of these so-called `econophysics' approaches
model the case of zero-intelligence traders,23 i.e. the exact opposite of the
`homo oeconomicus' in standard economics.24 Psychological factors, such as
imitation and herding, are assumed to be absent in such models working
20 It is beyond the scope of this introduction to name all the advantages and disadvan-
tages of ABMs. I refer the interested reader to Helbing (2012), ch. 2.
21 See for example Beja and Goldman (1980), LeBaron et al. (1999), and Lux and
Marchesi (1999, 2000).
22 For a single asset market, see Ehrenstein (2002) and Westerhoﬀ (2003, 2004a). How-
ever, Giardina and Bouchaud (2003b) ﬁnd that only substantial trading costs will actually
stabilize the market, while a small tax (of the order of a few basis points) would have no
real eﬀect. For two ex-ante identical markets, with one country unilaterally introducing
the tax, Westerhoﬀ (2004b) ﬁnds that the taxed market is stabilized while volatility in the
tax haven strongly increases. For markets of diﬀerent size, Hanke et al. (2010) conclude
that if the tax is introduced in the large (small) market, volatility decreases (increases)
there.
23 See Cliﬀ and Bruten (1997).
24 See for example Bak et al. (1997), Maslov (2000), and Challet and Stinchcombe
(2001).
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at very short time-scales. To date, few attempts have been made to model
the limit order book based on detailed interactions between many boundedly
rational agents and it is not clear how strategic interactions would alter the
ﬁndings as compared to zero intelligence models. In particular, most exist-
ing studies from the `econophysics' literature appear to be reluctant to model
the market structure in a realistic way, e.g. incorporating budget constraints,
mostly in order to avoid making behavioral assumptions about the agents.25
The model presented in chapter 2 aims at bridging the gap between short
and long time-scales. To quantify the eﬀects of the FTT, we take into ac-
count adjustments in trading strategies (time horizons) and their eﬀects on
liquidity. The ABM is based on a realistic CDA mechanism and allows
for a continuum of investment strategies within the chartist/fundamentalist
framework. Successful strategies spread through the population via a Ge-
netic Algorithm (GA), i.e. agents can adjust their strategies in response to
the FTT. The main conclusions are as follows: First, the model is able to
replicate certain stylized facts of real ﬁnancial time-series for several param-
eter combinations, e.g. the model replicates the building up and bursting of
price bubbles. Second, for both ﬁxed and ﬂexible behavioral strategies, we
ﬁnd the usual trade-oﬀ between monetary revenues (a kind of Laﬀer curve)
and stability, as higher tax revenues come along with higher volatility. This
ﬁnding is in line with the results from the existing literature. However, we
ﬁnd somewhat diﬀerent results for very small and large tax rates, indicating
that the eﬀects of the tax may not be entirely negative. In any case, the tax
allows to generate substantial tax revenues, which could be used for a number
of productive purposes. In reality, it appears likely that social welfare could
be enhanced by the imposition of such a tax, e.g. through directing money
and resources from the ﬁnancial sector towards more productive purposes.
Unfortunately, given the political power of the ﬁnancial sector, it is still an
open question whether policymakers indeed decide to impose such a tax.
We discuss numerous avenues of possible future research are discussed in
the paper. Here I just mention that we, that is Karl Finger and myself, are
working on a simpler version of the model. Our main aim is to extend such a
model to the case of two markets, i.e. allowing for a tax haven. Furthermore,
we want to compare the eﬀects of a FTT with that of a ﬁnancial activity tax,
which taxes the proﬁts from trading rather than all transactions.
25 To our knowledge, Chiarella and Iori (2002) were the ﬁrst to incorporate trading strate-
gies into a CDA setup. The authors state that without these strategies, it is impossible
to generate realistic time-series. See also Chiarella et al. (2009).
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1.2.2 Interbank Markets and Network Analysis
Interbank markets allow banks to exchange central bank money in order
to share liquidity risks.26 At the macro level, however, a high number of
bank connections could give rise to systemic risk.27 Since it is well known
that the structure of a network is important for its resilience,28 policymakers
need information on the actual topology of the interbank network. This is
even more so, since market-based indices for systemic risk fail in serving as
early-warning indicators.29 In order to move from micro- to macro-prudential
regulations, it is crucial to map and understand the dynamics of the interbank
network. Moreover, the identiﬁcation of meaningful systemic risk indices has
to take the actual structure of the interbank network into account.
Recent research in the natural sciences has signiﬁcantly advanced our
understanding of the structure and functioning of complex networks. Net-
work ideas have been applied to very diverse areas and data sets such as
the internet, epidemiology, ecosystems, scientiﬁc collaboration and ﬁnancial
markets, to name a few. Quite interestingly, despite the heterogeneity of the
underlying systems, many real-world network share a number of common
features.30
The experiences of the last few years have made policymakers aware of
the necessity of gathering information on the structure of the ﬁnancial net-
work in general and the interbank market in particular.31 Clearly it is of
overwhelming importance, to set up a dynamic ABM of the ﬁnancial system
in the future, where the interbank network is only one of many segments.
One reason for the previous scarcity of research on the connections between
ﬁnancial institutions is certainly the limitation of available data,32 the other
reason being the neglect of the internal structure of the ﬁnancial system in
standard macroeconomic models as explained before. Thus, it comes as no
surprise that most previous studies on the topology of interbank markets
have been conducted by physicists applying measures from the natural sci-
ences to a network formed by interbank liabilities.33 It has been found that
26 See Ho and Saunders (1985), Freixas et al. (2000) and Allen and Gale (2000).
27 Systemic risk is closely related to ﬁnancial contagion, see de Bandt and Hartmann
(2000), and implies that an idiosyncratic shock causing the failure of one or few institutions
may destabilize the entire system.
28 See also Allen and Gale (2000).
29 See Markose et al. (2010).
30 One of the most prominent features is the `small-world' phenomenon. This means
that most nodes can be reached by every other node by a very small number of steps. See
Watts and Strogatz (1998).
31 See Haldane (2009), Haldane and May (2011) and Trichet (2011).
32 See Mistrulli (2007).
33 See for example Boss et al. (2004), Inaoka et al. (2004), Soramäki et al. (2007), Bech
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interbank networks appear to share several common properties. For example,
such networks are
1. sparse (only few links exist at any point in time),
2. scale-free (power-law degree distribution, with the degree being the
number of active links per bank),
3. clustered (non-random network structure),
4. disassortative (high-degree nodes tend to trade with low-degree nodes
and vice versa).
The second part of this thesis contains basic analyses of a particular interbank
network. The overarching themes are the identiﬁcation of new (stylized?)
facts and the challenge of existing ones. For that purpose, we investigated the
Italian interbank network, based on a dataset covering all transactions on the
e-MID trading platform during the period 1999 to 2010. This dataset is used
simply due to the fact that the e-MID data are the only interbank data which
can be purchased freely without any restrictions. In contrast, getting access
to similar datasets for other markets is usually far more complicated, but
will be necessary to make statements about the universality of our ﬁndings.
Chapter 3 contains a basic analysis of some network properties of the
e-MID data. The basic motivation is to match the seemingly incompatible
ﬁndings of random daily networks,34, and the existence of preferential lending
relationships at other aggregation levels, i.e. signiﬁcant non-random struc-
ture.35 In this paper, we show that the aggregation period indeed has an
eﬀect on the informational value of the underlying networks. The main ﬁnd-
ing is that daily networks indeed feature a substantial amount of randomness
and cannot be considered as being suﬃciently informative for the underlying
`latent' network. This is illustrated on the basis of a number of network
statistics which are compared to those of random networks. Furthermore, we
ﬁnd a substantial amount of asymmetry in the network. Last but not least,
we ﬁnd that the GFC can be identiﬁed as a signiﬁcant structural break for
many network measures.
Essentially, these results show that it is far from trivial to map a given
data structure into a `network'. While daily records of the interbank trading
system can be arranged in an adjacency matrix and treated with all types
of network statistics, they provide probably only a very small sample of re-
alizations from a richer structure of relationships. Just like daily contacts of
and Atalay (2010), De Masi et al. (2006), and Iori et al. (2008).
34 See De Masi et al. (2006) and Iori et al. (2008).
35 See e.g. Cocco et al. (2009) for the Portuguese interbank market.
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humans provide very incomplete information of networks of friendship and
acquaintances, the daily interbank data might only provide a small selection
of existing, dormant established trading channels. Hence, inference based
on such high-frequency data may be misleading while a higher level of time
aggregation might provide a more complete view on the interbank market.
What level of aggregation is suﬃcient for certain purposes is an empirical
question depending on the research questions at hand. However, saturation
of certain measures may be a good indicator that most dormant links have
been activated at least once over a certain time horizon. At the same time,
such dependence of statistics on the time horizon serves to sort out a num-
ber of simple generating mechanisms (i.e. completely randomly determined
networks in every period) and reveal interesting dynamic structure.
Chapter 4 is closely related to the analysis in chapter 3, explicitly fo-
cusing on the distribution of in- and out-degrees in the Italian interbank
network. The analysis challenges the somewhat universal ﬁnding of scale-
free interbank networks. Quite interestingly, many interbank networks have
been reported to be scale-free networks. For example, using daily e-MID data
over the period 1999-2002, De Masi et al. (2006) reported power-laws for the
distribution of in- and out-degrees, with tail parameters 2.7 and 2.15, respec-
tively. Besides the existence of several well-known generating mechanisms for
scale-free networks,36 this ﬁnding carries important policy implications. One
important feature of scale-free networks is that they can be described as
robust-yet-fragile,37 indicating that random disturbances are easily absorbed
(robust) whereas targeted attacks on the most central nodes may lead to a
breakdown of the entire network (fragile). If the network of credit relation-
ships had such a structure, this would carry important policy implications.
For instance, such a network might experience long stable periods, during
which disruptions are conﬁned to peripherical banks and can be absorbed
easily within the entire system. However, such periods could be a mislead-
ing indicator of the overall stability of the system as problems aﬀecting the
most central nodes could suddenly cause a breakdown of the entire network,
cf. Haldane (2009). Given the substantial level of randomness in the daily
networks, cf. chapter 3, we will also look at the distributional properties at
the quarterly level. Due to the aggregation properties of power-laws, one
would expect any `true' power-laws at the daily level to carry over to other
frequencies as well.
Quite surprisingly in view of the previous literature, we ﬁnd hardly any
support in favor of power-laws: at the daily level the degrees are usually ﬁt
36 See for example Barabasi and Albert (1999).
37 See Albert et al. (2000).
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best by negative Binomial distributions, while the power-law may provide
the best ﬁt for the tail data. However, we typically ﬁnd very large power-
law exponents (with values as large as 7), i.e. levels where the power-law
is virtually indistinguishable from exponential decay. At the quarterly level,
Weibull, Gamma, and Exponential distributions tend to provide comparable
ﬁts for the complete degree distribution, while the tails again tend to display
exponential decay. We ﬁnd comparable results when investigating the dis-
tribution of the number of transactions, even though in this case the tails of
the quarterly variables are somewhat fatter. However, the Log-normal distri-
bution typically outperforms the power-law. Overall these ﬁndings indicate
that the power-law is typically a poor description of the data, implying that
preferential attachment and other generating mechanisms for scale-free net-
works are unsuitable explanatory mechanisms for the structure of the Italian
interbank network. Moreover, the networks contain a substantial level of
asymmetry, due to the low correlation between in- and out-degrees. Addi-
tionally, we ﬁnd that the two variables do not follow identical distributions
in general.
Chapter 5 sheds light on the hierarchical structure of the interbank net-
work. The hypothesis of the existence of a hierarchical structure can be drawn
from the disassortative mixing patterns, which imply that small banks tend
to trade with large banks, but rarely among themselves. In passing, many
authors have indeed remarked that there seemed to be some kind of commu-
nity structure in the interbank network they analyzed. For example, Boss
et al. (2004) note that the Austrian interbank network shows a hierarchical
community structure that mirrors the regional and sectoral organization of
the Austrian banking system. Soramäki et al. (2007) show that the network
includes a tightly connected core of money-center banks to which all other
banks connect. Thus there is some form of tiering in the interbank market.
The empirical ﬁndings of Cocco et al. (2009) also show that relationships
between banks are important factors to explain diﬀerences in interest rates.
Identifying communities in networks is an important aspect and in this paper
we are concerned with the identiﬁcation of the set of arguably systemically
important (core) banks. In order to do so, we estimate various versions
of core-periphery models in the spirit of Borgatti and Everett (2000). The
basic idea is that a network can be divided into subgroups of core and periph-
ery members, where the core (periphery) banks are maximally (minimally)
connected to each other. To our knowledge, Craig and von Peter (2010) is
the ﬁrst and so far only contribution applying a core-periphery structure to
the German interbank market. In this paper, we applied the (unrestricted)
discrete core-periphery model, the (restricted) tiering model due to Craig
and von Peter (2010) as well as symmetric and asymmetric versions of a
1. General Introduction 13
continuous core-periphery model (hitherto not applied to interbank data)
to the Italian interbank data. We ﬁnd that a core-periphery structure pro-
vides a better ﬁt for these interbank data than alternative network models.
The identiﬁed core shows a high degree of persistence over time, consisting
of roughly 28% of all banks before the global ﬁnancial crisis and 23% after-
wards. Quite interestingly, other standard community ﬁnding approaches are
unable to identify other community structures. We can classify the majority
of core banks as intermediaries, i.e. as banks both borrowing and lending
money in the market. Furthermore, allowing for asymmetric `coreness' with
respect to lending and borrowing activity considerably improves the ﬁt, and
reveals more concentration in borrowing than lending activity of money cen-
ter banks. We also shed light on the development during the ﬁnancial crisis
of 2008, ﬁnding that the reduction of interbank lending was mainly due to
core banks' reducing their numbers of active outgoing links.
The general conclusion is that preferential lending relationships at the
micro-level lead to hierarchical structure at the macro-level. The ﬁndings
carry important policy implications, e.g. is has been shown that a disassor-
tative core-periphery framework might be more robust in `normal' times, but
more fragile under exceptional circumstances when key nodes are under stress
or withdraw from the market. In this sense, the `coreness' translates to a
certain extent into `systemic relevance' of individual institutions.38 Addition-
ally, we argue that such network approaches allow to reduce the complexity
of interbank data sets in a number of ways. For example, the goodness-of-ﬁt
of the core-periphery framework can be seen as an indicator of money market
stress.
Chapter 6 moves on from the ﬁnding that it is impossible to identify
other community structures than the core-periphery partition. Here we
aimed at analyzing the trading strategies of individual institutions in more
detail. Splitting the dataset into half-yearly subsamples, we used the (intra-)
daily net trading volumes of the individual institutions as the trading strate-
gies and analyzed the correlations between them.39 We ﬁnd evidence for
signiﬁcant and persistent bilateral correlations between institutions' trading
strategies. In most semesters there are two anti-correlated clusters of trad-
ing strategies, indicating that banks tend to trade preferentially with banks
from the other cluster.40 This result is not only in line with the existence of
preferential relationships, but also with herding phenomena in banks' trading
strategies. Interestingly, the information whether a bank is a continuous net
38 See also Markose et al. (2010).
39 See Kyriakopoulos et al. (2009) for a similar approach.
40 Zovko and Farmer (2007) performed a similar analysis for the trading of members in
the London Stock Exchange.
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buyer or net seller appears to be the only deﬁning characteristic for its group
membership in this anonymous dataset. This is in contrast to the ﬁndings
of Iori et al. (2007), who performed a very similar analysis for the sample
period 1999-2002, and found the two clusters containing mostly large and
small banks, respectively. Overall, the ﬁndings are quite persistent over time
and appear to be largely unaﬀected by the GFC.
These ﬁndings add further evidence on the fact that preferential lending
relationships on the micro-level lead to community structure on the macro-
level. In this sense, trading on the e-MID platform appears to be a relatively
structured process in terms of trading strategies. Given that each trade
involves two counterparties, i.e. a buying and a selling side, it may appear
trivial that we identify the two clusters. However, the high level of persistence
shows that most banks tend to have rather stable trading strategies over time,
since they tend to appear in the same cluster over time, trading with the same
counterparties.
All of the presented work is just a ﬁrst step in describing and understand-
ing the structure of the interbank network in more detail. We are still at the
beginning of understanding individual bank behavior, which is crucial for the
complex aggregate dynamics. Building realistic ABMs of the ﬁnancial sys-
tem, however, involves more detailed knowledge about the universality of our
ﬁndings. As argued above, ﬁnancial institutions are exposed to each other
in a variety of markets, of which the interbank market is just one segment.
Future research should aim at mapping the complete ﬁnancial system. Only
after understanding the structure and dynamics, it will be possible to make
reliable policy recommendations for regulating (and possibly restructuring)
the ﬁnancial system. I plan to contribute to this proposal in a number of
future research projects.
1.2.3 Contributions
Here I brieﬂy describe my contribution to the individual chapters.
• Chapter 2: This paper is joint work with Thomas Lux and the result
of extensive discussions between the two of us. Professor Lux came up
with the idea to model informed traders in the spirit of Youssefmir et
al. (1998). The technical implementation, simulation, analysis, and
most of the writing, were done by myself.
• Chapter 3: This paper is joint work with Karl Finger and Thomas Lux.
The technical implementation and the writing, usually resulting from
extensive discussions with Professor Lux, were mostly done by Karl
and myself.
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• Chapter 4: This paper is joint work with Thomas Lux. The technical
implementation and the writing, again based on extensive discussions
with Professor Lux, were done by myself.
• Chapter 5: This paper is joint work with Thomas Lux. He provided the
basic idea of applying the core-periphery framework to the dataset. I
came up with the idea to estimate both the restricted and unrestricted
discrete models and the continuous models, which has not been done
so far. The technical part was all done by myself, writing and editing
was shared roughly equally. Mattia Montagna helped creating one of
the network pictures.
• Chapter 6: All the work in this paper was done by myself.
Part I
FINANCIAL TRANSACTION TAX AND
AGENT-BASED MODELLING
2. THE EFFECTS OF A FINANCIAL TRANSACTION TAX
IN AN ARTIFICIAL FINANCIAL MARKET
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2.1 Introduction and Existing Literature
For several decades the ﬁnancial transaction tax (FTT) has been dis-
cussed as an instrument to curb ﬁnancial market volatility.1 Only recently
-given the surging government deﬁcits from responses to the global ﬁnancial
crisis- the focus has shifted to the FTT's large potential monetary revenues.2
In this paper we investigate the eﬀects of a FTT in an agent-based artiﬁcial
ﬁnancial market.
The FTT's appeal stems from its potential to limit short-term specu-
lative behavior, and thus transaction volumes, on ﬁnancial markets. This
seems a reasonable aim given the divergence of ﬁnancial market and `real'
activity during the last decades, when increases in ﬁnancial market transac-
tion volumes continuously exceeded those of the real economy. The expo-
nential growth of ﬁnancial transaction volumes was fueled by a continuous
fall in transaction costs for many assets due to the technological progress
in computer-based trading and an increased competition between stock ex-
changes. One result of this development is the increased presence of so-called
high-frequency trading (HFT), which is predominantly employed by large
hedge funds and essentially represents the modern version of market mak-
ing.3 Unfortunately, higher liquidity4 seems to have come along with higher
fragility in the sense that ﬁnancial crises, i.e. the bursting of speculative
bubbles, became more likely.5 In this way, a FTT that favors longer-term
investments could have the eﬀect of reducing the decoupling of ﬁnancial mar-
ket from real activity and additionally free resources from the ﬁnancial sector
for more productive uses.
Critics of the FTT, most importantly from the ﬁnancial industry, usually
bring forward the following arguments: (1) market liquidity will dry up, (2)
volatility may thereby in fact increase, (3) banks will pass on the tax burden
to ﬁrms and other bank customers, raising capital costs in general, and (4)
1 The ﬁrst proposal for a general FTT was made by John Maynard Keynes (see Keynes
(1936), Chapter 12). James Tobin's proposal of what has hitherto been christianed Tobin-
tax, referred to currency markets, see Tobin (1978).
2 These revenues are estimated to range between 1 and 3% of national GDPs. See, e.g.
Pollin et al. (2003).
3 We should note, however, that many economists actually favor HFT, since the in-
creased liquidity should make markets more resilient. See Brogaard (2010) for an empirical
assessment.
4 Liquidity is the ability to trade large size quickly, at low costs, see Harris (2003).
5 Bordo et al. (2001) ﬁnd that the frequency of crises since 1973 has been double that
of the Bretton Woods and classical gold standard periods. Two important explanatory
factors are ﬁnancial globalization and safety nets encouraging ﬁnancial institutions to take
on higher risks.
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there is a danger of capital ﬂights from a taxed market towards untaxed
markets. In this paper we are concerned with the ﬁrst two (interrelated)
points.6
High liquidity, i.e. small transaction costs, fuels excess volatility7 (com-
pared to 'fundamentals') as it makes round-trips relatively cheap. Empirical
evidence veriﬁes that FTTs, despite applying for all market participants,
harm short-term speculators disproportionately more. For example, it has
been found that an increase of a transaction tax has increased asset hold-
ing periods, while transaction volumes have decreased.8 However, this does
not imply that volatility will decrease as well. In theory, there should be a
U-shaped relationship: for small tax rates volatility should decrease, since
(destabilizing) short-term oriented speculation becomes unproﬁtable. How-
ever, larger tax rates will aﬀect (stabilizing) longer-term strategies as well,
thereby reducing liquidity and potentially increasing volatility. Empirical ev-
idence on point (2) is therefore rather mixed: some studies ﬁnd that volatility
decreases, increases or does not react at all in response to a tax increase.9
Given these contradicting results, simulations of artiﬁcial ﬁnancial mar-
kets are a promising way to non-invasively evaluate the eﬀects of regula-
tory measures in general. Numerous agent-based models, usually within the
chartist-fundamentalist framework as in e.g. Kirman (1991, 1993) and Lux
(1995), are able to replicate many of the stylized facts characterizing ﬁnan-
cial market data.10 When used to evaluate regulatory policies, however,
crucial (simplifying) assumptions concerning agents' behavior and market
microstructure should aﬀect the results. For example, many authors assume
that a market-maker provides inﬁnite liquidity, in which case FTTs are po-
tentially stabilizing for small tax rates. For a single asset market, see Ehren-
stein (2002) and Westerhoﬀ (2003, 2004a). However, Giardina and Bouchaud
(2003b) ﬁnd that only substantial trading costs will actually stabilize the
market, while a small tax (of the order of a few basis points) would have no
6 In future research we are planning to deal with point (4) as well. This could be done
by having two markets and imposing the tax only on one of them.
7 See Shiller (1981).
8 See Jackson and O'Donnell (1985) and Baltagi et al. (2006). For example Baltagi et
al. (2006) ﬁnd that a tax increase from 0.3 to 0.5% reduced trading volume in China by
roughly 1/3.
9 See, e.g. Jones and Seguin (1997), Hau (2006) and Roll (1989), respectively.
10 An early example is Beja and Goldman (1980). See also LeBaron et al. (1999),
Challet and Zhang (1997), Chiarella and Iori (2002), Lux and Marchesi (1999, 2000), Lux
and Schornstein (2005), Raberto et al. (2003) and Chiarella et al. (2009). See e.g. Allen
and Taylor (1990) and Menkhoﬀ (1998) for empirical evidence on the use of chartist and
fundamentalist strategies, respectively.
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real eﬀect.11 However, since liquidity is a major determinant of volatility in
real markets,12 it is crucial when discussing the eﬀects of FTTs. Therefore
we explicitly take the microstructure of real markets and provision of liq-
uidity into account by simulating an order-driven continuous double-auction
(CDA).
While the models based on the marker-maker setting usually incorpo-
rate important psychological factors that drive the system's properties, e.g.
through herding and imitation, CDA models usually work at shorter time-
scales where psychological factors are either hard to model or simply assumed
to be absent. For example, Bak et al. (1997)13 treat the limit order book
(LOB) as a system of particles with each particle (order) having a mass (or-
der size) and a price (spatial position). Price variations stem from diﬀusion
and annihilation of particles, well-known processes in physics, which allows
to obtain analytical results. Even though many important insights can be
gained from such approaches, the usual criticism is that these models op-
erate within a zero intelligence framework.14 This is the exact opposite to
`homo oeconomicus' in mainstream economics, but traders are unlikely to be
either fully rational or plainly stupid. Another problem is that, by avoid-
ing detailed behavioral assumptions, these models typically ignore budget
constraints and wealth dynamics. Nevertheless, since these models are able
to replicate certain stylized facts of LOB data, the structure of the trading
protocol is likely to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the data-generating process.
To date, few attempts have been made to model the LOB based on de-
tailed strategic interactions between many boundedly rational agents, while
incorporating economic constraints.15 Our model aims at bridging the gap
between models with short and long time-scales.
To our knowledge, only few studies dealt with FTTs in detailed order-
driven markets. Two examples are Mannaro et al. (2008) and Pellizzari
and Westerhoﬀ (2009). Mannaro et al. (2008) use a zero intelligence frame-
11 For two ex-ante identical markets, with one country unilaterally introducing the tax,
Westerhoﬀ (2004b) ﬁnds that the taxed market is stabilized while volatility in the tax
haven strongly increases. For markets of diﬀerent size, Hanke et al. (2010) conclude that
if the tax is introduced in the large (small) market, volatility decreases (increases) there.
12 See Mike and Farmer (2008).
13 See also Maslov (2000) and Challet and Stinchcombe (2001).
14 See Cliﬀ and Bruten (1997). Interestingly, Gode and Sunder (1993) were the ﬁrst
to introduce the zero intelligence framework in a trading setup. The authors show that
the double auction mechanism ensures allocative eﬃciency irrespective of the level of
rationality of the agents.
15 To our knowledge, Chiarella and Iori (2002) were the ﬁrst to incorporate trading strate-
gies into a CDA setup. The authors state that without these strategies, it is impossible
to generate realistic time-series. See also Chiarella et al. (2009).
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work combined with a once-a-day supply-demand based market-clearing rule,
deleting all orders not executed during the clearing session and thus strongly
limiting their impact. In this setting the FTT is found to be destabiliz-
ing. Pellizzari and Westerhoﬀ (2009) compare the eﬀects of the FTT in
diﬀerent market settings. The main ﬁnding is that the FTT destabilizes a
CDA market, while it stabilizes a dealership market where specialists pro-
vide abundant liquidity. However, these studies suﬀer from the assumption
that all agents act with equal probability, i.e. they neglect the importance of
investment horizons.16 In this way, the FTT's eﬀect of more severe taxation
of short-term speculation is missed.17 Furthermore, possible adjustments of
agents' trading strategies in response to the FTT are often missing or at
least strongly limited. We incorporate learning of agents as well. Another
novelty compared to the existing literature is that the limit orders in our
model emerge from a rule-based decision process, rather than from a pure
zero intelligence framework.
In our model two groups of agents compete in the market: Noise traders
act as liquidity providers, by posting random orders. Informed traders use
information about past prices and the fundamental value when forming their
price expectations. As in Youssefmir et al. (1998), their price expectations
depend on three diﬀerent time horizons (see Figure 2.1): the investment
horizon (denoted by Hw) basically deﬁnes how often a particular agent acts
and how long his planning horizon is when making investment decisions.
Two diﬀerent trend horizons model the trend chasing behavior of agents:
the backward trend horizon (Hb) deﬁnes how many past price observations
are relevant when calculating the trend. The forward trend horizon (H t)
deﬁnes how long the agent expects his calculated trend to last before the
price will start returning to the fundamental value. This setting is very
ﬂexible concerning the strategies and we essentially allow for all combinations
of time horizons within a certain set. Most importantly, the relative size of
forward trend and investment horizon deﬁnes whether an agent is a chartist,
a fundamentalist or something in between.18
In order to endogenize agents' strategies, we employ a Genetic Algorithm
(GA). GAs constitute a class of search, adaptation and optimization tech-
niques based on the principles of natural evolution. In this way, switches be-
16 The importance of time-scales is a relatively recent research topic. See for example
Zumbach and Lynch (2001) and Borland and Bouchaud (2005).
17 See Anufriev and Bottazzi (2004) for the importance of investment horizons. In an
inﬁnite-liquidity model, Demary (2010) incorporates investment horizons and ﬁnds that
investment horizons increase for small tax rates.
18 Below, we will impose symmetry between the trend horizons, i.e. set Hb = Ht.
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tween strategies depend upon the relative strength of each strategy.19 Conse-
quently, the GA allows us to characterize the `optimal' (time-varying) strate-
gies for diﬀerent tax rates, where we are mainly interested in the adjustments
in investment horizons.
Fig. 2.1: Time-horizons in the model. In order to reduce the com-
plexity of the model, we will set Hb = Ht in the following.
More details can be found below.
Our main conclusions can be summarized as follows: First, the model
is able to replicate certain stylized facts of real ﬁnancial time-series for sev-
eral parameter combinations, e.g. the model replicates the building up and
bursting of price bubbles. Second, for both ﬁxed and ﬂexible behavioral
strategies, we ﬁnd the usual trade-oﬀ between monetary revenues (a kind of
Laﬀer curve) and stability, as higher tax revenues come along with higher
volatility. This ﬁnding is in line with the results from the existing literature.
However, we ﬁnd somewhat diﬀerent results for very small and large tax
rates, indicating that the eﬀects of the tax may not be entirely negative. In
any case, the tax allows to generate substantial tax revenues, which could be
used for a number of productive purposes.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 intro-
duces the structure of the model. Section 2.3 presents pseudo-empirical re-
sults and Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 CDA and Information
The basic model structure is as follows: the ﬁnancial market consists of
N heterogenous agents trading one asset (which pays no dividend and has
19 See Lux and Schornstein (2005). Our usage of the GA allows to analyze the evolution
of investment strategies on a micro-level. See LeBaron et al. (1999), Lux and Marchesi
(1999, 2000) as well.
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ﬁxed supply) against cash. Cash earns zero interest, so there are no interest
payments (or they are spent elsewhere). The market is order-driven and the
quoted price pt (midprice) is the average of the best ask (a1) and best bid
(b1) in the limit-order book (LOB), while a1 − b1 > 0 is the bid-ask spread.
In case there are no orders in the LOB, the quoted price is simply the last
quoted price. Prices are discrete and can only be submitted on a speciﬁed
grid, deﬁned by the tick-size ∆.20
We simulate a CDA market, where two types of orders exist: a market or-
der speciﬁes to buy or sell a certain amount of the asset at the best available
price. A limit order additionally speciﬁes a limit price at which the agent is
still willing to trade. In general, market orders are guaranteed execution but
not price, since with a market order a trader is assured that it will be exe-
cuted against the best price in the LOB within a short amount of time. Limit
orders, on the other hand are guaranteed price but not execution as they will
only be executed at, or below (above) for buy (sell) orders, the speciﬁed
price which may never happen if no matching order is found. Each trans-
action involves a market order transacting against an existing limit order.
Generally speaking, patient investors are more likely to place limit orders,
while impatient investors place market orders. The price of immediacy is
simply the bid-ask spread. Thus, choosing a limit price is a strategic deci-
sion that induces a trade-oﬀ between patience and (expected) proﬁt.21 The
price dynamics within the LOB are therefore driven by three forces: limit
order arrivals, market order arrivals (i.e. trades) and cancellations of limit
orders.22
Table 2.1 illustrates the structure of the CDA: Buy orders are stored on
the bid side (left), while sell orders are on the ask side (right). The two
relevant features are price-priority and time-priority. Price-priority means
that the best orders are placed on top of the book, i.e. the order with the
highest bid price (best bid) and the order with the lowest ask price (best
ask). Obviously, orders stored in the LOB cannot be executed immediately:
in the example, the best bid (100.50) is smaller than the best ask (101.50)
such that currently no trade is possible. Time-priority means that, after
providing price-priority, orders with the same limit price are sorted according
to submission date.23 Therefore the best bid is placed above the second best
20 In the future, it might be interesting to look at the eﬀects of tick size changes in
the market. It has been shown that the eﬀects of tick size changes are more subtle than
previously thought, see e.g. Ahn et al. (1996) and La Spada et al. (2011).
21 See Harris and Hasbrouck (1996).
22 There is a growing literature on the stylized facts of LOB data, see e.g. Bouchaud et
al. (2002), Farmer et al. (2004), and Mike and Farmer (2008).
23 Another alternative would be price-size priority, where large orders enjoy priority.
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Bid Ask
Price Quantity Time Price Quantity Time
100.50 20 12:38:39 101.50 10 12:15:01
100.50 10 12:42:08 105.00 5 12:28:40
95.60 8 12:10:52 110.50 10 09:01:05
87.90 5 10:15:23 125.50 8 12:40:18
Tab. 2.1: Example for a LOB at a certain point in time.
bid (with the same limit price), since it was submitted earlier to the LOB. In
the example the quoted price would be a1+b1
2
= 101.00. Note however, that
this quoted price is just a proxy for the price of an immediate transaction:
For example, assume there arrives a new sell order with a quantity of 25 and
limit price 100.00. In this case the order is marketable, such that the oﬀered
25 assets are sold at a price of 100.00, which diﬀers from the quoted price of
101.00.24
Despite disregarding dividends,25 we assume that the fundamental value
pf of the asset is positive and follows a geometric Brownian motion of the
form
pft+1 = p
f
t e(µt+1) (2.1)
where the noise term µt is iiN(0, σµ), σµ ≥ 0 is the corresponding volatility
and e(·) is the exponential function. In the following, we will set σµ = 0 for
simplicity and thus assume a constant fundamental value.26 Only informed
agents know the fundamental value, whereas the state of the LOB and the
Although no major exchange currently uses price-size priority, Nasdaq currently conducts
research in this direction.
24 Note how time- and price-priority favor the buying agent, i.e. the trade initiator, in
the Example: He submitted a limit price of 100.50 but only pays 100.00.
25 Dividend payments are negligible on a short-term basis, since they are only paid once a
year and usually only have a small eﬀect on wealth. Ignoring dividend payments simpliﬁes
the analysis, since (without the FTT and with cash earning zero interest) the total wealth
is constant. With a positive tax rate, however, the total amount of cash will be decreasing
over time. Therefore, we redistribute tax revenues equally among all agents for positive
tax rates to keep the total wealth constant.
26 We model trading dynamics on very short time-scales where the fundamental value is
unlikely to change signiﬁcantly. Furthermore, this assumption makes it possible to ignore
adverse selection problems due to news arrival. As long as the fundamental volatility is
relatively small (compared to the volatility of noise traders expectations), this does not
aﬀect the qualitative results. In the future it would be interesting to incorporate discrete
jumps of the fundamental value to make the model more realistic.
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history of the quoted prices are public information.27 Each agent is initially
endowed with Si0 = Ns assets and C
i
0 = Nsp0 units of cash. We impose
short-selling and capital constraints, such that Sit , C
i
t ≥ 0 for all t, i.28
2.2.2 Trader Types
Two groups of traders, diﬀering in the way they form their price expecta-
tions and choose their limit prices, compete in the market: there is a fraction
θ ∈ [0, 1] of informed traders and a fraction (1 − θ) of noise traders. Hence
there are Nθ = Nθ informed and (N −Nθ) noise traders.29 Each agent acts
once every Hw,i time-steps on average, which we model based on Poisson
waiting times with expected value Hw,i individually for each agent.30 Sub-
mitted orders will remain at most Hw,i time-steps in the LOB, after which
the orders will be removed. In section 2.2.4 we will introduce another channel
for the cancellation of the noise traders' orders.
One general point worth mentioning is that all agents act strategically
in terms of their order submission. This means that all agents create two
orders, where the ﬁrst order (with corresponding limit price p(1)) is always
being sent to the LOB, while the submission of the second order (limit price
p(2)) depends on whether the ﬁrst order was fully executed.31 For example,
an agent buying the asset today will try to sell it again at a higher price later
on. Quite interestingly, while this `buy-low/sell-high' framework is straight-
forward and incorporates the aim of wealth/utility maximization, we do not
know of a single study dealing with these conditional (take-proﬁt) orders
within a simulation model.
Noise Traders
Noise traders are usually assumed to trade for personal but not for spec-
ulative reasons. In our setting, noise traders have random price expectations
and act as liquidity providers in order to preclude no-trade situations. Noise
traders' limit prices are chosen randomly around the current best bids and
27 Of course, 'true' fundamentals are unobservable in reality. Another interesting feature
would be to model costly acquisition of the fundamental value.
28 This assumption obviously aﬀects the admissible range of order sizes, see Section 2.2.3.
29 Liquidity providers would be another possible label for the group of noise traders. The
term noise traders however, emphasizes the random nature of those agents random limit
price determination.
30 Thus the probability of a particular agent being chosen equals (Hw,i)−1. Agents with
relatively small investment horizons are thus acting more frequently than those with longer
horizons.
31 In real markets the second order corresponds to a take-proﬁt order.
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asks according to
p(k) = pt e(
k
t ), (2.2)
with k = 1, 2 and  denoting iiN(0, σ) random numbers, with σ > 0,
independent of µ (the fundamental increments).32 With this approach, we
directly obtain two limit prices, p(1) for the ﬁrst (unconditional) order and
and p(2) for the second (conditional) take-proﬁt order. Based on these limit
prices, we identify the market side that the trader acts upon by comparing
the limit prices, as we impose that their orders should not create a sure loss,
i.e. the agent buys ﬁrst and sells later if p(2) > p(1), or the agent sells ﬁrst
and buys later if p(2) < p(1).33 Note that we could make the distribution
of  explicitly dependent on other variables, for example positively related
to the historical volatility of returns. This type of volatility feedback, i.e.
having noise traders choose their limit prices from a broader distribution
when historical volatility is large, would then for example generate volatility
clustering mechanically (see Section 2.3.1).34 However, given that we are
more interested in the behavior of informed traders and their eﬀect on the
system's properties, we are reluctant to impose this feedback and hold σ
constant in the following.35
We would like to stress here that we incorporate noise traders as liquidity
providers in our model, since, as will become clear in the next section, it
is possible that many of the informed traders appear on the same market
side. Thus, noise traders provide liquidity when the informed agents are not
willing to do so or at least not suﬃciently to generate trades (and hence price
changes).36 Given the random structure of their limit prices, noise traders
32 Furthermore, we assume that σ > σµ. This assumption ensures some form of excess
volatility, where σ is essentially a scaling parameter for the return distribution.
33 In everything that follows, we treat market orders as limit orders with limit prices
equal to the best opposite price (marketable limit orders). For example, an agent will
submit a buy limit price at most equal to the best ask. This assumption simpliﬁes taking
into account budget constraints at order submission, since otherwise the trading price
would be uncertain.
34 For example, the noise traders in Raberto et al. (2003) are constructed exactly in
such a way, i.e. in their model informed traders are not necessary to reproduce volatility
clustering and excess kurtosis. However, this is a very `direct' way to guarantee volatility
clustering in a model. It is not clear why agents should behave like this and there is in
fact some evidence that past price volatility tends to lead the arrival of limit orders, see
Zovko and Farmer (2002).
35 Note that since the width of the distribution is ﬁxed, noise traders are more likely to
submit market orders when the spread is small, while they are more likely to submit limit
orders when the spread is large. This is in line with empirical ﬁndings, e.g. Biais et al.
(1995), Bae et al.(2003), and Foucault et al. (2005).
36 Note that, in contrast to other studies, we ﬁnd that many of the stylized facts cannot
be easily replicated using noise traders alone.
2. Financial Transaction Tax 27
tend to lose money to the informed traders on average, in particular when
there are pronounced trends. A relatively small number of noise traders is
already suﬃcient for the model to work. However, particularly in case that
the GA is deactivated, with such a small number of noise traders the gener-
ated bubbles appear relatively smooth, such that prices and returns would
be autocorrelated. Therefore, θ will not be too large during the simulations.
Informed Traders: Chartists and Fundamentalists
Price Expectations. Whether an informed agent buys or sells the asset de-
pends on his expectation of the asset's future price at the end of his in-
vestment horizon. When forming price expectations, informed traders use
information about past prices and fundamental values. Expectations evolve,
following Youssefmir et al. (1998), as
dpˆit+τ
dτ
= − pˆ
i
t+τ−1 − pft
H t,i
+
(
T it +
pt − pft
H t,i
)
e
(
− τ
H t,i
)
, (2.3)
where pˆit is agent i's expected price at t, T
i
t is the calculated trend and H
t,i
is the forward trend horizon over which agent i expects the trend to last.
The trend itself is an weighted average rate of price changes over a backward
horizon Hb,i of the form
T it =
1
Hb,i
∫ t
t0
dp
dτ
e
(
−t− τ
Hb,i
)
dτ, (2.4)
where dp is the price change between (t− τ) and t and Hb,i is the backward
trend horizon of i. As noted by Youssefmir et al. (1998), Eq. (2.4) can
be integrated as T it =
pt−〈pt〉Hb,i
Hb,i
, where 〈pt〉Hb,i is the exponential average
price over the horizon Hb,i. Thus the trend measures the deviation from
the moving average of prices, which is a popular approach among technical
analysts.
The evolution of trends can be obtained by taking the time derivative of
Eq. (2.4) which yields
dT it
dt
=
1
Hb,i
(
dp
dt
− T it
)
. (2.5)
Subject to the boundary condition pˆit = pt, each agent formulates his ex-
pected price development over the next Hw,i time-steps via Eq. (2.3) using
the calculated trend from Eq. (2.5). This system incorporates, depending
on the corresponding horizons, chartist and fundamentalist components. In
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principle, all agents are fundamentalists in the sense that for Hw,i → ∞
(given H t,i) the expected price will collapse towards the fundamental value.
As agents do not have inﬁnite investment horizons in general, the relative
magnitude of H t,i to Hw,i matters: agents with a small value of H t,i/Hw,i
can be considered as fundamentalists, a large value indicates a more chartist
strategy, and intermediate values are a combination of both. We should stress
already here that we found heterogeneity in Hb to be of minor importance
compared to Hw and H t. Therefore, in everything that follows, we simply
take Hb,i = H t,i for all agents. Note that this substantially reduces the total
number of strategies.
Technically, the nonlinear price expectations are inﬂuenced by three terms:
ﬁrst, agents expect the observed trend and the diﬀerence between price and
fundamental value to continue in the near term (this is the second part on the
right-hand side of Eq. (2.3)). However, the inﬂuence of this term decreases
for increasing τ (and hence for large Hw,i). Second, via the decreasing im-
pact of the calculated trend, the agent expects the price to eventually relax
towards the fundamental value at a rate of − pˆit−pft
Ht,i
. Note that fundamental-
ism is deﬁned in terms of the expected price at the end of the investment
horizon, but a fundamentalist may nevertheless try to make a proﬁt based
on short-term trends.
Fig. 2.2: Example: Development of expected price for diﬀerent for-
ward trend horizons, T it = 1, H
w,i = 500, pt = 110 and
pft = 100.
In the following, a discretized version (i.e. dt = dτ = 1) of Eqs. (2.3)
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and (2.5) will be employed. This produces a time-series of the expected price
development for each agent. As an example, consider Figure 2.2 which plots,
for diﬀerent forward trend horizons, the expected price development of an
agent with T it = 1 and an investment horizon of 500. The current price is 110
and the fundamental value equals 100. Obviously, for relatively small trend
horizons the agent expects the price to revert towards the fundamental value
soon. For larger trend horizons, the agent expects the trend to last in the
near term but the price to revert towards the fundamental value at the end
of his planning period. For very large trend horizons, this no longer holds.
Consequently there is a low level of speculation for small trend horizons, in
which case the dynamics are dominated by the ﬁrst term in Eq. (2.3).
Note that this way of modelling informed agents implies that all of them
are trend-followers, at least to some extent. This clearly aﬀects the autocor-
relation of prices and returns and makes the (in-)eﬃciency of the market a
serious issue, at least when the fraction of informed traders is not too small.37
We will comment on this in more detail below.
Limit Prices. The limit price determination of informed agents can be split
into three parts: In the ﬁrst part the agent uses Eqs. (2.3) and (2.5) to
forecast the evolution of the midprice between t and t + Hw,i. In case the
agent expects the price to be higher (lower) than the current price he will
submit a buy (sell) order. The limit prices of this order and the corresponding
conditional order depend on the expected development of the price between
t and t+Hw,i.
In the second step, the agent uses information about the midprice and
a proxy for the expected price volatility to form more detailed expectations
about the best bid and ask over time. As proxy for the expected price
volatility, we use the average distance between the current best and second
best prices on the two market sides.38 This is calculated as
σˆit =
((a2 − a1) + (b1 − b2))
2
, (2.6)
where a2 and b2 denote the second best ask and bid prices, respectively. In
37 In an earlier version of the paper, we mitigated this problem, by allowing informed
traders to employ a contrarian strategy, i.e. to use −T it rather than T it in Eq. (2.3)
with some probability (see Giardina and Bouchaud (2003a) as well). As it turned out,
the structure of the system made contrarian behavior very proﬁtable, so that the price
eventually collapsed towards the fundamental value and remained there during the rest of
the simulation.
38 The motivation for using the average gap is based on the ﬁnding that large price
changes are in fact due to gaps in the LOB, see e.g. Farmer et al. (2004) and Farmer and
Lillo (2004).
2. Financial Transaction Tax 30
this view, the average price change due to immediate market orders wiping
out the best prices on either market side is being calculated. Note that this
is the only channel in our model where (informed) traders use higher-order
information on limit prices. We leave it to future research to model the
information usage of LOB data in more detail.
Equipped with expectations about the midprice, the corresponding price
volatility, and the decision to buy or sell from the ﬁrst step, the agent then
chooses his limit prices as follows: Deﬁning
pˆimax = max{pˆt:τ :t+Hw,i}
pˆimin = min{pˆt:τ :t+Hw,i} (2.7)
gives the maximum and minimum of the expected midprice over the invest-
ment horizon of agent i. For an initial buy order, the agent then has to
decide between buying the asset right away using a market order with price
a1 or setting a limit order at the minimum expected ask, i.e. pˆ
i
min + 0.5σˆ.
Quite intuitively, he will choose the minimum of the two, in order to take
favorable future developments into account. Therefore, if he expects the best
ask to drop signiﬁcantly below the current value in the near future, he will
submit a limit order with a price below the current best ask. For the limit
price of the conditional sell order the agent has to decide between the maxi-
mum expected bid, i.e. pˆimax − 0.5σˆit and the expected bid at the end of his
investment horizon, and naturally takes the maximum of the two. Similar
arguments can be used for the case of an initial sell order. More formally,
the strategies of ﬁnding limit prices can be written as follows:
Deﬁnition 1. Buy limit prices: pˆt+Hw,i > pt.
p(1) = bi = min(a1, pˆ
i
min + 0.5σˆ
i
t)
p(2) = ai = max(pˆimax − 0.5σˆit, pˆt+Hw,i − 0.5σˆit).
(2.8)
Deﬁnition 2. Sell limit prices: pˆt+Hw,i < pt.
p(1) = ai = max(b1, pˆ
i
max − 0.5σˆit)
p(2) = bi = min(pˆimin + 0.5σˆ
i
t, pˆt+Hw,i + 0.5σˆ
i
t).
(2.9)
With this deﬁnition it may happen, in particular for large spreads, small
trends and/or small deviations from the fundamental value, that the two
limit prices are not in line with the agents' price expectations. For example,
an agent with an expected price increase might end up with limit prices
p(1) > p(2). To ensure consistency, such orders will not be submitted to the
LOB.
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Figure 2.3 illustrates the concept for a sell order: Again the current price
is equal to 110 and the fundamental value equals 100. The investment hori-
zon is Hw,i = 500. The expected price at the end of the investment horizon
is below the current price, therefore the agent will ﬁrst sell the asset and
try to buy it back at a lower price. Since the agent expects a positive trend
to continue in the near term, pˆimax exceeds the current price, while pˆ
i
min co-
incides with pˆt+Hw,i . Given his risk aversion, he places a sell order with
limit price ai = pˆimax − 0.5σit and a conditional buy order with limit price
bi = pˆt+Hw,i + 0.5σ
i
t. The expected return (after tax) of the agent equals
re = | ln(p(2)/p(1))| − χ, with χ denoting the two-sided tax rate.
Fig. 2.3: Example: Limit price determination for a sell order.
Price Bubbles and FTT. At this point, a brief explanation on the building
up and bursting of price bubbles, and their relation to the FTT, is in order:39
At the beginning of the simulation, random strategies are assigned to the in-
formed traders. Thus, approximately half of the population is willing to buy
the asset while the other half is willing to sell. In any case, the price will move
either upwards or downwards. Suppose it moves upwards, then the trend sig-
nals of informed agents with high-frequency strategies will turn positive. This
39 See Giardina and Bouchaud (2003b) for a similar explanation.
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can be the beginning of the bubble, where exactly those traders induce ad-
ditional positive price changes through their positive demand, which in turn
aﬀects the calculated trend variables of lower-frequency traders. Thus, the
buy pressure increases even more, where the sellers of the asset are informed
agents using fundamentalist strategies or noise traders. The larger the dis-
tortion between price and fundamental value, the more fragile the bubble
becomes: ﬁrst, the buying power of potential buyers decreases due to the
higher price and lower amount of cash available. This implies that the trend
signals of high-frequency traders become smaller, possibly even turning nega-
tive. A random negative shock, induced by a fundamentalist trader or a noise
trader, raises the possibility of a sudden downturn, where again the trend
signals of lower-frequency traders follow those of the high-frequency traders.
In this case a negative bubble may appear and the described process starts
again, however now with negative signs.
This description of a bubble process also clariﬁes the arguments favoring
a FTT: High-frequency oriented chartists have an incentive to create bubbles,
since trend-following strategies are only proﬁtable when there is some trend
to follow. These traders are also the ﬁrst to leave the sinking ship when the
bubble bursts, again amplifying the negative trend. This is particularly true
for high-frequency strategies which would be very costly when the buy/sell
signal is constantly wrong. Thus, with a large proportion of fundamental
traders in the population, the initial bubble might not even build up. The
FTT should be one way to increase the proportion of fundamentalists, as
it reduces the proﬁtability of marginally proﬁtable trades in the ﬁrst place.
In this way, it should lower the frequency of 'false' signals appearing in the
system. In Section 2.3 we will discuss the eﬀects of such a tax within our
model.
2.2.3 Asset Demand
Any (limit) order is a commitment to trade (at most) a certain quantity
at the speciﬁed limit price. In this part, we focus on the determination of
the order sizes. While deﬁning a strategy that maps price expectations into
order sizes appears to be a trivial task, our imposed short-selling and budget
constraints complicate things considerably.40 In our setting all agents are
initially endowed with the same level and composition of wealth. The wealth
of agent i at time t is simply W it = ptS
i
t +C
i
t and his wealth at the next date
is W it+1 = pt+1S
i
t +C
i
t = W
i
t + dptS
i
t . Therefore, given the price expectations
of the agent, the trading behavior reduces to an optimization problem with
40 See Franke and Asada (2008).
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respect to the asset holdings Sit .
As future price developments are uncertain, we assume agents to be risk-
averse. To some extent, this risk-aversion is reﬂected in the determination of
the informed agents' limit prices in Eqs. (2.8-2.9), but should also be present
in the choice of the order sizes. The usual approach in the literature is to
either use some form of utility maximization (often CARA or CRRA utility
functions)41, to use random order sizes42, or use rules-of-thumb, most im-
portantly unit orders with constant size equal to one.43. There are problems
with all these approaches: First, much of the literature favors the CARA
approach, mainly due to the fact that under this approach the desired asset
holdings are independent of wealth (for Gaussian returns). However, when
taking accumulated asset positions into account, the actual order size (de-
sired minus actual holdings) is by deﬁnition not independent of wealth.44
Imposing short-selling and credit constraints will then yield order sizes that
are not in line with economic principles. From an economic viewpoint, ran-
dom and unit order sizes are not very appealing as well, as they imply that
order sizes are independent of current wealth and behavioral parameters.
We overcome these problems by combining economic variables with rule-of
thumb behavior.45
The order size depends on three crucial variables: the agent's aggressive-
ness, his available resources, and, in case of a market order, the liquidity
available at the best opposite price. We specify the demand function as
dit =
{[
αi(·) Cit
(1+χ/2)bi
]
if buy order
[αi(·)Sit ] if sell order,
(2.10)
where [x] denotes rounding towards minus inﬁnity and αi(·) ∈ (0, 1] is an
aggressiveness parameter determining the proportion of cash/assets an agent
actually wants to use for investment. Note that only half the tax rate is
taken into account since buyer and seller will share the tax burden equally.
In principle, αi(·) could take any functional form, which is why we left
the arguments unspeciﬁed. Following Giardina and Bouchaud (2003b) and
Martinez-Jaramillo (2007), we simply set
αi(·) = α¯, (2.11)
41 See e.g. Chiarella et al. (2009) and Bottazzi et al. (2005) for an application of CARA
asset demand in an order-driven market.
42 See e.g. the random traders in Mannaro et al. (2008).
43 See e.g. Pellizzari and Westerhoﬀ (2009).
44 See Franke (2008).
45 Note that rule-of-thumb behavior, although having the weakness of being 'ad-hoc', is
more realistic in terms of how actual people make decisions, see Gigerenzer (2008). In this
regard, we are planning to implement the ﬁndings of Lachapelle and Challet (2010).
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i.e. a ﬁxed parameter identical for all agents.46 Note that, by construction,
the agent's budget constraint is never binding since he willingly only uses a
fraction of his wealth to invest in the risky asset.47 Thus, agents are reluctant
to submit very large orders which are likely to have strong market impact.48
Additionally, when submitting market orders, agents will at most trade
the amount available at the opposite best price, denoted as d1, i.e.
d¯it = min(d1, d
i
t). (2.12)
This takes into account the empirical fact that orders removing more than
the volume available at the opposite best quote are rare.49
A brief note on the eﬀects of the FTT is in order here. The tax aﬀects
transaction volumes negatively in two ways: ﬁrst via Eq. (2.10) single or-
der sizes necessarily become smaller due to the negative impact of the tax.
Second, agents will only post orders with an expected return larger than the
tax rate. Without the tax, the only requirement to post an order is that the
two limit prices diﬀer by at least one tick. Depending on the tax rate, orders
with rather small expected returns will not be posted anymore. In this way,
possible liquidity reductions for higher tax rates may be both due to noise
and informed traders.50
2.2.4 Cancellation and Trading Process
Cancellation. The price dynamics of the LOB are driven by the non-trivial
interplay between liquidity takers and liquidity providers.51 Prices may
change due to the arrival of market and limit orders, and the cancellation
of existing limit orders. Limit orders can disappear from the LOB in four
diﬀerent ways: 1) a newly arriving market order executes against the existing
46 As an alternative, we could make agents' aggressiveness explicitly dependent on eco-
nomic variables (such as volatility) or on the relative weight of chartism and fundamental-
ism. In such a setting, the aggressiveness of chartists would be higher, since chartists are
usually found to be less risk-averse than fundamentalists, see e.g. Menkhoﬀ and Schmidt
(2005). In order to reduce the complexity of the current model, we leave that for future
research.
47 This ensures that agents do not run out of assets/cash.
48 See Harris (2003), Ch. 15.
49 Farmer and Lillo (2004) have shown that roughly 87% of the market orders creating
an immediate price change have a volume equal to the volume at the opposite best, while
97% of the market orders creating an immediate price change have a volume at most of
the sum of volumes available at the two best opposite prices.
50 As a robustness check, we could also force noise traders to post orders with negative
returns. In this way, we could investigate the eﬀect of the tax in the case that market
makers do not have to pay the tax.
51 See Bouchaud et al. (2003), Bouchaud et al. (2004) and Toth et al. (2011).
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limit order, 2) a limit order can remain at most Hw intraday time-steps in
the LOB, afterwards it will be deleted automatically, 3) an agent being cho-
sen to act again will cancel any outstanding orders, 4) an agent cancels his
outstanding orders autonomously (possibly even at random), thus the order
`evaporates'.
While the ﬁrst three channels are obvious, the fourth channel has usually
attracted not as much attention in agent-based modelling. However, Farmer
et al. (2004) ﬁnd that cancellation occurs roughly 32% of the time at the
best price and 68% of the time inside the book. Challet and Stinchcombe
(2001) ﬁnd that typically 80% (20%) of all orders are cancelled (executed).52
The main argument for these huge numbers is that placing and cancelling
limit orders is usually free of charge and therefore a strategic opportunity for
all types of traders.53 Thus, when modelling the LOB, cancellation of orders
cannot be neglected.54
There may well be an important link between investment horizons and the
average order lifetime: It is widely believed that a power-law in the distribu-
tion of investment horizons may be the driving force behind the power-law
tail of price changes.55 However, when investment horizons are indeed fat
tailed, the same should be true for order lifetimes. And indeed, the lifetime
of an order increases as one moves away from the best bid/ask.56 Patient
investors are therefore less likely to cancel their orders, as found in Potters
and Bouchaud (2003).
For the sake of simplicity, we assume a Poisson process of order cancella-
tion for the noise traders as in Daniels et al. (2001). At the beginning of each
time-step, each noise trader cancels his outstanding orders with probability
picanc. For informed traders, we neglect this channel of order cancellation,
since this would inject a signiﬁcant amount of (additional) randomness to
their strategies.
Trading Process. Time evolves continuously within our CDA trading frame-
work. For simulation purposes, we discretize time such that between two
52 Similar values were reported in Lachapelle and Challet (2010). See Bouchaud et al.
(2002) as well.
53 See e.g. Cao et al. (2008). Note that fundamental traders will post limit orders with
prices far away from the best quotes. If the agent is not patient enough, he will cancel his
order prematurely.
54 See also Challet and Stinchcombe (2001).
55 There is some indirect evidence of a power-law distribution in time-scales, see e.g.
Lynch and Zumbach (2003). For a theoretical argument, see Lillo (2007). There, hetero-
geneity in the time horizons is identiﬁed as the most likely explanation of the fat-tailed
distribution of limit-order prices.
56 See also Challet and Stinchcombe (2001) and Farmer et al. (2004).
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points in time the algorithm does the following:
1. Update fundamental value.
2. Update outstanding orders (reduce order lifetime). Delete expired orders. Cancel
outstanding orders of noise traders with probability picanc.
3. Agents decide whether they will be active during this time-step, and approach
the market in a random order. During these (intraday) time-steps57 the following
happens:
• The active agent i deletes his outstanding orders and (possibly) generates his
two orders. The ﬁrst order is submitted to the LOB.
• Execute all possible trades (sequentially) taking into account price-time pri-
ority and send conditional orders to the LOB. Repeat until no trades possible
anymore. Update wealth continuously.
4. Save midprice, update trends and wealth. At times, redistribute the tax revenues
across all agents.
5. Optional: carry out the GA (and delete informed traders' outstanding orders).
2.2.5 GA Learning
A major aim of this paper is to investigate informed traders' optimal
strategies in response to the FTT, where a strategy can be fully described
by the agents' time horizons. Strategies evolve over time through a `social
learning' GA,58 where agents tend to imitate and recombine successful ideas
of other agents.59
Given a well-deﬁned search space, the proposed solutions are encoded in
strings (chromosomes) of length L using binary alphabet, i.e. the maximum
number of possible solutions equals 2L for each of the horizons. In order to
reduce the search space, we ﬁx H t for all agents (equal to the average value
in the admissible range) in the following and only optimize over Hw.60 In
order to increase the width of the search space, the parameter H˜ deﬁnes the
minimum/maximum horizons and the number of time steps between adjacent
57 Note that the number of intraday time-steps depends on the average investment hori-
zon and the number of agents. Having a large number of agents and small average invest-
ment horizons obviously slows down the simulation signiﬁcantly.
58 Holland (1975) introduced GAs as stochastic search algorithms for numerical opti-
mization.
59 See Vriend (2000) for a comparison of `social' and `individual learning' GAs.
60 Recall that we replaced the backward trend horizon by the forward trend horizon.
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strategies. Using the binary matrix Bw{Nθ ×L}, we can represent informed
traders' strategies as
Hw,i = H˜(1 +
L∑
j
2(j−1)Bw,ij ), (2.13)
with Bw,ij denoting the jth bit of i's strategy,
The GA maintains a population of Nθ solution candidates and evaluates
the quality of each according to a problem-speciﬁc ﬁtness function. The
genetic operators are the following:61
1. Reproduction: From the pool of all informed traders, Nθ we randomly select
copies (with replacement) with probabilities depending on each strategy's relative
ﬁtness, i.e. prob(reproduce agent i's strategy) = f it/
∑
f it with f
i
t being the ﬁtness
of i's strategy (tournament selection).
2. Crossover: For a fraction picross of the population we randomly couple pairs of
individuals and swap bits between them. The cutoﬀ point is a random integer
between 1 and (L− 1). The oﬀsprings are constructed by combining the left of this
position from parent one with that from the right-hand part of parent two and vice
versa.
3. Mutation: With probability pimut, each position within a string is altered to the
other value.
Thus, a binary GA has the two parameters picross and pimut.
62 The two pa-
rameters L and H˜ deﬁne the search space.
Obviously, the ﬁtness function is the crucial element of the GA. In our
setting, agents try to maximize wealth by optimizing their trading strategies.
To keep things simple, we relate the ﬁtness of a strategy to agent i's gross
return on wealth since the last activation of the GA
f it =
(
W it
W i
t−ωGA
)
. (2.14)
We calculate the values for all informed traders and compare them in the
reproduction step.63 In principle, it would be more useful to use a smoothed
61 Note that we neglect the so-called `election' operator, which ensures that the overall
ﬁtness of the new population actually exceeds that of the previous population. Given that
the calculation of the potential ﬁtness of new strategies is rather involved, we neglect this
operator in the following.
62 We also experimented with real-coded GAs, see Herrera et al. (1998), but found very
similar results.
63 In order to ensure that the selection pressure is not too large, we normalize the ﬁtness
values to the unit interval, where the best and worst performing strategies receive the
values 1 and 0, respectively. In this way, poorly performing strategies are not necessarily
being abandoned right away.
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ﬁtness measure rather than the raw returns on wealth as in Eq. (5.12).
However, since the agents' strategies will change when the GA is being acti-
vated, such a smoothed value would not properly reﬂect whether a particular
strategy was successful in the past. Additionally, agents with diﬀerent time
horizons would smoothen their ﬁtness values diﬀerently, with high-frequency
traders focusing more on short-term gains. We avoid both problems by using
the above ﬁtness measure and activating the GA every ωGA time-periods on
average. Note that we will not activate the GA too often, in order to ensure
the meaningfulness of the ﬁtness function.64
2.3 Pseudo-Empirical Results
In this section we present pseudo-empirical results from the model sim-
ulations. If not stated otherwise, the reported results are the outcome of
Monte-Carlo simulations of 22, 500 time-steps (where we disregard an initial
period of 2,500 time-steps), each of which repeated 20 times with diﬀerent
random seeds.65 In the following, we always diﬀerentiate between two cases in
our simulations, namely when the GA is switched oﬀ and when it is switched
on. In the latter case it will be activated every ωGA periods.
In order to get a feeling for the model's properties, we will ﬁrst present
time-series of single simulation runs for both cases. For such single runs, we
will always present time-series for the most interesting variables (e.g. price
and log-returns) and comment on certain statistical properties. Afterwards,
we will investigate the eﬀects of a FTT based on the Monte-Carlo approach.
The basic parameter values used in our simulations and brief descriptions for
all parameters are given in Table 2.2. In this baseline scenario, agents' time
horizons are picked uniformly from the admissible range. However, we will
also highlight the dependence of the system's properties on the choice of the
horizons.
At this point, we should mention one of the main drawbacks of agent-
based modelling, namely the large number of degrees of freedom in the choice
of the parameter values. This holds even more, when modelling very complex
decision-making of agents, as in our case. While one should employ empirical
estimates whenever possible, in case there is no (and perhaps never will be
one) empirical estimate, the modeler has to decide about this value. Modelers
often denote this as `calibration', which is a neat description for something
which can be dangerously misleading. Obviously, a model cannot be robust to
64 As a robustness check we use diﬀerent values of ωGA below.
65 We will see below that the error bars usually tend to be quite small, so this small
number of runs is indeed already suﬃcient.
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Parameter Value Description
General
H˜ = 20 Minimum horizon and distance between adjacent strategies
L = 5 Parameter related to the number of strategies
N = 500 Total number of agents
Ns = 100 Parameter for initial endowment
p0, p
f
0 = 100 Starting value: price/fundamental value
α¯ = 0.10 Order aggressiveness
∆ = 10−3 Tick size for the price
θ = 0.20 Fraction of informed traders
picanc = 0.01 Cancellation probability (noise traders)
σ = 10
−3 Volatility for noise traders' expectations
σµ = 0 Volatility of fundamental noise
χ = 0 Tax rate
GA
{Hw} Set of horizons relevant for the GA
picross = 0.2 Crossover probability
pimut = 10
−3 Mutation probability
ωGA = 1, 000 Activation frequency
Tab. 2.2: Baseline parameter setting for the simulations. Note that
we diﬀerentiate between the case with and without the GA.
changes in all parameters, but a model can only be considered relevant if (1) it
is able to produce realistic dynamics for (economically) plausible parameters
values, and (2) is robust with respect to changing certain parameters.
To stress this point, consider for example the parameter θ: What would be
a reasonable value for the fraction of informed traders? A priori we should ex-
pect a relatively large number of agents to use information about past prices
and the fundamental value when forming price expectations in real markets.
If so, how may of those agents will be chartists and fundamentalists, respec-
tively? Will it matter whether the GA is being activated? Within our model,
we found θ to be a very important parameter for the time-series properties.
Consequently, while there is always scope for ﬁne-tuning of the parameters
in order to obtain more `realistic' time-series we found the qualitative results
to be rather robust with respect to parameter changes as compared to our
baseline scenario in Table 2.2.66 For the eﬀects of the FTT, we found the
results to be quite robust as well.
66 In principle, we would be happy to use an approach similar to Franke and Westerhoﬀ
(2012), where the `optimal' parameters (with respect to the stylized facts) are estimated
via moment-matching. However, given the complexity of our model, and the related high-
number of degrees-of-freedom, parameter estimation would be prohibitive.
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2.3.1 Properties
One obvious question is whether our model is able to replicate some
of the stylized facts of empirical ﬁnancial time-series. Without going into
the details, the most basic stylized facts of asset prices and returns can be
summarized as follows:67
• Martingale property (unit root) of prices: Price dynamics close to a random walk.
Zero expected return, with only the very ﬁrst lags positively autocorrelated (at least
for high-frequency data).
• Fat-tailed return distribution: Positive excess kurtosis and power-law tails both
imply more probability mass in the center and the tails of the return distribution
(compared to Gaussian). Tail exponent around 3.
• Volatility clustering: Autoregressive dependence with very slow (hyperbolic) decay
in various measures of volatility.
Recently, many more stylized facts of order-book data have been identiﬁed
which we will not comment on in the following.68
Here, we do not aim to test quantitatively whether all of these stylized
facts are present in the model. Rather we present several basic properties,
which are illustrated by individual representative time-series from the model.
After explaining the baseline scenario in detail, we move on to comment on
certain statistical properties, when changing a set of selected parameters. In
the next section we then move on to the introduction of a FTT, which can
be seen as a simple parameter variation of χ.
Baseline Scenario and Dependence on θ
Without GA. Figure 2.6 shows the results for a single simulation run of the
baseline scenario, with the GA deactivated. The top left panel shows the
price and the fundamental value. We see that the price ﬂuctuates around
the fundamental value over time, and there is a continuous building up and
bursting of bubbles. On the top right panel we see the corresponding log-
returns, with kurtosis and skewness being 12.28 and -.04, respectively. Thus,
the return distribution is highly non-normal but roughly symmetric around
zero. In this regard, the center left panel further quantiﬁes the fat-tail of the
return distribution by means of the complementary cumulative distribution
(ccdf) of the return time-series on a log-log scale.69 The tail region shows
67 See e.g. Lux (2008).
68 See Bouchaud et al. (2008) for an extensive overview.
69 Here we show a rank-frequency plot of the ccdf, which is one minus the cdf, on log-log
scale.
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a somewhat linear decay, with an estimated tail exponent of 3.50.70 This
value lies within the range observed in real markets. The center right panel
shows the autocorrelation function (ACF) of the raw and absolute returns,
including the 95% conﬁdence intervals. For the raw returns (blue), the bid-
ask bounce is the major source for the ﬁrst few negative lags. However, due
to the trend-chasing behavior of informed traders, larger values of θ lead to
more autocorrelated prices and returns (see below), which wash-out the bid-
ask bounce. For higher lags, the autocorrelations are marginally insigniﬁcant.
For the absolute returns, the ﬁrst lags are signiﬁcantly positively autocorre-
lated, i.e. there is a small level of volatility clustering. However, the decay of
the autocorrelation function is much faster than empirically observed. As we
will see below, the trend-chasing behavior of informed traders tends to induce
a somewhat larger level of autocorrelation in the raw returns, as compared
to the absolute returns. The bottom left panel shows the bid-ask spread (in
ticks). We should ﬁrst note that the average spread is rather large, here
with an average value of 6.09 ticks. We see some persistence in the spread,
so large (small) spreads tend to be followed by large (small) spreads. The
bottom right panel shows the transaction volumes, i.e. the number of stocks
traded per time step. Quite interestingly, the Figure shows a smaller (if any)
level of persistence in the transaction volumes, such that large price changes
appear to be more or less unrelated to large volumes traded.
We checked that large price changes are in fact driven by gaps in the
LOB (unreported), as proposed by Farmer and Lillo (2004). Furthermore we
checked that, as long as there are some trends to follow, informed traders
tend to gain, while noise traders tend to lose on average. Figure 2.5 illustrates
this for the simulation run in Figure 2.4, where we show the average wealth
diﬀerence between informed and noise traders over time, which steadily in-
creases over time. Even though the interpretation is diﬀerent, this ﬁnding
is consistent with the results of Kyle (1985), where more informed traders
tend to gain from noise traders. However, we should stress that these are
only average values. There are also informed traders that lose substantial
amounts of their wealth, in part to other informed traders, but also to some
of the noise traders. In section 2.3.2 below we look at this issue in more
detail, with a particular focus on the eﬀects of the FTT on diﬀerent subsets
(in terms of trading strategies) of the population of informed traders.
As a next step, we brieﬂy compare the ﬁndings for diﬀerent values of θ.
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show the results for a single simulation run for θ = 0 and
70 For the estimation of the tail parameter, we used the usual Hill (1975) estimator based
on the top 15% observations of the absolute returns, i.e. ignoring signs. The values are
not aﬀected by focusing on positive or negative returns only.
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Fig. 2.4: Simulation results: Single run, θ = 0.2, baseline scenario
(GA oﬀ). Top left: price (blue) and fundamental value
(green). Top right: log-returns. Center left: rank-frequency
plot (ccdf, log-log-scale) of log-returns. Center right: Auto-
correlation of raw (blue), absolute returns (green), and 95%
conﬁdence interval. Bottom left: bid-ask spread (in ticks).
Bottom right: transaction volumes.
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Fig. 2.5: Simulation results: Single run, baseline scenario (GA oﬀ).
Dynamics of relative wealth of average informed trader vs.
average noise trader.
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.5, respectively. For θ = 0, the price is completely unrelated to the funda-
mental value: here it continuously exceeds the fundamental value. Without
informed traders there is no force that would push the price towards the
fundamental value. Quite interestingly, the return distribution has a fat-tail
already in the case with noise traders only (kurtosis 8.29, tail parameter 3.24)
and the ﬁrst lags of the ACFs are again signiﬁcant. In contrast, there is no
fundamental persistence in the returns, the bid-ask spread, and the trans-
action volumes, whatsoever. Also the bid-ask spread is substantially larger
(19.88 ticks on average), while transaction volumes are smaller. This changes
for large values of θ, where we see very smooth bubbles, which translate into
highly autocorrelated raw and absolute returns, with the raw returns having
a substantially larger positive autocorrelation at all lags, as compared to the
absolute returns.71 Choosing θ such that the ACF of the absolute returns
decays hyperbolically results in a very ineﬃcient market, with the ACF of
the raw returns decaying similarly slowly. In part, we already saw this for
the simulation of the baseline scenario. Still, our choice of θ in the baseline
scenario takes this trade-oﬀ into account.
An important reason for the small level of volatility clustering is probably
the absence of the leverage eﬀect in our model.72 The basic idea is that
leverage would increase the necessity of portfolio adjustments after large
negative price changes, i.e. large downward spirals.73 We leave this model
extension for future research.
Moving to the Monte-Carlo simulations for diﬀerent values of θ, Figure
2.8 summarizes some of the above ﬁndings, where we show the average values
(including plus and minus one standard deviation) of many runs. We ﬁnd
non-linear relationships for many of the variables. For example, the top left
and top right panels show the kurtosis and the tail parameter. We see that for
small θ a higher number of informed traders makes the tails somewhat fatter,
while for intermediate values, informed traders tend to smoothen the price
dynamics and thus lead to somewhat thinner tails. For very large values of θ
the tails are the fattest. The center left panel shows a U-shaped relationship
between the bid-ask spread and θ. To a much lesser extent this is also true for
the distortion (i.e. the absolute percentage diﬀerence between the price and
the fundamental value) and the volatility (i.e. the absolute price change).
In contrast, the center right panel shows that the trading volumes tend to
71 The simulated prices are qualitatively very similar to the results for the unstable case
in Youssefmir et al. (1998). There, the analysis is based on a much simpler version of the
model, solved based on a mean-ﬁeld approximation.
72 In simple terms, the leverage eﬀect corresponds to a negative correlation between past
returns and future volatility, see e.g. Bouchaud et al. (2001).
73 See e.g. Thurner et al. (2010).
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Fig. 2.6: Simulation results: Single run, θ = 0 (GA oﬀ). Top left:
price (blue) and fundamental value (green). Top right: log-
returns. Center left: rank-frequency plot (ccdf, log-log-
scale) of log-returns. Center right: Autocorrelation of raw
(blue), absolute returns (green), and 95% conﬁdence inter-
val. Bottom left: bid-ask spread (in ticks). Bottom right:
transaction volumes.
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Fig. 2.7: Simulation results: Single run, θ = 0.5 (GA oﬀ). Top
left: price (blue) and fundamental value (green). Top right:
log-returns. Center left: rank-frequency plot (ccdf, log-log-
scale) of log-returns. Center right: Autocorrelation of raw
(blue), absolute returns (green), and 95% conﬁdence inter-
val. Bottom left: bid-ask spread (in ticks). Bottom right:
transaction volumes.
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Fig. 2.8: Simulation results: Monte-Carlo simulations. Dependence
on θ (GA oﬀ). Top left: kurtosis (blue) and skewness
(green). Top right: tail exponent (top 15% observations).
Center left: bid-ask spread. Center right: transaction vol-
umes. Bottom left: distortion (| ln(p/pf)|). Bottom right:
volatility (absolute price change). Plotted are mean values
(solid lines), plus and minus one standard deviation (dashed
lines).
increase in θ, but become smaller for very large values.
With GA. Figure 2.9 illustrates the results of a single simulation run with
the GA activated. In this case, the bottom right panel shows that both
the average (blue) and best (green) investment horizon tends to increase
slightly.74 However, the dynamics of the investment horizons are far from
being cyclical (which might be a potential source of interesting dynamics).
This is true for practically all parameter settings and variants of the GA. In
most cases, the average investment horizons remain close to or slightly above
the midpoint of the admissible range. We show in section 2.3.2 that this
`convergence' can be partly explained by the bad performance of strongly
chartist strategies and the good performance of intermediate and fundamen-
talist strategies. However, as soon as most agents switch to these strategies,
they become less proﬁtable. This self-referential nature of the optimization
problem shows that extracting valuable information, in terms of an `opti-
mal' trading strategy, is a complicated task. In that regard, even focusing
74 The best investment horizon is the Hw of the ﬁttest strategy at GA activation.
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on Hw only and restricting the size of the search space was not suﬃcient to
reduce the complexity of this task. Furthermore, the election operator usu-
ally makes sure that the ﬁtness of new strategies is higher than the previous
ones. However, in a highly complex system as the present one, it is very hard
(impossible?) to calculate the potential ﬁtness of a new strategy. We plan to
work on a simpler version of the model in the future, in order to see whether
the dynamics of the GA might become more cyclical.
We also performed a number of checks on the working of the GA (e.g.
diﬀerent GA parameters, diﬀerent ﬁtness functions, and the real GA), but
found similar results. Additionally, we checked the robustness of the results
using two very simple algorithms, based on selection pressure and imitation
only.75 Again, the results are very similar to those of the baseline GA. Thus,
if anything, the GA leads to an increase of the average investment horizons
towards intermediate strategies, i.e. strong chartism appears not to pay. In
most of the following, we will therefore show the results without the GA,
except for the case focusing on the FTT.
Dependence on 〈Hw/H t〉
In the baseline scenario, both the informed and noise traders' investment
horizons are uniformly distributed, such that the average value of invest-
ment over (forward) trend horizon, denoted as 〈Hw/H t〉, equals 1. Here we
show that the diﬀerent values indeed matter for the system dynamics. For
this purpose, we draw the informed traders' investment horizons from Nor-
mal distributions with diﬀerent mean values, while keeping H t ﬁxed as the
midpoint of the admissible range for all informed traders.76 Obviously, a
smaller average investment horizon for the informed traders should lead to
more activity and thus to higher volatility. Additionally, given that we ﬁx
H t, smaller (larger) average investment horizons corresponds to a situation
with more chartism (fundamentalism). This is also the basic justiﬁcation of
letting only Hw ﬂuctuate in the GA, as it allows us to easily identify the
diﬀerent states of the system.
Figure 2.10 shows a simulation run for 〈Hw/H t〉 = 1. As expected, the
results are very similar to those of the baseline scenario presented in Figure
2.4. The major diﬀerence is the signiﬁcantly smaller level of autocorrelation
75 These two algorithms work as follows: (1) Selection pressure. The strategies of the
least successful individuals are being replaced by random strategies. (2) Imitation. Two
agents `meet' randomly and less successful agent adopts the more proﬁtable strategy.
76 Note that we do not change the standard deviation, but only shift the mean of the
distribution. In order to identify the eﬀects of these changes, we leave the noise traders'
investment horizons uniformly distributed.
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Fig. 2.9: Simulation results: Single run, baseline scenario (GA on).
Top left: price (blue) and fundamental value (green). Top
right: log-returns. Center left: rank-frequency plot (ccdf,
log-log-scale) of log-returns. Center right: Autocorrelation
of raw (blue), absolute returns (green), and 95% conﬁdence
interval. Bottom left: bid-ask spread (in ticks). Bottom
right: average (blue), best (green), and maximum/minimum
allowed (black) investment horizons.
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Fig. 2.10: Simulation results: Single run, baseline scenario (GA oﬀ).
〈Hw/Ht〉 = 1. Top left: price (blue) and fundamental
value (green). Top right: log-returns. Center left: rank-
frequency plot (ccdf, log-log-scale) of log-returns. Cen-
ter right: Autocorrelation of raw (blue), absolute returns
(green), and 95% conﬁdence interval. Bottom left: bid-ask
spread (in ticks). Bottom right: transaction volumes.
in raw returns, making the resulting price time-series appear more realistic.
In contrast, Figure 2.11 show a simulation run for 〈Hw/H t〉 = 0.2. This
corresponds to a situation with pronounced chartism. Quite interestingly, in
this case the system's properties are very similar to the case of large θ in the
previous section. The major diﬀerence here is very small level of volatility
clustering. For the sake of completeness, Figure 2.12 shows a simulation run
for 〈Hw/H t〉 = 1.8. This case corresponds to a situation with pronounced
fundamental trading. As we can see, there are no clear price bubbles, such
that the price tends to track the fundamental value closely. The return
distribution is again fat-tailed and there is still some volatility clustering.
Figure 2.13 summarizes the results of the Monte-Carlo simulations for
diﬀerent values of 〈Hw/H t〉. Again we see a non-linear relationship for sev-
eral summary statistics. Quite interestingly, the kurtosis has a peak at the
value of 1 and similarly the tail parameter has a minimum around 1.2 (top
left and right, respectively). Thus, the tails are fattest around 1, indicating
that this value might be a critical value for the system dynamics. Given the
smaller level of activity for higher values of 〈Hw/H t〉, it is not surprising that
the bid-ask spread tends to increase (center left) and trading volumes tend
to decrease (bottom right). This is clearly driven by a substantially smaller
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Fig. 2.11: Simulation results: Single run, baseline scenario (GA oﬀ).
〈Hw/Ht〉 = 0.2. Top left: price (blue) and fundamental
value (green). Top right: log-returns. Center left: rank-
frequency plot (ccdf, log-log-scale) of log-returns. Cen-
ter right: Autocorrelation of raw (blue), absolute returns
(green), and 95% conﬁdence interval. Bottom left: bid-ask
spread (in ticks). Bottom right: transaction volumes.
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Fig. 2.12: Simulation results: Single run, baseline scenario (GA oﬀ).
〈Hw/Ht〉 = 1.8. Top left: price (blue) and fundamental
value (green). Top right: log-returns. Center left: rank-
frequency plot (ccdf, log-log-scale) of log-returns. Cen-
ter right: Autocorrelation of raw (blue), absolute returns
(green), and 95% conﬁdence interval. Bottom left: bid-ask
spread (in ticks). Bottom right: transaction volumes.
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Fig. 2.13: Simulation results: Monte-Carlo simulations. Dependence
on 〈Hw/Ht〉 (GA oﬀ). Top left: kurtosis (blue) and skew-
ness (green). Top right: tail exponent (top 15% observa-
tions). Center left: bid-ask spread. Center right: transac-
tion volumes. Bottom left: distortion (| ln(p/pf )|). Bottom
right: volatility (absolute price change). Plotted are mean
values (solid lines), plus and minus one standard deviation
(dashed lines).
number of outstanding orders of informed traders (unreported). Concerning
the system's stability, we see that the distortion is clearly negatively related
to 〈Hw/H t〉, i.e. the average distortion is largest in the highly chartist regime
(bottom left). Thus, more chartists indeed drive prices away from the fun-
damental value. Interestingly, this does not necessarily translate itself into
smaller volatility, as can be seen from the bottom right panel. We see that the
volatility decreases up to a value 〈Hw/H t〉 = 0.8 and then starts to increase
slightly again. This suggests that the chartist regime is the most unstable,
followed by the completely fundamental regime.77 The least volatile regime
appears to be one with both chartists and fundamentalists, even though this
might lead to fatter tails. This does make sense, given that the tail contains
only the most extreme observations, which tend to have a small eﬀect on the
average level of volatility.
77 Note that the higher level of volatility in the fundamental regime, as compared to
the chartist/fundamentalist setting, is driven by noise traders' activities. In this case,
mostly noise traders are responsible for the dynamics, which can involve substantial price
ﬂuctuations. The (fundamentalist) informed traders then simply take care that the price
does not diverge too much from the fundamental value, but remain inactive otherwise.
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2.3.2 Eﬀects of FTT
Now we turn to the eﬀects of a (two-sided) FTT.We will present aggregate
results from Monte-Carlo simulations for 18 diﬀerent tax rates for both cases,
i.e. with and without GA.78 The parameters used are summarized in Table
2.2. We should note that the case without GA corresponds to ﬁxed behavioral
rules, which is similar to what is often done in the literature on FTTs in order-
driven artiﬁcial ﬁnancial markets. The novelty of our approach lies in the
endogeneity of the agents' investment horizons.
GA oﬀ
Figure 2.14 summarizes the most important model properties in depen-
dence of the tax rate. In the following, we present results from the Monte-
Carlo simulations for the case without the GA. The top left panel shows the
tax revenues in dependence on the tax rate. We ﬁnd the usual Laﬀer curve
relationship, i.e. the tax revenues tend to increase for small tax rates until
they start decreasing again for larger ones. The top right panel shows that
the tails become fatter for larger tax rates. This indicates that the variance
of the most extreme observations becomes substantially larger. Note that the
tail exponent is usually larger than 2, except for very large tax rates where
we might end up in the Levy-stable regime. The center left panel shows that
the tax leads to a signiﬁcant increase of the bid-ask spread. Thus, as ex-
pected, the liquidity is signiﬁcantly reduced.79 The center right panel shows
that transaction volumes tend to decrease in the tax rate, which is not sur-
prising given that all trades become less proﬁtable. Most interestingly, the
bottom panels show the distortion (left) and volatility (right), respectively.
Quite surprisingly, the distortion tends to decrease for very small tax rates,
increases later on and reaches the initial level without tax only for relatively
large tax rates. In contrast, the volatility tends to increase for very small
to intermediate tax rates, but decreases later on.80 We will comment on the
78 We used the following tax rates (in percent): 0 (baseline scenario), 0.01, 0.02, 0.03,
· · · , 0.18%. We use 0.18% as the maximum value, since the LOB may be empty at times
for larger tax rates and we require at least one order to be on each side of the book to be
existent at any point in time.
79 Note the relatively large change for very small tax rates (also present in the transaction
volumes and the distortion). This eﬀect is mostly driven by liquidity reductions from very
short-term oriented informed traders, whose trades become unproﬁtable even for these
very small tax rates. For larger tax rates, the amount of liquidity provided both by noise
traders and informed traders tend to increase the distortion again.
80 For larger tax rates, the volatility increases substantially. We do not show the results,
since the LOB might become very sparse, with only few or no orders present at certain
points in time.
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Fig. 2.14: Simulation results: Monte-Carlo simulations. Dependence
on χ (GA oﬀ). Top left: tax revenues. Top right: tail expo-
nent (top 15% observations). Center left: bid-ask spread.
Center right: transaction volumes. Bottom left: distor-
tion (| ln(p/pf)|). Bottom right: volatility (absolute price
change). Plotted are mean values (solid lines), plus and
minus one standard deviation (dashed lines).
`kinks', i.e. the strong changes in some of the variables for very small tax
rates in section 2.3.2. The ﬁndings for the distortion and volatility can be
explained by the wedge that the tax drives between agents' two limit prices.
Only those limit prices corresponding to a positive expected return (post-tax)
are submitted to the LOB. However, these orders are unlikely to be executed.
For example, in case of an initial market order, the limit price of the second
order needs to be substantially far away from the current price. However, this
second order will probably never be executed. In this way, price ﬂuctuations
are relatively rare (volatility decreases), but if the price changes it does so
substantially (tail index smaller). Additionally, the informed traders make
sure that prices do not depart too much from the fundamental value. We
should also note that the tax rate with the maximum volatility level is close
to the tax rate that maximizes tax revenues, representing the usual trade-oﬀ
between stability and tax revenues.
Summing up, the results for small tax rates are roughly in line with those
from the literature, except for the strong decrease in distortion for very small
tax rates.81 This suggests that a small tax rate should reduce liquidity and
81 See Mannaro et al. (2008) and Pellizzari and Westerhoﬀ (2009) for the CDA case.
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transaction volumes, but might actually bring prices closer to the fundamen-
tal values and only marginally increasing volatility. Additionally, our ﬁndings
also show that larger tax rates may not create entirely negative eﬀects. In
this case, comparable values for distortion and volatility as in the no-tax case
come along with substantial tax revenues.
GA on
Figure 2.15 shows the results for the case with the GA activated. The
ﬁndings are very similar to the case without the GA: the tax revenues shows
the Laﬀer curve relationship, the tail parameter decreases in the tax rate,
and the bid-ask spread increases in the tax rate. Similarly, the distortion
drops for small tax rates and decreases for larger ones, whereas the volatility
increases for small tax rates and decreases later on. In the center right panel
we also plot the average (blue) and best (green) investment horizons for the
diﬀerent tax rates. Clearly, there is no convergence in the time horizons, and
the average values are very close to (or slightly above) the initial mean. We
also see that the standard deviation does not change for the diﬀerent tax
rates. In the end, the conclusions from the case without GA remain largely
unaﬀected.
Investment Horizons, Performance, and FTT
In the previous section, we analyzed the eﬀects of the FTT in terms of
aggregate system properties both with and without GA. Here, given that we
expect the tax to aﬀect the behavior of certain groups of traders in diﬀerent
ways, we take a closer look at diﬀerent subgroups of the population of the
informed traders. In everything that follows, we use the parameters from the
baseline scenario (GA oﬀ) and a set of rather small tax rates compared to
the previous sections.82 The main reason for using these smaller rates is the
relatively high sensitivity of informed traders' trading decisions, in particular
for very small investment horizons, to minor changes in the tax rate. Here
we mainly aim at explaining the `kinks', for example in distortion, in Figure
2.14 for very small tax rates, but focusing on the behavior of certain groups
of informed traders. This analysis also allows to make further statements
about the dynamics of the GA. For this purpose, we do not randomly assign
investment horizons to the informed traders within the admissible range, but
rather divide them into three diﬀerent groups: All agents in group 1 use a
small investment horizon, those in group 2 an intermediate value, and those
in group 3 a large value. To be precise, for the three groups Hw corresponds
82 The maximum tax rate used here is only 0.0035%.
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Fig. 2.15: Simulation results: Monte-Carlo simulations. Dependence
on χ (GA on). Top left: tax revenues. Top right: tail expo-
nent (top 15% observations). Center left: bid-ask spread.
Center right: investment horizons (mean and best). Bot-
tom left: distortion (| ln(p/pf)|). Bottom right: volatility
(absolute price change). Plotted are mean values (solid
lines), plus and minus one standard deviation (dashed
lines).
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to the minimum, the midpoint, and the maximum investment horizons in the
admissible range, respectively. Thus, group 1 uses a chartist strategy, group
3 a fundamentalist strategy, and group 2 something in between.
We see that informed traders tend to gain, while noise traders tend to
lose on average (cf. Figure 2.5). In the following, by analyzing the wealth
dynamics of the three groups (relative to the performance of noise traders),
we will show that the distribution of gains and losses of informed traders is
far from uniform. This analysis also helps us in understanding the dynamics
of the investment horizons with the GA activated. Most importantly, we ﬁnd
that the increase in investment horizons shown before is mainly due to the
very bad performance of group 1, i.e. the chartists. This can be seen from
Figures 2.16-2.18, where we plot the average wealth diﬀerence (in absolute
terms) between the three groups and the group of noise traders over time for
single simulation runs and diﬀerent tax rates.
Figure 2.16 shows that, without a tax group 2 (green line) performs best,
i.e. the intermediate strategy is the most lucrative, as it tends to strongly
gain in wealth over time. Similarly, group 3 tends to gain as well, but on a
smaller scale, so the fundamental strategy is also proﬁtable. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, the worst performers are in group 1, whose average wealth tends
to be comparable to the wealth of noise traders (at times even smaller as
the wealth diﬀerence may be negative and highly cyclical). Thus, chartists
tend to perform very poorly on average. An explanation for the good perfor-
mance of group 2 is that group 1 is the major source of predictable bubbles
(high-frequency traders), while group 3 tries to drive prices back towards the
fundamental level (low-frequency traders). The intermediate strategy works
on a higher frequency than the fundamental traders, thereby leading them
to follow the trend at times or expecting reversal towards the fundamental
value at other times.
From this viewpoint the dynamics of the average investment horizons
with the GA, as described in section 2.3.1, are sensible; the GA spreads the
best performing strategies, replacing less successful ones. Thus, the average
investment horizon tends to move quickly towards intermediate investment
horizons. However, we should stress that we only show the average wealth
dynamics for the three groups, i.e. neglecting within-group variations. These
variations, however, may crucially aﬀect the working of the GA.83 We should
also stress that, in order to avoid strong path dependence, our ﬁtness function
(cf. Equation 5.12) may at times suggest that chartists performed rather well;
83 For example, we checked the dynamics of the average investment horizons for varying
(average) initial values of 〈Hw/Ht〉 (cf. section 2.3.1). It turns out that the average
horizons with the GA typically end up close to the initial average. This may to a large
extent be driven by a signiﬁcant amount of noise in the proﬁtability of individual strategies.
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Fig. 2.16: Single run, baseline scenario (GA oﬀ) with three groups of
informed traders with small, intermediate, and large Hw.
Average wealth diﬀerences between the three groups and
noise traders. Group 1 (3) are the chartists (fundamental-
ists), while group 2 uses an intermediate strategy.
even though they might lose money on average, the strong cyclicality of their
ﬁtness values can lead to very large ﬁtness values of individuals. Clearly, the
GA has diﬃculties extracting this information.
Figure 2.17 shows the wealth dynamics for a very small tax rate. We see
that the ordering is conserved, since group 2 still performs better on average
than the other groups. As before, chartists tend to perform very badly, in
this example even losing money over time, while fundamentalists and those
with an intermediate strategy tend to gain. Thus, for very small tax rates,
chartists continue posting very unproﬁtable orders. This changes for very
large tax rates, as we can see from Figure 2.18: here the average wealth
of chartists now exceeds that of the noise traders. Large tax rates reduce
the amount of strong chartist orders, so chartists post fewer orders (i.e. ef-
fectively work on lower frequencies) and perform better. Also we see that
their wealth dynamics are signiﬁcantly less cyclical, so reducing their post-
ing of high-frequency orders tends to reduce the occurrence of bubbles and
bursts. Interestingly, we see that for the fundamental strategy becomes most
proﬁtable for larger tax rates. Note that in this case there are practically
no cyclical ﬂuctuations, so the calculated trends (necessary for calculating
the expected prices) tend to be very small. This implies that the trend-
ing component for all strategies becomes negligible, so practically all traders
tend to expect the price to revert towards the fundamental value. From this
viewpoint, it is clear that fundamental traders tend to be the most success-
ful, since their orders have the longest lifetime, i.e. the highest probability
that their two limit prices are being hit by the noise traders. The longer
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Fig. 2.17: Single run, baseline scenario (GA oﬀ) with small tax rate
and three groups of informed traders with small, interme-
diate, and large Hw. Average wealth diﬀerences between
the three groups and noise traders. Group 1 (3) are the
chartists (fundamentalists), while group 2 uses an interme-
diate strategy.
investment horizon also implies that the diﬀerence between the current price
and the expected price can be larger, such that the majority of orders with
expected proﬁts (after tax) are posted by the group of fundamental traders.
Figure 2.19 illustrates the eﬀects of diﬀerent tax rates on the order sub-
mission process of the three groups. There we show the average fraction of
order submissions relative to the frequency of being active for all groups.
First, we see that noise traders (black) are practically unaﬀected by these
relatively small tax rates, as they post orders practically every time when
they become active (i.e. the fraction of order submissions is close to 1). In
contrast, we see that group 1 posts orders roughly 60% of the time without
a tax, but this fraction approaches zero relatively quickly. We see a step-
wise relationship, which is due to the fact that prices (and thus the taxes
to be paid) are not continuous, but depend on the tick size. For groups 2
and 3 we observe similar relationships, but the values are on a signiﬁcantly
higher level for these relatively small tax rates. Quite interestingly, at the
highest tax rate in this analysis, group 3 continues posting orders 80% of
the time. The kinks in the previous section are therefore mainly driven by
the inactivity of chartists already for relatively small tax rates (cf. Figure
2.20). As expected, the tax aﬀects strategies with higher trading frequency
signiﬁcantly more. Note that for such small tax rates, the other groups con-
tinue posting orders, so the absence of strong speculative bubbles reduces
the average distortion. The fraction of order submissions for group 2 and 3
also tend to approach zero for larger tax rates, with group 3 being active also
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Fig. 2.18: Single run, baseline scenario (GA oﬀ) with larger tax rate
and three groups of informed traders with small, interme-
diate, and large Hw. Average wealth diﬀerences between
the three groups and noise traders. Group 1 (3) are the
chartists (fundamentalists), while group 2 uses an interme-
diate strategy.
for larger tax rates (unreported). For very large tax rates, i.e. those used in
the previous sections, even the fundamental traders act rarely, such that the
average distortion starts increasing again.
2.4 Conclusions
In this paper we presented a detailed artiﬁcial ﬁnancial market, where
agents compete against each other within a CDA mechanism. While in-
corporating the usual chartist/fundamentalist/noise trader framework, our
model has the advantage of explicitly accounting for the importance of time
horizons in ﬁnancial markets. We showed evidence that the model is able
to replicate certain well-known stylized fact of ﬁnancial time-series, among
them the martingale property, fat-tailed return distributions, and, albeit to a
lesser extent, volatility clustering. Moreover, for certain parameter combina-
tions the model is able to generate the building-up and bursting of asset price
bubbles. We also discussed the results for a number of parameter variations.
The main focus of this paper was on the eﬀects of a FTT in the artiﬁcial
ﬁnancial market. In this regard, the two cases, i.e. with ﬁxed and ﬂexible
behavioral strategies, yield very similar results, due to typical convergence
to the intermediate investment strategy due to the GA. We ﬁnd the usual
trade-oﬀ between monetary revenues (Laﬀer curve) and stability, as higher
tax revenues come along with higher volatility. The results for small tax
rates are roughly in line with those from the literature, except for the strong
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Fig. 2.19: Simulation results: Monte-Carlo simulations. Fraction of
order submissions relative to the activity frequency for
noise traders (black), and group 1-3.
decrease in distortion for very small tax rates.84 This suggests that a small
tax rate should reduce liquidity and transaction volumes, but might actually
bring prices closer to the fundamental values and only marginally increasing
volatility. Additionally, we also show that larger tax rates may not create
entirely negative eﬀects. In this case, comparable values for distortion and
volatility as in the no-tax case come along with substantial tax revenues.
These revenues could be used for a number of productive purposes. Addi-
tionally, the reduced market activity also frees-up resources, both in terms
of ﬁnancial and human capital, that could be directed to other parts of the
economy.
In reality, we would need to weigh the diﬀerent eﬀects in order to come up
with a welfare-optimizing solution. For example, here we simply redistributed
the tax revenues among the traders to keep total wealth constant. In reality
one could think of transferring the money to those who are in need. Given
the extraordinary high transaction volumes in real markets, partly driven
by the arrival of HFTs, it appears promising to introduce a small tax to
reduce the possibly distorting eﬀects of their activities and generate large
tax revenues at the same time. In part, our results suggest that imposing
a very small tax would make HFT strategies highly unproﬁtable. However,
since their trading algorithms are usually not meant to follow trends or drive
prices towards some fundamental value, their eﬀects on the macro-properties
of the system are still under debate. In the end, even a tiny FTT would lead
to a shrinking of the ﬁnancial sector, allowing to extract highly productive
resources (e.g. human capital) for other purposes.
84 See Mannaro et al. (2008) and Pellizzari and Westerhoﬀ (2009) for the CDA case.
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Fig. 2.20: Simulation results: Monte-Carlo simulations. Dependence
on χ (GA on) for relatively small tax rates with three
groups of informed traders. Top left: tax revenues. Top
right: tail exponent (top 15% observations). Center left:
bid-ask spread. Center right: transaction volumes. Bot-
tom left: distortion (| ln(p/pf)|). Bottom right: volatility
(absolute price change). Plotted are mean values (solid
lines), plus and minus one standard deviation (dashed
lines).
The presented model is very ﬂexible and serves as a good illustration of
the complexity of the optimization task in real markets. The self-referential
nature of this task makes the extraction of valuable information quite diﬃ-
cult. In this regard, it is worth noting that the order generation process of
individuals is still poorly understood, in contrast to the aggregate order-book
dynamics for which a number of scaling-laws have been identiﬁed.85 We hope
that future research, for example by means of laboratory experiments, may
help us in deciphering these processes. It is crucial to understand the agents'
individual behavior at the micro-level to generate more realistic dynamics at
the macro-level. In the end, we believe that our model is an ambitious ﬁrst
step towards more realistic `wind-channels' for testing regulatory policies. In
future research, we plan to tackle several of the issues mentioned throughout
the text.
85 See e.g. Zovko and Farmer (2002).
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INTERBANK MARKETS AND NETWORK
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3. NETWORK ANALYSIS OF THE E-MID OVERNIGHT
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DYNAMIC PROCESSES
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3.1 Introduction and Existing Literature
Interbank markets are crucial for the functioning of the economy. How-
ever, as painfully illustrated by the global ﬁnancial crisis (GFC) in 2007/08,
creating links at the micro-level may generate systemic risk at the macro-
level. Thus, the structure of the interbank network, with the banks having
connections in terms of credit relationships, is important for its stability. The
economy depends on stable interbank markets, since short-term money mar-
ket rates aﬀect those of longer maturities and thus the real economy. From
this viewpoint, it appears quite surprising that the economic profession has
not been concerned much with the functioning of interbank markets until
recently. The usual focus is on the overnight segment of the interbank de-
posit market, since it tends to be the largest spot segment of money markets.
In this paper, we analyze the network properties of the Italian e-MID (elec-
tronic market for interbank deposits) data based on overnight loans during
the period 1999-2010.
Most existing studies on the structure of real interbank markets have
been conducted by physicists trying to get an idea of the topology of diﬀer-
ent interbank markets. Examples include Boss et al. (2004) for the Austrian
interbank market, Inaoka et al. (2004) for the Japanese BOJ-Net, Soramäki
et al. (2007) for the US Fedwire network, Bech and Atalay (2010) for the US
Federal funds market, and De Masi et al. (2006) and Iori et al. (2008) for
the Italian e-MID (electronic market for interbank deposits). The most im-
portant ﬁndings reported in this literature are: (1) most interbank networks
are quite large (e.g. more than 5000 banks in the Fedwire network), (2)
interbank networks are sparse, meaning that only a minority of all possible
links do actually exist, (3) degree distributions appear to be scale-free (with
coeﬃcients between 2-3), (4) transaction volumes appear to follow scale-free
distributions as well, (5) clustering coeﬃcients are usually quite small, (6)
interbank networks are small worlds and (7) the networks show disassortative
mixing with respect to the bank size, so small banks tend to trade with large
banks and vice versa.
Most relevant for our study are the two papers on the e-MID. We should
stress here that the e-MID data are the only interbank data which can be
purchased freely without any restrictions. In contrast, getting access to sim-
ilar datasets for other markets is usually far more complicated. The authors
analyze daily networks from 1999-2002 and ﬁnd intradaily and intramonthly
seasonalities. The authors conclude that the networks appear to be random
at the daily level. This ﬁnding is in stark contrast with the ﬁndings of pref-
erential lending relationships in the Portuguese interbank market by Cocco
et al. (2009). In this paper, we are mostly concerned with matching these
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seemingly incompatible ﬁndings, by showing that the aggregation period has
an eﬀect on the informational value of the underlying networks. The main
ﬁnding is that daily networks indeed feature a substantial amount of ran-
domness and cannot be considered as being representative for the underlying
`latent' network. This is illustrated on the basis of a number of network
statistics which are compared to those of random networks. Furthermore, we
ﬁnd a substantial amount of asymmetry in the network. Last but not least,
we ﬁnd that the GFC can be identiﬁed as a signiﬁcant structural break for
many network measures.1
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 gives
a brief introduction into (interbank) networks, section 3.3 introduces the
Italian e-MID trading system and gives an overview of the data set we have
access to. Section 3.4 describes our ﬁndings and section 3.5 concludes and
discusses the relevance of these ﬁndings for future research.
3.2 Networks
A network consists of a set of N nodes that are connected by M edges
(links). Taking each bank as a node and the interbank positions between
them as links, the interbank network can be represented as a square matrix
of dimension N×N (data matrix, denotedD).2 An element dij of this matrix
represents a gross interbank claim, the total value of credit extended by bank
i to bank j within a certain period. The size of dij can thus be seen as a
measure of link intensity. Row (column) i shows bank i's interbank claims
(liabilities) towards all other banks. The diagonal elements dii are zero, since
a bank will not trade with itself.3 Oﬀ-diagonal elements are positive in the
presence of a link and zero otherwise.
Interbank data usually give rise to directed, sparse and valued networks.4
However, much of the extant network research ignores the last aspect by
focusing on binary adjacency matrices only. An adjacency matrix A contains
elements aij equal to 1, if there is a directed link from bank i to j and 0
1 In a companion paper, we focus explicitly on ﬁtting the degree distribution, see Fricke
et al. (2013). The main ﬁndings are (1) The degree distributions are unlikely to be
scale-free, and (2) the in- and out-degrees do not follow the same distribution.
2 In the following, matrices will be written in bold, capital letters. Vectors and scalars
will be written as lower-case letters.
3 This is true when we think of individual banks as consolidated entities.
4 Directed means that di,j 6= dj,i in general. Sparse means that at any point in time the
number of links is only a small fraction of the N(N −1) possible links. Valued means that
interbank claims are reported in monetary values as opposed to 1 or 0 in the presence or
absence of a claim, respectively.
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otherwise. Since the network is directed, both A and D are asymmetric in
general. In this paper, we also take into account valued information by using
both the raw data matrix as well as a matrix containing the number of trades
between banks, denoted as T. In some cases it is also useful to work with the
undirected version of the adjacency matrices, Au, where auij = max(aij, aji).
As usual, some data aggregation is necessary to represent the system as
a network. In the following, we use quarterly networks.
3.3 The Italian Interbank Market e-MID
The Italian electronic market for interbank deposits (e-MID) is a screen-
based platform for trading of unsecured money-market deposits in Euros, US-
Dollars, Pound Sterling, and Zloty operating in Milan through e-MID SpA.5
The market is fully centralized and very liquid; in 2006 e-MID accounted
for 17% of total turnover in the unsecured money market in the Euro area.
Average daily trading volumes were 24.2 bn Euro in 2006, 22.4 bn Euro in
2007 and only 14 bn Euro in 2008.
Available maturities range from overnight up to one year. Most of the
transactions are overnight. While the fraction was roughly 80% of all trades
in 1999, this ﬁgure has been continuously increasing over time with a value of
more than 90% in 2010.6 As of August 2011, e-MID had 192 members from
EU countries and the US. Members were 29 central banks acting as market
observers, 1 ministry of ﬁnance, 101 domestic banks and 61 international
banks. We will see below that the composition of the active market partici-
pants has been changing substantially over time. Trades are bilateral and are
executed within the limits of the credit lines agreed upon directly between
participants. Contracts are automatically settled through the TARGET2
system.
The trading mechanism follows a quote-driven market and is similar to a
limit-order-book in a stock market, but without consolidation. The market
is transparent in the sense that the quoting banks' IDs are visible to all other
banks. Quotes contain the market side (buy or sell money), the volume, the
interest rate and the maturity. Trades are registered when a bank (aggressor)
actively chooses a quoted order. The platform allows for credit line checking
before a transaction will be carried out, so trades have to be conﬁrmed by
5 The vast majority of trades (roughly 95%) is conducted in Euro.
6 This development is driven by the fact that the market is unsecured. The recent
ﬁnancial crisis made unsecured loans in general less attractive, with stronger impact for
longer maturities. See below. It should be noted, that there is also a market for secured
loans called e-MIDER.
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both counterparties. The market also allows direct bilateral trades between
counterparties.
The minimum quote size is 1.5 million Euros, whereas the minimum trade
size is only 50,000 Euros. Thus, aggressors do not have to trade the entire
amount quoted.7 Additional participant requirements, for example a certain
amount of total assets, may pose an upward bias on the size of the par-
ticipating banks. In any case, e-MID covers essentially the entire domestic
overnight deposit market in Italy.8
We have access to all registered trades in Euro in the period from Jan-
uary 1999 to December 2010. For each trade we know the two banks' ID
numbers (not the names), their relative position (aggressor and quoter), the
maturity and the transaction type (buy or sell). As mentioned above, the
majority of trades is conducted overnight and due to the global ﬁnancial cri-
sis (GFC) markets for longer maturities essentially dried up. We will focus
on all overnight trades conducted on the platform, leaving a total number
of 1,317,679 trades. The large sample size of 12 years allows us to analyze
the network evolution over time. Here we focus on the quarterly aggregates,
leaving us with 48 snapshots of the network.
3.4 Results
In this section, we look at the network structures formed by interbank
lending over various horizons of time aggregation of the underlying data. We
will see that comparing various network measures at diﬀerent levels of time
aggregation reveals interesting features suggestive of underlying behavioral
regularities. Given that most studies focus on overnight data, it has become
quite standard to focus on networks constructed from daily data. Here we
ﬁnd, that, at least for the Italian interbank network, it may be more sensible
to focus on longer aggregation periods, namely monthly or quarterly data.
We also discuss in how far the network structure has changed (and, in how
far it has remained intact) after the default of Lehman Brothers in September
2008.
3.4.1 General Features
In total, 350 banks (255 Italian and 95 foreign) were active at least once
during the sample period. However the number of active banks changes
7 The minimum quote size could pose an upward bias for participating banks. It would
be interesting to check who are the quoting banks and who are the aggressors. Furthermore
it would be interesting to look at quote data, as we only have access to actual trades.
8 More details can be found on the e-MID website, see http://www.e-mid.it/.
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substantially over time as can be seen from the left panel of Figure 6.1.9
We see a clear downward trend in the number of active Italian banks over
time, whereas the additional large drop after the onset of the GFC is mainly
due to the exit of foreign banks. The right panel shows that the decline
of the number of active Italian banks went along with a relatively constant
trading volume in this segment until 2008. This suggests that the decline of
active Italian banks was mainly due to mergers and acquisitions within the
Italian banking sector. Given the anonymity of the data set, it is impossible
to shed more light on this interesting issue. The overall upward trend of
trading volumes was due to the increase of active foreign banks until 2008,
while their activities in this market virtually faded away after the onset of
the crisis. Interestingly, the average volume per trade tends to increase over
time, as can be seen from the strong negative trend in the total number of
trades in Figure 3.2, at least for the Italian banks.
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Fig. 3.1: Number of active banks (left) and traded volume (right) over
time. We also split the traded volume into money lent by
Italian and foreign banks, respectively.
An interesting question in this regard is, who trades with whom. Figure
3.3 illustrates this for the number of trades (top) and the transacted volume
(bottom) by country. For example, the green lines show the total number
of trades (traded volumes) of foreign banks lending money to Italian banks,
relative to all outgoing trades of foreign banks. Similarly, the blue lines
show the total number of trades (traded volumes) of money ﬂowing between
Italian banks, as a fraction of all outgoing trades of Italian banks. The general
patterns are the same for both Figures: Italian banks lend most of the time
to other Italian banks (99.31% on average) and only a negligible amount
9 Similar developments are reported by Bech and Atalay (2010) for the federal funds
market.
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Fig. 3.2: Number of trades per quarter.
to foreign banks (0.61% on average). This pattern is remarkably stable over
time. In contrast, at the beginning of the sample period, foreign banks mostly
used the market in the absence of (many) other foreign counterparties to
lend money to Italian banks. This has changed over time and foreign banks
mostly later on used the platform to trade with other foreign banks. It is not
quite clear why this is the case, the underlying trend seems to point towards
structural changes altering the (foreign) banks' behavior. For many research
questions, one should therefore only use the subsample of Italian banks. In
most of what follows, we stick to this choice.
This leads us to a ﬁrst glance at the network structure. Figure 3.4 shows
the banking network formed by the 119 active banks (89 Italian) in the last
quarter of 2010.10 The network consists mainly of two components: The very
dense part formed by the Italian banks (circles) on the right-hand side and
the far less interconnected foreign banks (triangles) on the left-hand side.
The higher activity of the Italian banks is not represented in terms of the
volume traded. We use total outgoing volume as a proxy for banks size and
group the banks into 4 classes according to which percentile (30th, 60th, 90th
or above) they belong to. This attribute is shown in the Figure as the size
and the brightness of the nodes. We should note that 3 out of 12 banks of
group 4 are foreign banks which is in line with their fraction of the total
banks (30 out of 119). Hence, foreign banks trade less on average (both in
terms of volume and number of trades), however, the volume per trade is
higher.
10 The Figure was produced using visone, http://www.visone.info/, by Brandes andWag-
ner (2004).
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Fig. 3.3: Fraction of trades (top) and traded volume (bottom) be-
tween banks from diﬀerent countries.
It is also interesting to highlight some speciﬁc features of the trading
behavior of individual banks in this particular quarter, since not all banks use
the market in the same way:11 There are 14 banks with zero in-degree and 29
banks with zero out-degree. Surprisingly these banks are quite heterogeneous
and not, as one might expect, just small banks. As an example the highest
overall transaction volume of 58.6 bn Euro for a single bank, and therefore
roughly 9.3% of the total trading volume, was traded by a German bank
borrowing this sum in 90 trades from 8 counterparties. Another interesting
case is an Italian bank trading only with one counterparty, lending this other
bank 5.02 billion Euro in 76 trades, whereas borrowing just 0.03 billion in
3 trades. Even though these special relationships are quite interesting, the
anonymity of the data set makes it impossible for us to say more on the
particular relationships that might lead to these interesting outcomes. After
this broad overview of the market and the ongoing interactions, we turn to
the question of a sensible aggregation period. As should be clear from the
discussion above, we will mostly focus on the (sub)network formed by Italian
banks only.
11 For a detailed analysis of the trading strategies in the e-MID, see Fricke (2012).
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Fig. 3.4: The banking network in the 4th of quarter 2010: triangles
are foreign banks. The size of the node as well as the bright-
ness of the red color indicate the size in terms of volume lent.
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3.4.2 Density
The density ρ of a network is deﬁned as the number of existing links (M)
relative to the maximum possible number of links. It can be calculated as
ρ =
M
N(N − 1) . (3.1)
Figure 5.2 illustrates the evolution of the density for four diﬀerent aggregation
periods (day, month, quarter, year). Except for the daily networks the density
is quite stable over time and slightly increases until the GFC, which was
a signiﬁcant structural break for the monthly and quarterly network. We
should note that the breakpoint (quarter 39), coincides with the quarter
during which Lehman Brothers collapsed. The daily density ﬂuctuates much
more strongly, but overall increases throughout the sample.12
Fig. 3.5: The density for yearly (blue), quarterly (red), monthly
(green) and daily (black) aggregated networks. A Chow-test
and an additional CUSUM-test indicate a structural break
for quarter 39 (month 117) at the 1% signiﬁcance level, but
not for the yearly or daily networks.
Compared to the ﬁndings for other interbank networks, the density of the
Italian interbank network is quite high. For example, Bech and Atalay (2010)
12 The density for the total network, including the foreign banks, seems to steadily
decline over the sample period. This illustrates the fact that the increasing fraction of
foreign banks are less interconnected with the (smaller) Italian banks.
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and Soramäki et al. (2007) report an average density of below 1% in daily
interbank networks, compared to an average density of roughly 3.1% in our
case. The main reasons for the higher density are most likely the relatively
small number of participating banks in the market and the transparent mar-
ket structure which easily allows each bank to trade with any other bank in
the market. For comparison, the Fedwire network investigated by Soramäki
et al. (2007) contains 5,086 institutions.13 The means of 20.8% for quarterly
aggregated networks (13.4% monthly) reveal much higher ﬁgures. Obviously
the network density is positively related to the aggregation period, but to
our knowledge the structure of this relation has not been investigated for
interbank networks so far.
For this reason, we compare the aggregation properties of the empirical
networks with those of random networks. Here we use Erdös-Renyi networks,
i.e. completely random networks, and random scale-free networks, where the
out-degrees follow a power-law distribution with scaling parameter 2.3.14 The
experiments work as follows: For each year, we aggregate the daily networks
and plot the resulting density in dependence of the aggregation period, from
one day up to one year (roughly 250 days). For the random networks, we
aggregate artiﬁcial Erdös-Renyi and scale-free networks for each day with
the same number of active banks and density as the observed daily network.
The results are the average values for 100 runs for the Erdös-Renyi and the
scale-free networks.15 We ﬁnd very similar qualitative results for all 12 years.
As an example, Figure 3.6 illustrates the results for 1999. For all three
networks, there appears to be a saturation level for the density, however at
diﬀerent levels. The Erdös-Renyi networks always show the highest density
13 Additionally, the electronic nature of the trading platform might make links between
any two institutions more likely.
14 The power-law distribution with tail exponent 2.3 is a common ﬁnding in many inter-
bank markets, see e.g. Boss et al. (2004). The resulting sequences of the out-degrees are
attributed to the nodes by ranking those according to the observed out-degrees, consider-
ing only active banks during the particular day. Note that if we did not account for the
ordering of the observed degree sequences, we would end up with very similar aggregation
properties as the Erdös-Renyi case. The in-degrees are distributed in a random uniform
way, ruling out self-links and counting each link at most once. For a detailed analysis of
the degree distributions for this data set see Fricke et al. (2013).
15 Note that the density of aggregated Erdös-Renyi networks can be written as
ρrT = 1−
T∏
t=1
(1− ρrt ),
where (1−ρrt ) is the probability of observing no links in the network at time t whatsoever,
but since we adjust the number of active banks on a daily basis using tese probabilities
would not constitute a completely satisfactory approach in our case.
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Fig. 3.6: Data for 1999. Density for the aggregated Erdös-Reny
(blue), Scale-Free (red) with α = 2.3, and observed net-
works (green). Aggregation period in days. Note: we do not
plot standard deviations, since these are negligible.
(up to .851), followed by the Scale-Free networks (up to .559) and the ob-
served networks (only up to .280). Apparently, it is much more likely for the
empirical data that the same link gets activated several times than for the
randomized data of Erdös-Renyi and scale-free networks (where the overall
number of links is the same by construction). This is supported by the fact
that in the observed networks a total number of 2, 757 links are observed only
once in the year, while for the scale-free and random networks these values
are 5, 040 and 5, 746, respectively. Hence, these results indicate the existence
of lasting (preferential) lending relationships in the actual banking network.
3.4.3 What is a Sensible Aggregation Period?
After showing that longer than daily aggregation tends to reveal non-
random structures for the Italian banking network, we are concerned with
determining the `correct' aggregation period in more detail in this section.
This question is crucial for extracting relevant information, since the banking
network cannot be observed at a given point in time, but always has to be
approximated by aggregating trades over a certain period.16 Most studies use
16 The literature on interbank networks is surprisingly silent about the choice of the
aggregation period. We are aware of only one paper (Kyriakopoulos et al. (2009)) inves-
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daily aggregates (daily networks), which seems justiﬁed by the fact that the
underlying loans are (mostly) overnight. Economically, however, overnight
loans can be seen as longer-term loans, where the lender can decide every
day whether to prolong the loan or not. Aggregating over a longer period
is only preferable, if it can reveal a non-random structure of the banking
network. The existence of preferential relationships would imply that daily
transactions are not determined myopically, but that a virtual network of
longer lasting relationships exists. Daily transactions would then be akin to
random draws from this underlying network with the realizations depending
on current liquidity needs and liquidity overhang. Aggregation over a suﬃ-
ciently long time horizon might reveal more and more of the hidden links,
rather than adding up purely random draws from all possible links. The
relatively fast saturation of the empirical density that we observe in ﬁgure
3.6 is consistent with this interpretation. To shed more light on this issue
we consider the consistency of yearly, quarterly, monthly and daily aggre-
gated networks. The main ﬁnding is that we observe a much higher degree
of structural stability for monthly or quarterly networks, depending on the
application, rather than daily networks.
The use of a `sensible' aggregation period should ensure that we extract
stable features (if they exist) of the banking network rather than noisy trad-
ing patterns at diﬀerent points in time. In this regard, it is important to
investigate the stability of the link structure, in order to assess whether sub-
sequent occurrences of the network share many common links. In order to
do this, we rely on the Jaccard Index (JI),17 which can be used to quantify
the similarity of two sample sets in general. Here it is deﬁned as
J =
S11
S01 + S10 + S11
, (3.2)
where Sxy counts the number of relations having status aij = x at the ﬁrst
instance and aij = y at the second. The JI measures links which survive as a
fraction of links which are established at any of the two points in time. Hence,
it also takes into account those banks which are active in only one of the two
periods. Figure 3.7 shows that the JI is very stable over time for longer
aggregation periods, but not for the daily level. As expected, the JI tends to
be higher for longer aggregation intervals. The daily measures are much more
unstable and increase substantially until the GFC. More problematic than
the smaller average level are however the extreme outliers on the downside.
tigating this issue.
17 The so-called graph correlation, see e.g. Butts and Carley (2001), shows qualitatively
very similar results, but is not able to cope with banks entering or exiting market. The
correlation of both measures is always above .9 irrespective of the aggregation period.
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Fig. 3.7: Jaccard Index for daily (black), monthly (green), quarterly
(red) and yearly (blue) networks.
As a rule-of-thumb, in social network analysis one considers networks with
JI values above .3 as substantially stable.18
Table 3.1 shows the mean, minimum, 10th percentile and standard devi-
ation of the JIs for diﬀerent aggregation periods. Again, the most evident
observation is that the daily networks are rather special: the minimum and
the 10th percentile of the JI are signiﬁcantly smaller, indicating that we ob-
serve values below .2 in at least 10% of the sample, which is not a rare event.19
18 See Snijders et al. (2009).
19 We should note that, as apparent from Figure 3.7, the reason for the 10th percentile
to be below the .2 threshold is not the GFC.
Jaccard Index Year Quarter Month Day
mean .5543 .5302 .4638 .2861
standard deviation .0535 .0368 .0333 .0740
min .4652 .4479 .3735 .0603
10th percentile .5072 .4835 .4183 .1904
Tab. 3.1: Jaccard Index for daily, monthly, quarterly and yearly net-
works. Calculations were carried out for all subsequent net-
works at the diﬀerent aggregation periods. Standard devi-
ations based on all observations.
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Reciprocity Year Quarter Month Day
mean .4264 .2085 .0829 .0042
standard deviation .0580 .0423 .0244 .0060
Tab. 3.2: Reciprocity of the Italian Banking network. Calculations
were carried out for all networks at the diﬀerent aggregation
periods. Standard deviations based on all observations.
These results suggest a high degree of randomness in the daily networks.
Obviously, higher values of the JI are no guarantee that we are closer
to the `real' network per se. Note that in a network with randomly drawn
connections, the index should be positively related to the length of the ag-
gregation period. Thus, it is important to show that other network measures
also take on values signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from random networks for longer
aggregation periods. In the following, we will therefore have a closer look at
the reciprocity of the network.
Reciprocity is a global concept for directed networks that measures how
many of the existing links are mutual. It can be calculated by adding up
all loops of length two, i.e. reciprocal links, and dividing them by the total
number of links.
Table 3.2 shows higher levels of reciprocity for longer aggregation peri-
ods.20 In the case of daily networks we observe very few mutual links, as Iori
et al. (2008) stated this is a very plausible ﬁnding, since banks rarely bor-
row and lend money from the same bank within a particular day. However,
the values for longer aggregation periods show that the banking network is
not one-sided, supporting the evidence on the inability of daily networks to
represent the `true' underlying (directed) banking network. The left panel of
Figure 3.8 illustrates the results for 1999, where we perform a similar analysis
as for the density above, by comparing the observed network reciprocity to
those of Erdös-Renyi and scale-free random networks.21 The actual values
are, again, always the lowest. The right panel of Figure 3.8 shows that the
reciprocity (after 19 days for the real network) exceeds the density for all
three networks. Note that for random networks one would expect the two
measures to be almost identical. However, diﬀerent banks are active at dif-
ferent days and if many banks are often simultaneously active the chance
20 A structural break (after the GFC) is detected by a Chow-test as well as an additional
CUSUM test for the 10th year, the 39th quarter and the 117th month respectively, but
not for daily networks. For the yearly networks only the Chow-test indicates a structural
break. Note that the yearly analysis involves only 12 data points.
21 Again the results are qualitatively very similar for the other years as well.
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Fig. 3.8: Data for 1999. Left: reciprocity for the Erdös-Renyi (blue),
Scale-Free (red) with α = 2.3, and observed networks
(green). Right: diﬀerence between reciprocity and density
for the respective networks. Aggregation period in days.
of forming a reciprocal link is higher (remember that we used the actually
active banks of each day in the Monte Carlo exercise). However, more im-
portant for our analysis is that for the real network the diﬀerence between
reciprocity and density increases steadily and exceeds the diﬀerence of the
random networks. Hence, using longer than daily aggregation is not only
capable of taking mutual credit relationships into account, but even indi-
cates a preference of banks to form them. On the other hand, the saturation
of the reciprocity indicates that banks will have mutual credit relationships
with most of their counterparties.22 Thus, the noise level of networks with
longer aggregation periods is smaller and the directed version of the networks
contains a substantial amount of information.
On the base of the Jaccard index, monthly and quarterly networks appear
most stable as they have a high index with a very low standard deviation, i.e.,
the highest degree of structural stability of lending relationships over time.
Yearly aggregation levels, in contrast, have somewhat higher variation in their
JI and might be problematic, because the banking network (in particular
during unstable times) is likely to evolve much faster. Somewhat related is
the change in the composition of banks, i.e. banks leaving and entering the
22 This may of course be aﬀected by the time-varying composition of active banks. See
below.
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market, since we consider a bank as active for the whole year even if it leaves
the market after the ﬁrst trading day.23 Concerning the monthly level, Iori et
al. (2008) discovered intradaily and -monthly seasonalities which may aﬀect
our results. In everything that follows, we will therefore mostly focus on the
quarterly networks.
3.4.4 Transitivity
Here we are interested in transitive relations between three banks. The
concept of transitivity states that a speciﬁc relationship  is transitive if from
i  j and j  k it follows that i  k holds. Equality is a transitive relation, but
inequality is not. From i = j = k follows i = k, yet i 6= j 6= k does not imply
i 6= k.
The relation we are interested in is i has a link to j or aij = 1. The
relationship is obviously not transitive, since i has a link to j and j has a
link to k does not strictly imply that k also has a link to i. However, it is
interesting to investigate how many such closed triplets occur. More generally
speaking, transitivity measures whether the existence of certain links depend
both on the relation between the two counterparties and on the existence
of links with a third party. The measure most prominently used for this
Fig. 3.9: The two possibilities how the directed path of length two
(solid lines) between i and k can be closed. On the left hand
side the path is closed into a loop of length three (CC1). On
the right hand side the triplet is interconnected but not in
the same single direction (CC2).
purpose is the (directed) clustering coeﬃcient24, which, despite its name, has
no relation to cluster identiﬁcation whatsoever.25 It measures the number of
23 This problem occurs for each aggregation period, but is likely to become more pro-
nounced for longer frequencies.
24 For more detailed deﬁnitions of clustering coeﬃcients see Zhou (2002).
25 See Fricke and Lux (2012) and Fricke (2012) for detailed approaches of cluster identi-
ﬁcation in the e-MID market.
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(directed) paths of length two in the network and takes the fraction of these
which are closed.26 Figure 3.9 illustrates two ways to close the triplet i, j, k
in a directed network. First, the directed path may be closed into a loop as
shown on the left hand side of the ﬁgure. The function of such closure is
given by the coeﬃcient CC1:
CC1 =
∑
j 6=i 6=k aijajkaki∑
j 6=i 6=k aijajk
(3.3)
Second, the link from i to k may be reversed. The function of such closure
is given by the coeﬃcient:
CC2 =
∑
j 6=i 6=k aijajkaik∑
j 6=i 6=k aijajk
(3.4)
An important distinction is that the nodes in the case of CC1, as apparent
from Figure 3.9, have each one in- and one outgoing link and therefore show
no hierarchical ordering. Figure 3.10 shows that the results for the two
coeﬃcients are very diﬀerent. The mean for CC1 is .164 and .571 for CC2.
This is further evidence for the non-random character of the banking network,
since the probability of an `average' link to exist is just equal to the density
of .208. Hence, the existence of a path of length two between i and k via
j makes it 2.75 times more likely that the link from i to k exists compared
to a random link27, but reduces the probability that there is a link from k
to i by 21%. The huge diﬀerence indicates that the banking network has a
hierarchical ordering on the triadic level.
Figure 3.11 illustrates that for the Erdös-Renyi networks the evolution of
the clustering coeﬃcients is almost identical (correlation above .999). The
exact numbers of the clustering coeﬃcients for the observed networks change
with the aggregation, but CC1 is always much smaller than CC2 for all
aggregation levels as shown by ﬁgure. CC2 is at the beginning even higher
for the observed network than for the random networks, but saturates after
a steep increase relatively quickly on a much lower level (up to .624). CC1
on the other hand is almost zero at the beginning. Note that a loop of length
three at a single day implies that each involved bank would get back some
of its own lending via an intermediate bank, which appears very unlikely.
However, CC1 increases (up to .386) for longer aggregation periods showing
that such relations do exist. Note that the daily or undirected networks are
not capable of taking this into account.
26 Any connection along directed links between two nodes i and j is called a path and
the length of the path is deﬁned as the number of edges crossed. There are no restrictions
on visiting a node or link more than once alongside a path.
27 The probability of random link is exactly the density of .208.
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Fig. 3.10: The two clustering coeﬃcients of quarterly networks: CC1
(green) is the fraction of path of length two which are closed
into a loop by a third link. CC2 characterizes links in which
the triangle is closed in a hierarchical way.
3.4.5 Small-World Property
Another very prominent measure in the network literature is the average
shortest path length (ASPL). Interest in this measure stems from the remark-
able ﬁnding that in many `real world' networks the ASPL is quite small, also
known as the small-world phenomenon.28 Here we focus on the undirected
version of the network.
Watts and Strogatz (1998) show that completely random networks al-
ready have a very small ASPL, but at the same time a relatively low (undi-
rected) clustering coeﬃcient (CC) equal to its density. On the other hand, a
regular network, where all nodes have connections to their s nearest neigh-
bours, has a CC of 1, but a very high ASPL. Interestingly, already the in-
troduction of a few `random' links reduces the ASPL signiﬁcantly, because
these `long range' links connect diﬀerent clusters of the network. The authors
argue that the interesting `real world' networks are neither purely regular nor
random. Therefore Watts and Strogatz (1998) deﬁne small-world networks
28 Small ASPLs have been detected for social, information, technological and biological
networks. The ﬁrst empirical ﬁnding dates back to the chain letter experiments conducted
by Milgram (1967). His ﬁnding that on average only six acquaintances are needed to form
a link between two random selected persons led to the famous phrase of `six degrees of
separation'.
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Fig. 3.11: Left: CC1 for the Erdös-Renyi (blue), Scale-free (red) with
α = 2.3, and observed networks (green), while the are ag-
gregated on a daily basis up to one year(1999). Right:
CC2.
to additionally have a higher CC than random networks. Hence, to further
investigate if the banking network exhibits the small-world property, we cal-
culate the ASPL and the CC and compare the values to random networks.
The (symmetric) matrix G of dimension N × N contains the geodesic
distances between any two nodes, i.e. each element gij is the length of the
geodesic path between node i and j. The ASPL is calculated by dividing the
sum of all (existing) geodesic path lengths by the total number of (existing)
geodesic paths.29 The CC is calculated similar to the directed case (CC1 and
CC2), but ignores the directedness of the links.
In this case a comparison of the networks aggregated day by day is not
suitable, since the density of both random networks as visible in ﬁgure 3.6
after a quarter (around 63 days) is much higher. Therefore the simulated ran-
dom networks correspond to the aggregated quarterly networks with respect
to their density (and their out-degree distribution for scale-free networks).
Table 3.3 summarizes the results: The ASPL for all networks is small and
29 It is not necessary for two nodes to have a shortest path, since there might be no link
leading from one to the other. In this case the two nodes lie in diﬀerent components of
the network and by convention the length of these non existing geodesic paths are set to
inﬁnity. The undirected banking network consists always of only one component and the
same is true for the investigated random networks, because of the high density.
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CC ASPL
Erdös-Renyi .3736 1.6470
(.0058) (.0073)
Scale-free .4131 1.6259
(.0103) (.0134)
Observed .5422 1.6486
(.0434 ) (.0373 )
Tab. 3.3: The average CC and ASPL for the observed network and
for 100 Erdös-Renyi and scale-free (with α = 2.3) random
networks. Standard deviations in brackets.
almost identical, in which the very low value is due to the high density. The
CC for the Erdös-Renyi networks is by construction close to the density, since
all links have per quarter exactly this probability to occur. The CC for the
scale-free is with .413 higher, but is exceeded by the observed network (.542).
This indicates the higher regularity in the link structure. Hence, the banking
network lies midway between regular and completely random graphs. As can
be seen from the last column of Table 3, the ASPL does not provide much
scope for distinguishing between the benchmark Erdös-Renyi and scale-free
networks and the empirical ones. The reason might be that the relatively
high density leads to relatively short path lengths anyway.30
3.4.6 Eﬀects of the Global Financial Crisis
Finally, we take a closer look at the eﬀects of the GFC on the banking
network.31 The start of the GFC is not easy to determine, but we have seen
that the collapse of Lehman Brothers in quarter 39 (2008 Q4) was a major
shock for the global ﬁnancial market in general and the Italian interbank
market as well.32 The eﬀects of this event were twofold: ﬁrst, the counter-
parties of Lehman Brothers realized huge loses. Second, the perception of
risks changed, since Lehman had been considered to be `too-big-too-fail' be-
fore. The resulting dramatic increase of perceived counterparty risk reduced
30 The results are qualitatively the same if we consider the directed version of the net-
work. The ASPL for the quarterly networks is 1.912 against 1.802 for the random networks.
The CC2 (.571) is signiﬁcantly higher than for Erdös-Renyi networks with .208, whereas
CC1 (.164) is even smaller. However, in this case the network consists not only of one
giant component which makes the interpretation of the ASPL more diﬃcult.
31 See also Fricke and Lux (2012).
32 See Brunnermeier (2008).
3. Network Analysis of the e-MID 85
the willingness of banks to lend to each other, which ultimately aﬀected the
real economy due to tighter lending restrictions. The monetary authorities
and governments around the world injected substantial amounts of capital
into the ﬁnancial system to prevent interbank markets from freezing in the
following weeks. We have seen, that important network measures such as
density and reciprocity, were signiﬁcantly aﬀected by these events as well.
Quarter 36 37 38 39 40
Banks 101 100 100 98 97
Volume 445,991 409,340 435,338 404,353 385,819
Trades 20,984 20,078 19,963 18,160 16,477
Links 2,425 2,253 2,249 2,153 1,768
Trades per Link 8.65 8.91 8.88 8.43 9.32
Quarter 41 42 43 44 45
Banks 96 96 94 94 94
Volume 234,102 267,057 197,021 227,076 196,503
Trades 14,184 13,981 12,525 11,636 11,577
Links 1,533 1,506 1,599 1,449 1,530
Trades per Link 9.25 9.28 7.83 8.03 7.57
Tab. 3.4: The table summarizes the number of Italian banks, total
volume (million Euros), number of trades, number of links
and links per trade for the quarters 36-45, while the Lehman
collapse has been in quarter 39.
Here we investigate the change in banks' behavior during and after the
breakdown of Lehman Brothers. To begin with, Table 3.4 contains several
basic network statistics for ten quarters around the breakpoint (quarter 39).
Interestingly, the number of active Italian banks remained relatively stable
during this period, and in fact 86 banks were active in all of the ten quarters.
The stability of this composition is important, since under these circum-
stances changes in the behavior of the banks on the aggregated or individual
level should be mainly driven by their response to this exogenous shocks.
We also see that the total trading volume, the number of trades and the
number of links are all decreasing over this period, but the exact patterns are
distinct. Surprisingly, the volume is quite stable until the 40th quarter, but
drops by 39.3 percent in the 41st quarter. In contrast, the number of trades
starts to fall in the 39th quarter and decreases further until quarter 44. The
total number of links already starts to decrease in quarter 37, but overall
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tends to develop in a very similar way to the number of trades.33 In the end,
the most immediate reaction to the crisis was that banks traded similar total
volumes but in fewer trades and with a smaller number of counterparties in
order to minimize their (perceived) counterparty risks.34
Interestingly, the trades per link are the highest for the three quarters
after the Lehman collapse. This indicates that the banks relied stronger
on their preferred counterparties. Preferred in this context might simply
means that the banks had more reliable information about these banks, which
however should coincide with former trading relationships. Eventually, we
conclude that the breakdown of Lehman Brothers signiﬁcantly aﬀected the
behavior of individual banks and thus had a clear impact on the structure of
the network. Quite surprisingly, we ﬁnd that the link structure of subsequent
networks remained rather stable during this period, since no structural break
is detected for the Jaccard Index. Furthermore, despite the signiﬁcant impact
of the GFC, we do not ﬁnd evidence for a complete drying up of the e-MID
market, even at the daily level.35
3.5 Conclusions and Outlook
In this paper, we have investigated the interbank lending activity as doc-
umented in the e-MID data from 1999 until the end of 2010 from a network
perspective. Our main ﬁnding is that daily networks feature too much ran-
domness to be considered a representative statistic of some underlying latent
network. The JI shows the higher consistency over time for longer aggre-
gation periods and the very low density compared to (aggregated) random
networks indicates the existence of preferred trading relations. In general
the evolution of all global network measures for longer aggregation periods
(month, quarter, year) is very similar in their deviation from the Erdös-Enyi
and scale-free benchmarks. Moreover, the monthly and quarterly networks
are characterized by a signiﬁcantly higher than random clustering coeﬃcient,
and thus reveal some regularity in the link structure. The (almost) zero reci-
procity and CC1 of daily networks proves the inability of this aggregation
level to reveal information on such structural elements. However, quarterly
networks consistently exhibit a non-random structure and allow us to con-
sider the mutuality of the relations and are therefore a preferable subject of
study, especially if one is interested in the evolution of the network over time.
33 The correlation between both is .963 for this period and .957 over the complete sample.
34 Fricke and Lux (2012) show that most of these changes were in fact driven by behav-
ioral changes of core banks.
35 As noted above, this is not true for loans longer than overnight. These markets
essentially collapsed completely, which is not surprising given that the loans are unsecured.
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Essentially, these results show that it is far from trivial to map a given
data structure into a `network'. While daily records of the interbank trading
system can be arranged in an adjacency matrix and treated with all types
of network statistics, they provide probably only a very small sample of re-
alizations from a richer structure of relationships. Just like daily contacts of
humans provide very incomplete information of networks of friendship and
acquaintances, the daily interbank data might only provide a small selection
of existing, dormant established trading channels. Hence, inference based
on such high-frequency data may be misleading while a higher level of time
aggregation might provide a more complete view on the interbank market.
What level of aggregation is suﬃcient for certain purposes is an empirical
question depending on the research questions at hand. However, saturation
of certain measures may be a good indicator that most dormant links have
been activated at least once over a certain time horizon. At the same time,
such dependence of statistics on the time horizon serves to sort out a num-
ber of simple generating mechanisms (i.e. completely randomly determined
networks in every period) and reveal interesting dynamic structure.
Another interesting result is that the network is asymmetrical in many
respects. For the quarterly network the fraction of reciprocal links is very
similar to the density. Furthermore, the two directed clustering coeﬃcients
are very diﬀerent. The probability for path of length two to be closed into a
loop is 3.48 times smaller than the other way. Additionally, the correlation
between in- and out-degree is merely .12 for the complete sample. Therefore,
the information that a bank has a a large number of incoming links is a
surprisingly poor indicator of how many outgoing links the bank has.
Moreover, for many measures the GFC could be identiﬁed as a structural
break and also the decreasing number of volume, trades and links support
that the GFC heavily aﬀected the Italian interbank market. However, the
network overall remained surprisingly stable and despite the decrease of its
volume (in the beginning of 2010) the e-MID market was never close to drying
up completely.
In the future more attention should be given to the analysis of directed
banking networks using longer aggregation periods to identify structural com-
monalities. This has important consequences for the regulation of credit in-
stitutions, since at the daily level it is diﬃcult to detect the systemically
important institutions. For policymakers and regulators, it would be po-
tentially (dangerously) misleading to focus on the noisy daily networks, even
more since the low level of connectivity suggests a low-degree of systemic risk
at any point in time. More important, in our view, is to get a better idea on
the wider pool of counterparties of all credit institutions, in order to detect
possible behavioral changes among the set of relatively active banks. Such
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changes might then serve as an indicator for funding problems of individual
institutions.36 In the end, it would be important to extend our phenomeno-
logical analysis in order to test hypotheses about the behavior of banks at
the micro-level that drives the system's properties.
36 See Fricke and Lux (2012).
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4.1 Introduction and Existing Literature
Since the onset of the global ﬁnancial crisis (GFC) in 2007/08, the analysis
of network structures formed by interbank liabilities has received increasing
attention. Considering an ensemble of ﬁnancial institutions, individual banks
are connected to each other through some of their activities (usually credit
ﬂows) and the bilateral exposures can be mapped into a credit network. Such
a perspective is useful in order to study the knock-on eﬀects on other banks
due to disruptions of the system caused by the failure of individual nodes
(e.g. insolvency of one bank). A new strand of literature has started to
construct ﬁnancial networks based on empirical data available at supervisory
authorities or hypothetical network structures to investigate the contagious
eﬀects of failures of single banks.1 A basic ﬁnding of network theory is that
the topology of a network is important for its stability, with the interbank
network obviously being no exception.2 In this regard, the understanding of
the structure and functioning of complex networks has advanced signiﬁcantly
in recent years.
In this paper, we focus on one of the most prominent network charac-
teristics, namely the degree distribution, where the degree is the number of
(incoming/outgoing) connections per node. Even though the degree distri-
bution does not provide suﬃcient information for all facets of the structure
of the network (Alderson and Li, 2007), it is often considered as one of
the deﬁning characteristics of diﬀerent network types. For example, net-
works with random link formation (Erdös and Renyi, 1959, or ER random
networks) display Poisson degree distributions, i.e. most nodes have degrees
within a relatively narrow range. In contrast, many real-world networks have
been reported to display fat-tailed degree distributions: most nodes have a
very small degree, but the tail contains nodes with substantially larger de-
grees (cf. Clauset et al., 2009). This feature is shared by the important
class known as scale-free (SF) networks, in which the fraction of nodes with
degree k is proportional to k−α, where α is the so-called scaling parameter.
The term scale-free indicates that there is no typical scale of the degrees, i.e.
the mean may not be representative. These networks received considerable
attention in the literature due to a number of interesting properties (cf. Cal-
darelli, 2007). One important feature of scale-free networks is that they can
be described as robust-yet-fragile,3 indicating that random disturbances are
easily absorbed (robust) whereas targeted attacks on the most central nodes
may lead to a breakdown of the entire network (fragile). Quite interestingly,
1 See e.g. Upper and Worms (2004), Nier et al. (2007), and Gai et al. (2011).
2 See Haldane and May (2011) and Albert et al. (2000).
3 See Albert et al. (2000).
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many interbank networks have been reported to resemble scale-free networks
(cf. Boss et al., 2004, Soramäki et al., 2007, De Masi et al., 2006, and Iori
et al., 2008). If the network of credit relationships had such a structure,
this would carry important policy implications. For instance, such a network
might experience long stable periods, during which disruptions are conﬁned
to peripherical banks and can be absorbed easily within the entire system.
However, such periods could be a misleading indicator of the overall stability
of the system as problems aﬀecting the most central nodes could suddenly
cause a breakdown of the entire network, cf. Haldane (2009).
The distribution of network degrees is just one example among many
phenomena in the natural sciences as well as from the socio-economic sphere
that have been claimed to follow a scaling law (power-law or Pareto-law).
Other well-known examples include: Zipf's law for the city size distribution
(Gabaix, 1999), the distribution of ﬁrm sizes (Axtell, 2001), the size distri-
bution of innovations (Silverberg and Verspagen, 2007) or the distribution
of large asset returns (Mandelbrot, 1963, Lau et al., 1990, and Jansen and
de Vries, 1991). While these examples appear to be supported by empirical
evidence and meanwhile count as stylized facts, a variety of other ﬁndings
of power-laws seem more questionable. It appears from a number of recent
reviews of power-law methodology and power-law ﬁndings (cf. Avnir et al.,
1998, Stumpf and Porter, 2012) that there had been an over-emphasis on scal-
ing laws and often too optimistic interpretation of statistical ﬁndings in the
literature of the natural sciences. For instance, in a meta-study of power-laws
reported in publications in the main physics outlet Physical Review between
1990 and 1996, Avnir et al. (1998) found that most claims of power-laws (aka
scaling or fractal behavior) had a very modest statistical footing. As they say
`... the scaling range of experimentally declared fractality is extremely lim-
ited, centered around 1.3 orders of magnitude.' In terms of statistics jargon
this means that the more typical declaration of a power-law in these publi-
cations is based on a partially linear slope in a relatively small intermediate
range of the empirical cumulative distribution of some observable.
The power-law exponent (like the ones reported for the degree distri-
bution) is typically obtained by a linear regression in a log-log plot of the
cumulative distribution. Obviously, this approach suﬀers from a number
of shortcomings: (i) even if the hypothetical data-generating process is a
Pareto distribution, this log-log ﬁt would not be an eﬃcient way to extract
the parameter of the underlying distribution.4 It is actually a method that is
deﬁnitely inferior to maximum likelihood (which is easy to implement), and
4 See Goldstein et al. (2004). Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011) improve the regression
method by shifting the rank observations.
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results are hard to interpret as, due to the dependency of observations in the
log-log plot of the cumulative distribution, the statistical properties of this
estimator are not straightforward, (ii) the implicit censoring of the data that
is exerted by selecting a scaling range makes it easy to deceive oneself. Many
distributions might actually have some intermediate range in their `shoul-
ders' where their cdf looks appropriately linear. But their remaining support
(small and large realizations) might display a completely diﬀerent behavior.
Since power-laws in the natural sciences are thought to be interesting if they
extent over several orders of magnitude, it is unclear what the interpretation
of such an intermediate power-law approximation would be.
Statistical extreme value theory (EVT) provides yet another perspective
on power-law behavior. The basic result of this branch of statistics is a
complete characterization of the limiting distributions of extremes (maxi-
mum or minimum) of time series of iid observations (where results for the
iid case have been generalized for dependent processes under relatively mild
conditions, cf. Leadbetter, 1983, and Reiss and Thomas, 2007, for details).
According to EVT, the appropriately scaled minimum or maximum of a se-
ries of observations converges in distribution to one of only three functional
forms: the Fréchét, Gumbel or inverted Weibull distribution. Since extremes
are by deﬁnition very rare, it is often even more relevant, that the tail of a
distribution converges in distribution in a similar way to one of three adjoint
functional forms. Namely, the outer part approaches either a power-law de-
cay, an exponential decay or a decay towards a ﬁxed endpoint for the three
types of extremal behavior, respectively. Power-law behavior is, therefore, a
very general form of limiting behavior for the large realizations of a stochastic
process. EVT has originally been developed for continuous distribution func-
tion. Since degree distributions are discrete (degrees being integer numbers),
its is worthwhile to note that corresponding limit laws for discrete variables
are available as well, cf. Anderson (1970). In our context this might imply
that very large realizations of the degree distribution could still decay like a
power-law even if the bulk of the distribution does not appear to follow such
a distribution (and the implications for the fragility of the system might be
similar as for `true' scale-free networks). It is important to emphasize that
both the limiting behavior of extremes and tails are stable under aggregation.
Hence, data at diﬀerent levels of (time-) aggregation should obey the same
extreme value and tail behavior.
One reason for the `popularity' of power-laws in the natural sciences is
that they are often the signatures of relatively simple and robust generat-
ing mechanisms that might apply to a variety of phenomena. In the case
of networks, a power-law distribution of degrees is the imprint of so-called
scale-free networks. Reported power-laws for interbank networks have been
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within a relatively narrow range around 2.3 both for the in- and out-degree
distributions (see e.g. Boss et al., 2004, Soramäki et al., 2007, and De Masi
et al., 2006), even though most papers lack a thorough statistical analysis
of the issue, with Bech and Atalay (2010) being a notable exception. If
these ﬁndings were robust, the known generating mechanisms for scale-free
networks would be strong candidates as mechanisms for the formation of in-
terbank links. Furthermore, the well-known reactions of scale-free networks
to disturbances would be of immediate concern for macro-prudential regu-
lation. Thus, taking into account the relevance of such topological features,
and the documented over-emphasis on power-law behavior, a more rigorous
statistical analysis of the distributional properties of interbank network data
should be worthwhile. Similar approaches have revealed that numerous pre-
vious claims of power-law behavior were not supported by the data (Stumpf
and Porter, 2012).
In this paper, we consider interbank networks based on the Italian e-MID
(electronic market for interbank deposits) data for overnight loans during
the period 1999-2010. Our main focus is to ﬁt a set of diﬀerent candidate
distributions to the degrees for diﬀerent time horizons. Using daily data
over the period 1999-2002, De Masi et al. (2006) reported power-laws for
the distribution of in- and out-degrees, with tail parameters 2.7 and 2.15,
respectively. Finger et al. (2012) have shown recently that the networks'
properties depend on the aggregation period.5 We will, therefore, not con-
ﬁne our analysis to daily data (the basic frequency of our data set), but also
look at the distribution of in- and out-degrees for networks constructed on
the base of aggregated data over longer horizons. Quite surprisingly in view
of the previous literature, we ﬁnd hardly any support in favor of previously
reported power-laws: at the daily level the degrees are usually ﬁt best by
negative Binomial distributions, while the power-law may provide the best
ﬁt for the tail data. However, we typically ﬁnd very large power-law expo-
nents (with values as large as 7), i.e. levels where the power-law is virtually
indistinguishable from exponential decay. At the quarterly level, Weibull,
Gamma, and Exponential distributions tend to provide comparable ﬁts for
the complete degree distribution, while the tails again tend to display expo-
nential decay. We ﬁnd comparable results when investigating the distribution
of the number of transactions, even though in this case the tails of the quar-
terly variables are somewhat fatter. However, the Log-normal distribution
typically outperforms the power-law. Overall these ﬁndings indicate that the
5 Since we cannot easily observe the state of a hypothesized network of interbank links
at a given point in time, some data aggregation is necessary. Usually, for time-aggregated
data a link is assumed to exist between two banks, if there has been a trade at any time
during the aggregation period.
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power-law is typically a poor description of the data, implying that preferen-
tial attachment and other generating mechanisms for scale-free networks are
unsuitable explanatory mechanisms for the structure of the Italian interbank
network. Moreover, the networks contain a substantial level of asymmetry,
due to the low correlation between in- and out-degrees. Additionally, we ﬁnd
that the two variables do not follow identical distributions in general.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 gives a
short introduction into (interbank) networks, section 4.3 brieﬂy introduces
the Italian e-MID trading system and gives an overview of the data set we
have access to. Section 4.4 describes our ﬁndings and section 4.5 concludes
and discusses the relevance of these ﬁndings for future research.
4.2 Networks
A network consists of a set of N nodes that are connected by M edges
(links). Taking each bank as a node and the interbank positions between
them as links, the interbank network can be represented as a square matrix
of dimension N×N (data matrix, denoted D). An element dij of this matrix
represents a gross interbank claim, the total value of credit extended by bank
i to bank j within a certain period. The size of dij can thus be seen as a
measure of link intensity. Row (column) i shows bank i's interbank claims
(liabilities) towards all other banks. The diagonal elements dii are zero, since
a bank will not trade with itself.6 Oﬀ-diagonal elements are positive in the
presence of a link and zero otherwise.
Interbank data usually give rise to directed, sparse and valued networks.7
However, much of the extant network research ignores the last aspect by
focusing on binary adjacency matrices only. An adjacency matrix A contains
elements aij equal to 1, if there is a directed link from bank i to j and 0
otherwise. Since the network is directed, both A and D are asymmetric in
general. In this paper, we also take into account valued information by using
both the raw data matrix as well as a matrix containing the number of trades
between banks, denoted as T. In some cases it is also useful to work with the
undirected version of the adjacency matrices, Au, where auij = max(aij, aji).
As usual, some data aggregation is necessary to represent the system as a
network. In the following, we deﬁne interbank networks by aggregating over
daily as well as quarterly lending activity.
6 This is of course only true when taking banks as consolidated entities.
7 Directed means that di,j 6= dj,i in general. Sparse means that at any point in time the
number of links is only a small fraction of the N(N −1) possible links. Valued means that
interbank claims are reported in monetary values as opposed to 1 or 0 in the presence or
absence of a claim, respectively.
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4.3 The Italian Interbank Market (e-MID)
The Italian electronic market for interbank deposits (e-MID) is a screen-
based platform for trading of unsecured money-market deposits in Euros, US-
Dollars, Pound Sterling, and Zloty operating in Milan through e-MID SpA.8
The market is fully centralized and very liquid; in 2006 e-MID accounted for
17% of total turnover in the unsecured money market in the Euro area, see
European Central Bank (2007). Average daily trading volumes were 24.2 bn
Euro in 2006, 22.4 bn Euro in 2007 and only 14 bn Euro in 2008.
Detailed descriptions of the market and the corresponding network prop-
erties can be found in Finger et al. (2012).9 In this paper we used all regis-
tered trades in Euro in the period from January 1999 to December 2010. For
each trade we know the banks' ID numbers (not the names), their relative
position (aggressor and quoter), the maturity and the transaction type (buy
or sell). The majority of trades is conducted overnight and due to the global
ﬁnancial crisis (GFC) markets for longer maturities essentially dried up. We
will focus on all overnight trades conducted on the platform, leaving a total
number of 1,317,679 trades. If not stated otherwise, the reported results are
based on trades conducted between Italian banks only, reducing the total
number of trades to 1,215,759.
4.4 Results
In this section we present empirical results on the dynamics and distribu-
tion of the number of links (degrees) and the number of transactions (ntrans)
of individual institutions. The degree of a node gives the total number of
links that a bank has with all other banks and can thus be seen as a measure
for the importance of individual nodes. Undirected networks imply symmet-
ric adjacency matrices. In this case bank i's total degree ki is simply the
number of relationships bank i has with other banks, i.e.
ktotali =
∑
j 6=i
auij. (4.1)
For directed networks, we diﬀerentiate between incoming links (bank i bor-
rows money from other banks) and outgoing links (i lends money to other
8 The vast majority of trades (roughly 95%) is conducted in Euro.
9 See also the e-MID website http://www.e-mid.it/.
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banks), and deﬁne the in- and out-degree of i (kini and k
out
i ) as
kini =
∑
j 6=i
aji
kouti =
∑
j 6=i
aij,
(4.2)
respectively. Note that our networks contain only banks with at least one
(directed) link. In this way, the total degree of a sample bank is always
at least equal to one, while it may be the case that either the in- or out-
degree equals zero for a particular bank. Since we ignore zero values in the
distribution ﬁtting approach, this aﬀects the number of observations for the
diﬀerent variables.
For the number of transactions, we use similar deﬁnitions based on the
T matrix, with each element ti,j giving the number of trades with credit
extended from bank i to bank j. To be precise, we calculate the number of
in-/out-transactions as
nini =
∑
j 6=i
tji
nouti =
∑
j 6=i
tij.
(4.3)
Additionally, we analyze the total number of transactions, for simplicity de-
ﬁned as the sum of in- and out-transactions
ntotali = n
in
i + n
out
i . (4.4)
4.4.1 Dynamics of the Degrees and Number of Transactions
Before investigating the distribution of the variables under study, we pro-
vide a brief overview of their dynamics over time, restricting ourselves to
quarterly data here. Figure 4.1 shows the in-/out-degrees (left) from the di-
rected networks and the total degrees from the undirected networks (right).
The upper left panel shows the mean and median in-degree and out-degrees
over time.10 Clearly, the mean values are decreasing over time, and so does
the median in-degree which is mostly very close to the mean value. For both
series we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant structural break after quarter 10. In contrast,
the median out-degree ﬂuctuated around an average value of roughly 17 over
most of the sample period, but with a signiﬁcant structural break after quar-
ter 39 due to the GFC. These values are considerably smaller than the values
10 Note that the mean in- and out-degree are identical by deﬁnition.
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Fig. 4.1: Mean and median degree over time. Left: in- and out-
degree. Right: total degree. Top: absolute levels. Bottom:
standardized values (divided by the number of active banks
per quarter).
for the in-degree, pointing towards a substantial level of skewness in the out-
degree distribution. Thus, the distributions of in- and out-degrees are likely
to be not identical. The lower left panel shows the relative mean and median
degree over time, i.e. the values in the upper panel standardized by the num-
ber of nodes active in each quarter. We see that the negative trend in the
upper panel is mostly driven by the negative trend in the number of active
banks. Thus, the standardization appears to make the in-degrees of diﬀerent
quarters comparable. This is less so for the median out-degree, which is far
more volatile over the sample period.11 For the sake of completeness, the
corresponding values for the degrees from the undirected networks are shown
on the right-hand side. Both for the absolute and relative values the mean
and median values are very similar, except for the beginning of the sam-
ple period. This is driven by the high level of asymmetry in the out-degree
distribution for the ﬁrst half of the sample, which appears to decrease later
on.
What does the evidence on the diﬀerences between the in- and out-degree
11 Interestingly, after standardizing the degrees, we ﬁnd structural breaks in all three
time series close to quarter 39, i.e. around the GFC.
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Fig. 4.2: Left: Scatter plot of in- vs. out-degree. Correlation: .0899.
Right: Correlation between individual banks' in- and out-
degree over time. Italian banks.
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Fig. 4.3: Mean and median number of transactions over time. Left:
Directed Network. Right: Undirected Network. Top: ab-
solute levels. Bottom: standardized values (divided by the
number of active banks per quarter).
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distributions imply? Given that many studies on interbank markets work
with undirected networks, these studies entail the implicit assumption of a
high correlation between in- and out-degrees of individual banks. The left
panel of Figure 4.2 shows a scatter-plot of in-degree against out-degree for
Italian banks, showing a small correlation of .0899 for all observations. For
single quarters, we ﬁnd that the correlation between these measures may be
very small, at times even negative. Thus, banks with a high in-degree do not
necessarily have a high out-degree and vice versa. The directed version of
the network contains a considerable amount of information. The right panel
of Figure 4.2 indeed shows a relatively monotonic decline of the correlation
over time. This implies that banks have become more `specialized', i.e. in
any quarter they appear to enter the market predominantly as lenders or
borrowers.
For the number of transactions, Figure 4.3 shows the dynamics of the
mean and median in-/out-ntrans (left) and the total ntrans (right). The
upper left panel shows that the average number of transactions per bank is
close to 200 during most quarters, but signiﬁcantly decreases during and after
the GFC. For both variables, the median values are substantially smaller than
the mean, which hints towards a high level of skewness. Again, substantial
diﬀerences in the median values indicate that the in- and out-variables are
unlikely to follow identical distributions. The bottom left panel shows the
standardized mean and median values. Quite interestingly, the somewhat
negative trend of the variables vanishes, except for the GFC period. The same
observation applies to the total number of transactions on the right panels.
The results concerning the correlation between in- and out-transactions are
comparable to those for the degrees (not reported).
4.4.2 The Degree Distributions
Due to the change in the size of the Italian interbank network, and the
detection of two candidates for signiﬁcant structural breaks during our sam-
ple period, we split the data set into three periods: Period 1 covers quarters
1-10, period 2 covers quarters 11-39, and period 3 covers the remaining quar-
ters 40-48.12 Assuming that the realizations of single days (quarters) are iid
draws (or weakly dependent ones) from the same underlying data generating
process, allows us to pool the data of the three subperiods into larger samples
for the in-, out-, and total degrees (ntrans) of active banks, respectively. We
use both daily and quarterly aggregates, i.e. construct variables that count
12 Note that the ﬁrst subsample roughly coincides with the data set used by De Masi et
al. (2006).
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the number of unique counterparties (degree) and total number of transac-
tions (ntrans) for each bank within each day and quarter, respectively.13 For
the daily (quarterly) data this amounts to a total of 96,892 (1,780), 188,582
(3,369), and 41,775 (843) pooled observations for the three periods, respec-
tively. For the sake of completeness, we also show the results when pooling
all observations for the three time periods (1-3) for each degree measure.
We should stress that pooling observations from several periods is crucially
necessary in order to obtain reliable parameter estimates, in particular for
daily data. We will elaborate on this issue in more detail in the next section.
As a ﬁrst step, we compare the in- and out-degree distributions and check
whether they could be realizations from the same underlying distribution.
Figure 4.4 shows the histograms of the in-, out-, and total degrees for the
diﬀerent time-periods using quarterly data. We see that the histograms look
very diﬀerent when comparing in- and out-degrees for each sample period.
We should note that a substantial fraction of observations equals zero, both
for in- and out-degrees. While the in-degree histograms appear to have a
certain hump-shape, the out-degrees look more like a slowly decaying function
with monotonic decline of probability from left to right. Furthermore, the
L-shaped form of the out-degree distributions appears to be more stable over
time, even though the scale on the x-axis changes substantially. Individual
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests provide further evidence against the equality
of in- and out-degree distributions for all sample periods. The KS test allows
to check whether two variables follow the same probability distribution, but
also whether one variable follows a certain speciﬁc distribution. In our case,
the KS test statistic is calculated as
KSn = sup
x
|F1,n(x)− F2,n(x)|, (4.5)
where supx denotes the supremum of all possible values, while F1,n(·) and
F2,n(·) are the empirical distribution functions of the sample of in-degrees
and out-degrees, respectively. At all sensible signiﬁcance levels, we have
to reject the null hypothesis of the equality of both distributions. Similar
observations can be made when pooling all observations across the three
subperiods, see Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.6 shows the complementary cumulative distribution functions
(ccdf) for the quarterly degree measures for all sample periods on a log-log
scale, the typical way to represent data when suspecting power-law decay.
Note that for a power-law, these ccdfs would be straight lines, which upon
inspection seems unlikely to provide a good approximation to any of our
13 In Appendix 4.6.4 we present a similar analysis for the distribution of transaction
volumes of individual institutions.
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Fig. 4.4: Quarterly data, degree. Histograms for in-degree (left), out-
degree (center), and total degree (right) for Period 1, 2, and
3.
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tions.
4. Distribution of Links in the Interbank Market 102
100 102 104
10−4
10−2
100
lo
g(C
CD
F)
In−degree
log(degree)
100 102 104
10−4
10−2
100
log(degree)
lo
g(C
CD
F)
Out−degree
 
 
Complete
Period 1
Period 2
Period 3
100 102 104
10−4
10−2
100
log(degree)
lo
g(C
CD
F)
Total degree
Fig. 4.6: Quarterly data, degree. Complementary cumulative distri-
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and total degree (bottom) for all time periods on a log-log
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Fig. 4.7: Daily data, degree. Complementary cumulative distribution
functions (ccdf) in-degree (top), out-degree (center), and to-
tal degree (bottom) for all time periods on a log-log scale.
subsamples, even for the tail regions. Again the distributions of in- and out-
degrees look quite diﬀerent in general, even though the shapes of the tail
regions appear to be more homogeneous than what one might have expected
after inspection of the raw data in Figures 4.4 and 4.5. Similar arguments
hold for the distribution of total degrees, which has a somewhat similar shape
as the in-degree distribution. For this reason, we will mostly restrict ourselves
to comment on the results for the in- and out-degrees, respectively. We also
show the ccdfs for the daily observations in Figure 4.7. Again, it is hard to
detect a linear decay for most samples, at least not over several orders of
magnitude.
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Distribution Fitting Approach
Our basic approach is to ﬁt a number of candidate distributions in order to
investigate which distribution describes the data `best' in a statistical sense.
We should note that, similar to the approach in Stumpf and Ingram (2005),
we use both discrete and continuous candidate distributions, implying that
for the latter we treat the degrees as continuous variables. The candidate
distributions, always ﬁtted using maximum likelihood (ML), are:
- the Exponential distribution, with parameter λ > 0 (rate),
- the Gamma distribution, with parameters k > 0 (shape) and θ > 0
(scale),
- the Geometric distribution, with probability parameter p ∈ [0, 1],
- the Log-normal distribution, with parameters µ (scale) and σ > 0
(shape),
- the negative Binomial distribution, with parameters r > 0 (number of
failures) and p ∈ [0, 1] (success probability),
- the Poisson distribution, with parameter λ > 0,
- the discrete power-law or Pareto distribution, with parameters xm > 0
(scale) and α > 0 (shape),
- the Weibull or stretched exponential distribution, with parameters λ >
0 (scale) and k > 0 (shape).
We should note that a large part of the literature focuses on ﬁtting the
power-law only, in particular when the ccdfs have an apparently linear shape.
Given that this is not the case here, we test a number of alternative distri-
butions to ﬁnd the distributions that ﬁt the data best. Nevertheless, even
though the power-law might not be a good description of the complete distri-
bution, it could still provide of good ﬁt of the (upper) tail region. Therefore,
we conducted two sets of estimations of the above distributions for each sam-
ple: ﬁrst, we ﬁtted the complete distribution using all entries of our samples.
Here we should stress, that several of the distributions have strictly positive
support, while the others also allow for the occurrence of zero links. For the
sake of consistency we will therefore only use non-zero values for the degree
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and ntrans variables in the following.14 This means, for some distribution
functions, we are using truncated variables in general (both for the complete
and tail observations) and need to adjust the ML estimators for these dis-
tributions accordingly, cf. Appendix 4.6.1. In a second step, we explicitly
ﬁtted three of the eight candidate distributions, namely the Exponential, the
Log-normal, and the power-law, to a certain upper tail region for each pe-
riod and variable (the other candidates would obviously make little sense as
tail distributions). There are diﬀerent possibilities to identify the `optimal'
tail region and here we employ the approach of Clauset et al. (2009), which
has been demonstrated to yield reliable estimates of both power-law parame-
ters for certain distributions converging to Paretian tail behavior. The basic
idea of this approach is to ﬁnd the optimal tail parameter for all possible
cutoﬀ points using maximum likelihood, where the optimal xm is the one
corresponding to the lowest KS statistic. Details can be found in Appendix
4.6.2.15 The tail region is then deﬁned by the scale parameter xm, and the
other distributions are ﬁtted to all observations where x ≥ xm. Note that
this approach gives an obvious advantage to the ﬁt of the power-law in the
`tail' region. Quite surprisingly, however, in many cases the power-law is not
the best description of the data tailored in this way as we will see below.
In these goodness-of-ﬁts (GOF) experiments, we ﬁrst estimate the pa-
rameters for each candidate distribution, both for the complete data set and
the upper tail region, respectively, using ML. Using these parameters, we
calculate the KS test-statistic for each candidate distribution and take the
one with the lowest value as the `best' ﬁt of the respective data.16 As a last
step, we evaluate the GOF of this candidate distribution based on the KS
test statistic. Given that the critical values of the KS distribution are only
valid for known distributions (i.e. without estimating parameters), we have
14 This is important, since we cannot replicate the large number of zero values based on
these distributions that we observe in the empirical data. Ignoring zeros reduces the num-
ber of quarterly observations to 1,742, 3,271, and 788 for the in-variables, and 1,450, 2,733,
and 663 for the out-variables, respectively. For the daily data this leaves 70,584, 133,280,
and 28,093 for the in-variables, and 39,619, 83,723, and 17,961 for the out-variables, re-
spectively. The number of observations for the total degree and ntrans variables remain
unaﬀected, since only active banks are in the sample.
15 There exist a number of alternative approaches in statistical extreme value theory
for determining the optimal tail size. The approaches by Danielsson et al. (2001) and
Drees and Kaufmann (1998) yielded results very similar to those reported in the text. We
also checked certain ﬁxed thresholds for identifying the tail region. The results remain
qualitatively the same as long as the chosen upper quantile is reasonably large.
16 In principle, we could also use likelihood-based criteria, e.g. AIC or BIC. However,
Clauset et al. (2009) provide some evidence that the KS statistic is preferable as it is more
robust to statistical ﬂuctuations.
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to perform individual Monte-Carlo exercises.17 In these exercises, we ran-
domly sample many degree sequences from the best ﬁtting distributions with
their estimated parameter values and then calculate the KS test statistic of
these synthetic data sets. The reported p-values count the relative fraction of
observations larger than the observed ones, such that low p-values (say 5%)
indicate that the pertinent distribution can be rejected. We should stress
that we carry out this analysis only for the best ﬁtting distribution, since the
remaining ones have already been found to be inferior under the KS criterion.
Details on the Monte-Carlo design can be found in Appendix 4.6.3.
In the following we will use this approach to investigate the distribution of
degrees and number of transactions for both daily and quarterly aggregates.
Already at this point we should stress that the GOF tests mostly indicate that
the distributions have to be rejected at traditional levels of signiﬁcance for
the complete samples, while the ﬁts to the tail tend to perform better. This
ﬁnding is, however, strongly driven by the signiﬁcantly smaller number of
observations for the tail data, which yields relatively large and more volatile
KS statistics compared to the complete distributions.
Daily Data
We start our analysis with the daily degree data for which earlier studies
have reported power-laws (De Masi et al., 2006, and Iori et al., 2008). Before
turning to the results, we need to stress several complicating issues arising
from network data in general, and our data in particular. For example,
Stumpf and Porter (2012) note that `[a]s a rule of thumb, a candidate power-
law should exhibit an approximately linear relationship on a log-log plot over
at least two orders of magnitude in both the x and y axes. This criterion
rules out many data sets, including just about all biological networks'. In this
sense, ﬁnite and possibly very small network sizes make it hard to provide
evidence for scale-free networks (Avnir et al., 1998, and Clauset et al., 2009).
For our data, Figure 4.8 shows the maximum in- and out-degrees for the
individual days over time. We see that the criterion of Stumpf and Porter
(2012) is typically violated. Thus, it should be hard to ﬁnd evidence in favor
of the power-law hypothesis for the complete distributions. Additionally, the
number of observations in the `tail' of the data for a single day becomes
very small leading to large ﬂuctuations of estimates across days and large
error bands of single estimates. These issues highlight the importance of
applying rigorous statistical methods to identify the best ﬁtting distributions,
i.e. simply identifying a linear slope of the ccdf on a log-log scale might easily
17 See Clauset et al. (2009) and Stumpf et al. (2005) for similar approaches.
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Fig. 4.8: Daily data. Maximum in- and out-degrees over time.
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Fig. 4.9: Daily data, degree. Histograms for the power-law exponents
for the complete distributions, in-, out- and total degree,
respectively.
be misleading. Similar remarks also apply for the daily ntrans variables (see
below), while quarterly data are typically slightly less problematic.
To highlight our previous comments, Figures 4.9 and 4.10 show the dis-
tribution of the estimated daily power-law parameters for the complete and
tail observations, respectively, for all sample days. For the complete daily
samples, the results are very stable over time and across types of degrees, cf.
Figure 4.9. In fact, we will see that this stability tends to carry over to the
complete distributions of the aggregated data as well. In contrast, there is a
substantial level of heterogeneity for the power-law exponent of the tail ob-
servations for the individual days, cf. Figure 4.10. Thus, we cannot conﬁrm
previously reported ﬁndings of `typical' tail parameters between 2 and 3 for
any of the degree variables.18 While numerous observations lie within this
range, for many days we ﬁnd substantially larger values, at times as large as
18 The results are very similar when focusing on the individual period 1-3 as deﬁned
before.
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Fig. 4.10: Daily data, degree. Histograms for the power-law expo-
nents for the tail observations, in-, out- and total degree,
respectively.
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Fig. 4.11: Daily data, degree. Total number of observations (com-
plete) and number of tail observations for out-degree.
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7.19 Apparently, the daily tail data are too noisy to identify a `typical' tail
parameter, cf. Figure 4.11.20 The mismatch between the narrow range of
values obtained for the complete data set of single days and the broad range
of estimates for their tail might also indicate that the former are mainly
determined by the more central part of the distribution.
Since data for single days are too scarce to allow reliable parameter es-
timation, pooling observations over longer horizons might be advisable to
obtain better estimates. This, of course, requires the assumption of daily
data being drawn independently from the same underlying distribution, or
only with weak dependence of adjacent observations. While it is not straight-
forward to check this assumption for complete daily ensembles (as opposed
to a time-series of univariate daily data), we have made some attempt at
checking for statistical breaks for averages of degree statistics and have cut
our complete sample into subsamples accordingly. Note also that any analy-
sis of a network structure would be more or less futile, if we could not assume
some stationarity of the structural characteristics of the network. Fricke and
Lux (2012) demonstrate that the e-MID network is indeed structurally stable
along many dimensions.
We report our estimation results for the pooled daily data in Tables 4.1-
4.3. Our main ﬁnding is that the negative Binomial distribution provides
the best ﬁts (in bold) for all daily degree measures and for all samples (i.e.
the complete samples and the three subsamples identiﬁed via tests for struc-
tural breaks), cf. Table 4.1. The results from the GOF experiments indicate,
however, that the best ﬁtting candidate distributions have to be rejected.
Therefore, even the winner among the candidate distributions appears to be
an unlikely description of the data. We should also stress that the ﬁt of the
power-law is usually rather poor, competing with the Poisson distribution for
the worst description of the data. Similar to the ﬁndings for the individual
days, the estimated tail parameters are between 1.5 and 1.6, cf. Table 4.2
(top, complete). Figure 4.7 together with the relatively poor KS statistics
for estimated power-laws suggests that estimates in the scaling range 1-2 are
19 We have set 7 as the upper bound of the power-law parameter in our numerical ML
implementation. For larger values the evaluation of the zeta function appearing in the
discrete Pareto law, cf. Appendix 4.6.2, is not accurate enough to obtain reliable estimates.
The fact that the estimated values hit the upper bound quite frequently indicates that the
estimated values may become even larger when increasing the upper bound.
20 We also generated synthetic power-law distributed random draws and estimated their
scaling parameters based on the algorithm for the selection of the tail region detailed above
(not reported). For the small sample sizes of the typical daily data, the tail parameter of
these synthetic data is highly volatile as well, even though the very large values observed
for the actual data are very rare. As usual, however, increasing the number of observations
(say more than 500), typically yields estimates very close to the true parameters.
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In Out Total
Period 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3
Exponential .0465 .0627 .0448 .0498 .0789 .0911 .0777 .0447 .0488 .0764 .0374 .0406
Gamma .0627 .0670 .0661 .0870 .0515 .0511 .0536 .0559 .0562 .0637 .0512 .0592
Geometric .0132 .0250 .0129 .0299 .0608 .0759 .0595 .0224 .0214 .0510 .0127 .0289
Log-normal .0814 .0748 .0816 .1001 .0725 .0722 .0736 .0746 .0631 .0605 .0641 .0701
Neg. Bin. .0063 .0177 .0082 .0224 .0114 .0160 .0138 .0105 .0153 .0208 .0115 .0103
Poisson .2313 .2409 .2347 .1715 .3500 .3774 .3476 .2678 .2973 .3318 .2892 .2087
Power-law .2099 .2151 .2107 .1985 .2077 .2024 .2079 .2140 .2366 .2219 .2427 .2373
Weibull .0591 .0630 .0646 .0872 .0547 .0552 .0574 .0555 .0522 .0575 .0481 .0581
Tab. 4.1: Daily data, degree. KS statistic for the candidate distribu-
tions (complete). Minimum values in bold indicate the best
ﬁtting distribution. Asterisks would indicate non-rejection
of this distribution at the 5% conﬁdence level, where the
critical values were obtained from a Monte-Carlo exercise
as described in the main text. There is, however, no such
case in this table.
obtained as very inaccurate straight lines ﬁtted to a strongly curved distribu-
tional shape. Moving to the tail observations, we ﬁnd that exponential and
power-law distributions tend to provide the best ﬁt for all variables, cf. Table
4.3. Thus, it appears that the power-law is a better description of the tail
observations - a usual ﬁnding for many data sets. In contrast to the complete
distributions, the GOF experiments suggest that the estimated distributions
are mostly not rejected for the tail observations.21 Upon closer inspection,
however, we see the KS statistics of the exponential and the power-law are
typically close to each other, in particular when the tail exponents are very
large, cf. Table 4.2 (top, complete). Even though the power-law appears
to provide the best ﬁt for some of the tail data, the very large parameter
values (larger than 4, often close to 7) are in a range where the power-law
becomes almost undistinguishable from exponential decay. Often such high
values would be obtained spuriously from distributions with an exponential
decline as semi-parametric estimators of the tail index would not be able to
`identify' the limit of α → ∞. The huge diﬀerence in estimated power-law
parameters for the complete sample compared to the tail also indicates that
the empirical distribution shows pronounced curvature (actually conﬁrming
the visual inspection of absence of a linear slope over the complete support
and very fast decline at the end in Figure 4.7). On the other hand, it is also
interesting to remark that the estimated coeﬃcients are relatively uniform
for both the complete sample and the tail, respectively, across periods and
21 This result is driven by the higher noise level in the tail data due to a smaller number
of observations compared to the complete distributions.
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In Out Total
Period 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3
Daily
Complete 1.61 1.61 1.60 1.67 1.50 1.48 1.50 1.54 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.57
(.001) (.003) (.002) (.005) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.005) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.003)
Tail 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 5.93 4.43 7.00 5.53 6.03 4.70 7.00 7.00
(.175) (.300) (.160) (.260) (.110) (.078) (.170) (.161) (.100) (.071) (.146) (.393)
Quarterly
Complete 1.28 1.26 1.28 1.33 1.29 1.28 1.29 1.33 1.24 1.23 1.24 1.27
(.004) (.006) (.005) (.001) (.004) (.008) (.006) (.001) (.003) (.006) (.004) (.009)
Tail 5.13 7.00 7.00 4.63 7.00 6.90 7.00 4.82 5.20 6.90 7.00 5.01
(.134) (.460) (.325) (.233) (.482) (.532) (.412) (.306) (.145) (.421) (.330) (.261)
Tab. 4.2: Power-law parameters and standard deviations, degree.
Values obtained via numerical maximization of the log-
likelihood for discrete data. Standard deviations (in paren-
theses) approximated as (α−1)/√T , with T being the num-
ber of observations. Top: daily data, bottom: quarterly
data.
In Out Total
Period 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3
Exponential .0357∗ .0354∗ .0355∗ .0954 .0642 .0580 .0353∗ .0388∗ .0685 .0637 .0300∗ .0457
Log-normal .0664 .0639 .0762 .1036 .0479 .0479 .0541 .0771 .0484 .0455 .0521 .0927
Power-law .0372 .0376 .0400 .0203∗ .0129∗ .0305∗ .0392 .0455 .0114∗ .0192∗ .0352 .0382∗
Tab. 4.3: Daily data, degree. KS statistic for the candidate distri-
butions (tail). Minimum values in bold indicate the best
ﬁtting distribution. Asterisks indicate non-rejection of this
distribution at the 5% conﬁdence level, where the critical
values were obtained from a Monte-Carlo exercise as de-
scribed in the main text.
for all the measures of degree. This speaks of relatively uniform shapes of
the distributions, at least in view of this simple statistic. Summing up, the
power-law distribution appears to be a poor description of the data, both
for the complete distribution and the tail observations (where it more or less
coincides with an exponential for the high estimates of the tail index). We
also need to stress that the identiﬁed power-law exponents, both for individ-
ual days and pooled observations, are far oﬀ from those reported in earlier
studies. It is not clear how these estimates were obtained.
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In Out Total
Period 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3
Exponential .1474 .1544 .1661 .1520 .0797 .0932 .0710 .0925 .1740 .1675 .1887 .2171
Gamma .0573 .0543 .0723 .0942 .0595 .0514 .0738 .0961 .0414 .0284∗ .0673 .0943
Geometric .1533 .1586 .1723 .1619 .0778 .0918 .0728 .1009 .1771 .1696 .1920 .2223
Log-normal .1141 .0972 .1274 .1377 .1063 .0984 .1164 .1226 .0972 .0760 .1185 .1453
Neg. Bin. .0601 .0580 .0729 .1025 .0708 .0615 .0836 .1081 .0395 .0318 .0627 .0881
Poisson .3117 .3462 .2753 .2561 .4367 .4707 .4116 .4183 .3601 .4115 .3183 .2489
Power-law .3828 .4023 .3849 .3522 .2727 .2728 .2842 .2608 .4376 .4546 .4387 .4291
Weibull .0380 .0342∗ .0456 .0689 .0624 .0609 .0736 .0912 .0246 .0361 .0325 .0495∗
Tab. 4.4: Quarterly data, degree. KS statistic for the candidate dis-
tributions (complete). Minimum values in bold indicate the
best ﬁtting distribution. Asterisks indicate non-rejection of
this distribution at the 5% conﬁdence level, where the crit-
ical values were obtained from a Monte-Carlo exercise as
described in the main text.
In Out Total
Period 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3
Exponential .0248∗ .0466 .0325∗ .0628∗ .0395∗ .0394 .0352∗ .0459∗ .0331∗ .0315∗ .0437∗ .0530∗
Log-normal .0379 .0441∗ .0431 .0766 .0526 .0533 .0663 .0756 .0451 .0494 .0769 .0794
Power-law .0651 .0748 .0471 .0949 .0502 .0384∗ .0559 .0918 .0515 .0405 .0602 .0778
Tab. 4.5: Quarterly data, degree. KS statistic for the candidate dis-
tributions (tail). Minimum values in bold indicate the best
ﬁtting distribution. Asterisks indicate non-rejection of this
distribution at the 5% conﬁdence level, where the critical
values were obtained from a Monte-Carlo exercise as de-
scribed in the main text.
Quarterly Data
The results for the quarterly data are shown in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. Weibull
distributions typically provide the best ﬁts for the in- and total degrees,
while Exponential and Gamma distributions yield comparable ﬁts as the
Weibull for the out-degrees. Similar to the complete distributions for the
daily data, the optimal ﬁts are insigniﬁcant, except for three cases. Again,
the best ﬁts appear to be unlikely descriptions of the observed data. The
power-law exponents for the complete sample are again quite small, typically
between 1.25 and 1.3, cf. Table 4.2 (bottom, complete). Turning to the
tail observations, we ﬁnd that Exponential distributions provide the best ﬁts
in all but two cases (in-degree in period 1, out-degree period 1). Similar
to the daily observations, for the best ﬁts of the tail data, the pertinent
distributions cannot be rejected as the `true' data-generating process at the
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95 percent signiﬁcance level. The poor ﬁt of the power-law again comes
along with relatively large tail exponents, cf. Table 4.2 (bottom, tail). In
summary, similar to the daily data, we do not ﬁnd evidence in favor of scale-
free networks.
Robustness and Discussion
A reason for not ﬁnding evidence for power-law distributions may be the
fact that we focus on the subnetwork formed by Italian banks only. Stumpf
et al. (2005) have shown that (randomly chosen) subnetworks of scale-free
networks are in fact not scale-free. Therefore we also checked the distribu-
tions including foreign banks as well, similar to the existing papers using
the e-MID data. We found that the results (including the tail parameters)
remain qualitatively unaﬀected (not reported). In terms of Stumpf et al.
(2005), these ﬁndings indicate again that the networks including all banks
are unlikely to be scale-free, and that our previous ﬁndings for Italian banks
alone are not biased due to random sampling from a larger scale-free network
(indeed, it seems very unlikely that the Italian banks should constitute a ran-
dom set from the overall sample of all banks). Then it comes as no surprise
that the subnetworks formed by Italian banks only are also not scale-free. In
fact, it is remarkable that there appears to be no signiﬁcant qualitative eﬀect
of incorporating foreign banks or not.
In Finger et al. (2012) it has been shown that the quarterly e-MID net-
works are more complete representations of the underlying `latent' network
structure, whereas daily networks might be seen as random activations of
parts of the more complex, hidden structure. Under this perspective, the
lack of coincidence of the ﬁtted distributions for diﬀerent levels of time ag-
gregation might not be too surprising.
Summing up, our results indicate that the power-law hypothesis needs to
be tested more thoroughly for other networks in general and the interbank
network in particular,22 with the power-law being one of many candidate
distributions. The ﬁndings are in line with other studies casting doubts on
certain claims of power-law and scaling behavior in a broad range of empirical
studies (cf. Avnir et al., 1998).
4.4.3 The Distribution of the Number of Transactions
Note that the quarterly degree of a given bank is not the simple sum
of its daily degrees, since a link that has been activated many times over a
quarter, is counted only as one link on the quarterly level of network activity.
22 See Stumpf and Porter (2012).
4. Distribution of Links in the Interbank Market 113
If we consider the number of links in the daily data as (possibly power-law
distributed) random variables, the number of transactions over a longer time
horizon is, in fact, what we obtain from simple aggregation of the daily
degrees observed for any bank i. Assuming that the degrees of all banks are
drawn from the same distribution, we obtain in this way a sample of sums
of random variables following the same underlying distribution. Note that
we would expect a power-law at the daily level to survive in the aggregation
process for an iid random process of link formation as well as for various
extensions allowing for `weak' dependency.23 The extremal behavior of the
distribution of degrees should, therefore, be preserved in the distribution of
the number of transactions over longer horizons. We turn to the analysis of
this quantity in this subsection.
Note also that the ﬁnite size of the network might pose a problem due to
the eﬀective imposition of an upper limit on the observable degrees. It might,
therefore, be the case that a scale-free distribution is just hard to verify
because of the small number of observations. In contrast, the aggregated
ntrans variables have the advantage that they have no obvious upper bound,
so testing the power-law hypothesis might be more sensible in this case.
Figures 4.12 and 4.13 show the ccdfs of the quarterly and daily ntrans
variables. Again, linear decay over several orders of magnitude is hard to
detect visually. However, at least for the quarterly data we see that the
variables under study span several orders of magnitude, making the data
more useful candidates for our distribution ﬁtting approach.
In Out Total
Period 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3
Quarterly
Complete 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.21 1.21 1.22 1.21 1.23 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.17
(.003) (.005) (.003) (.008) (.003) (.006) (.004) (.009) (.002) (.004) (.003) (.006)
Tail 3.48 2.78 3.54 3.06 3.16 2.99 2.21 2.95 2.77 3.03 2.76 3.68
(.091) (.082) (.116) (.136) (.094) (.143) (.044) (.180) (.040) (.106) (.050) (.200)
Tab. 4.6: Power-law parameters and standard deviations, ntrans.
Values obtained via numerical maximization of the log-
likelihood for discrete data. Standard deviations (in paren-
theses) approximated as (α−1)/√T , with T being the num-
ber of observations. Quarterly data.
For daily data, the range of the observed variables remains rather limited,
23 The stability under aggregation of power-laws characterizing the tails of iid random
variables is one of the basic tenets of the statistical theory of extremes, cf. Reiss and
Thomas (2007). In this sense, summing up daily power-law networks should preserve the
tail index for diﬀerent frequencies.
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Fig. 4.12: Quarterly data, ntrans. Complementary cumulative distri-
bution functions (ccdf) in-trans (top), out-trans (center),
and total trans (bottom) for all time periods on a log-log
scale.
100 101 102
10−6
10−4
10−2
100
log(trans)
lo
g(C
CD
F)
In−trans
 
 
Complete
Period 1
Period 2
Period 3
100 102 104
10−6
10−4
10−2
100
lo
g(C
CD
F)
Out−trans
log(trans)
100 102 104
10−6
10−4
10−2
100
log(trans)
lo
g(C
CD
F)
Total trans
Fig. 4.13: Daily data, ntrans. Complementary cumulative distribu-
tion functions (ccdf) in-trans (top), out-trans (center), and
total trans (bottom) for all time periods on a log-log scale.
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even though the maximum value is roughly twice the one for the degrees
(not reported). Since for daily realizations of the number of transactions
we ﬁnd virtually identical results to those of the daily degrees, we abstain
from presenting these here, and immediately turn to quarterly aggregated
observations.
In Out Total
Period 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3
Exponential .0452 .0516 .0467 .0748 .2334 .2598 .2131 .2716 .0612 .0524 .0761 .0955
Gamma .0153 .0287 .0199 .0388 .0167 .0165 .0185 .0498 .0356 .0485 .0325 .0549
Geometric .0450 .0511 .0465 .0744 .2331 .2595 .2129 .2713 .0614 .0525 .0763 .0960
Log-normal .0801 .0786 .0843 .0953 .0712 .0610 .0725 .1013 .0701 .0508 .0738 .1207
Neg. Bin. .0205 .0280 .0249 .0419 .0205 .0188 .0223 .0586 .0353 .0477 .0321 .0543
Poisson .5744 .5859 .5775 .5527 .6706 .6860 .6710 .6221 .5896 .6164 .5813 .5216
Power-law .3610 .3865 .3658 .3384 .2381 .2397 .2607 .2209 .4497 .4488 .4648 .4236
Weibull .0185 .0244 .0186 .0420 .0383 .0389 .0392 .0668 .0391 .0481 .0386 .0437∗
Tab. 4.7: Quarterly data, ntrans. KS statistic for the candidate dis-
tributions (complete). Minimum values in bold indicate the
best ﬁtting distribution. Asterisks indicate non-rejection of
this distribution at the 5% conﬁdence level, where the crit-
ical values were obtained from a Monte-Carlo exercise as
described in the main text.
In Out Total
Period 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3
Exponential .0684 .0874 .0709 .0687 .0393∗ .0805 .0532 .0751 .0528 .0616 .0492 .0948
Log-normal .0258∗ .0202∗ .0441∗ .0560∗ .0408 .0594∗ .0495 .0700∗ .0274∗ .0336∗ .0362∗ .0579
Power-law .0476 .0570 .0520 .1219 .0988 .0741 .1024 .0718 .0676 .0604 .0683 .0426∗
Tab. 4.8: Quarterly data, ntrans. KS statistic for the candidate dis-
tributions (tail). Minimum values in bold indicate the best
ﬁtting distribution. Asterisks indicate non-rejection of this
distribution at the 5% conﬁdence level, where the critical
values were obtained from a Monte-Carlo exercise as de-
scribed in the main text.
We show the results in Tables 4.7 and 4.8, ﬁnding that negative Binomial,
Gamma and Weibull distributions appear among the best ﬁts, depending on
the concept (in-, out-, or total transactions) and the period considered. How-
ever, their KS statistics are typically at a comparable level. The results from
the GOF experiments show that the best ﬁtting distributions are neverthe-
less rejected as data-generating processes (exception: total ntrans in period
3). Again, the ﬁt of the power-law is very bad in general, with tail parame-
ters around 1.20, cf. Table 4.6, and KS statistics that consistently come in
4. Distribution of Links in the Interbank Market 116
second to last (with the Poisson distribution performing worst). Moving to
the quarterly tail data, we ﬁnd that in most cases the Log-normal provides
the best ﬁt (exceptions: out-degree for the complete sample and total de-
gree in period 3). This is quite surprising, given that the scaling parameters
now lie in the `typical' range for power-laws, here between 2.21 and 3.68.
Therefore, even though the power-law estimates appear more sensible, it is
inferior by some margin in ﬁtting the tail data (with a cut-oﬀ determined
by the best-ﬁtting Pareto law) to the Log-normal, and sometimes also to
the Exponential. As with the previous cases, the results from the GOF ex-
periments indicate that the best ﬁtting tail distributions usually cannot be
rejected via KS tests with Monte-Carlo distributions. While it is well-known
that it is hard to distinguish Log-normal from power-law tails, these ﬁndings
raise doubts on the universality of power-law tails and highlight the need for
thorough statistical approaches of testing the power-law hypothesis.
As another robustness check, we investigated the distribution of transac-
tion volumes (tvol), cf. Appendix 4.6.4, again diﬀerentiating between in-tvol,
out-tvol and their sum (total tvol), respectively. While the tails of the tvol
variables are typically much fatter compared to the degree and ntrans vari-
ables, the power-law remains a poor description both for daily and quarterly
data.
4.5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have revisited the distributional properties of interbank
loans for the Italian interbank network during the years 1999-2010. Using
both the degrees and the number of transactions, we ﬁtted a set of diﬀerent
candidate distributions to these data for daily and quarterly aggregates, re-
spectively. Given that the daily networks have previously been claimed to
be scale-free (De Masi et al., 2006), it comes as a surprise that we ﬁnd no
evidence in favor of the power-law hypothesis: at the daily level the degrees
are usually ﬁt best by negative Binomial distributions, while the tails tend to
decay exponentially, i.e. the ﬁtted power-laws display very large tail parame-
ters. At the quarterly level, Weibull, Gamma, and Exponential distributions
tend to provide comparable ﬁts for the complete degree distribution, while
the tails again tend to display exponential decay. For the number of transac-
tions we ﬁnd comparable results, even though the tails of the quarterly data
appear to be fatter. However, in this case the Log-normal distribution usu-
ally outperforms the power-law. Moreover, we found that the networks are
characterized by a substantial level of asymmetry, as exempliﬁed by the low
correlation between in- and out-degrees. We also ﬁnd that the two variables
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do not follow identical distributions in general.
Overall these ﬁndings indicate that the power-law is typically a poor
description of the data. This implies that preferential attachment and related
mechanisms (see e.g. De Masi et al., 2006), are unlikely explanations for
the formation of the Italian interbank network. Note that these ﬁndings
are also not in line with a large part of the empirical (interbank) network
literature for other data sets, putting doubts on the universality of scale-free
interbank networks. Our results also indicate that the power-law hypothesis
needs to be tested more thoroughly for other networks in general and the
interbank network in particular. The ﬁndings are related to other studies
casting doubts on certain claims of power-law and scaling behavior in a broad
range of empirical studies (cf. Avnir et al., 1998, and Stumpf and Porter,
2012), and it seems possible that claims of scale-free behavior of interbank
lending activity may not survive under closer statistical scrutiny.
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4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Truncated Distributions and Maximum Likelihood
The distribution ﬁtting approach described in the main text involves ﬁt-
ting a set of candidate distributions with possibly diﬀering support. For
example, some distributions have support at zero, while others do not. Simi-
larly, when focusing on the tail observations we have to get rid of the probabil-
ity mass below the cutoﬀ point in order to accurately calculate the statistics.
Therefore, we describe the use of truncated distributions and ML ﬁtting in
this Appendix in more detail.
Normalization
When working with truncated variables, we need to make sure to use the
correct pdfs and cdfs, since the ML estimation and the evaluation of the ﬁt
(KS statistic) depend on them. In order to illustrate this issue, let variable
x have the pdf p(x) with support [0,∞]. As usual, the cdf is deﬁned as
P (a) = P (X ≤ a) =
∫ a
0
p(x)dx. (4.6)
Now, suppose the data are (left-)truncated at some value xm, i.e. the variable
x˜ follows the same distribution as x, but the pdf has limited support [xm,∞]
with minimum value xm > 0. For our purposes, it is therefore useful to deﬁne
the quantity
P<(a) = P (X < a) = 1−
∫ ∞
a
p(x)dx, (4.7)
or more compactly
P<(a) = P (a)− p(a). (4.8)
We can properly construct the pdf of x˜, say p˜, as
p˜(x) =
{
p(x)
1−P<(xm) , if x ≥ xm
0, else.
(4.9)
where the denominator distributes the probability mass of p(x) among the
support of x˜.
For the calculation of the KS statistics, we also need the adjusted cdf.
For the supported values of x˜ it takes the form
P˜ (x) =
∫ x
xm
p(x)
1− P<(xm)dx =
1
1− P<(xm)
∫ x
xm
p(x)dx, (4.10)
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or
P˜ (x) =
P (x)− P<(xm)
1− P<(xm) , (4.11)
which can be easily evaluated.
Maximum Likelihood for Truncated Variables
Using the previous deﬁnitions, we can show that the ML estimator for
left-truncated variables does not coincide with the standard estimator. The
standard ML estimator, i.e. using a sample of n observations of x and de-
noting by θ the vector of parameters, can be written as
L(θ|x1, · · · , xn) = p(x1, · · · , xn|θ) =
n∏
i
p(xi|θ), (4.12)
or in logs
ln(L) =
n∑
i
ln[p(xi|θ)]. (4.13)
Using the deﬁnitions from above, we can show that the ML estimator for
left-truncated variables diﬀers from the one in Eq. (4.13). Using Eq. (4.9),
we can write the likelihood as
L =
n˜∏
i
p˜(xi|θ) =
n˜∏
i
p(x|θ)
1− P<(xm|θ) , (4.14)
where x ignores those observations smaller than xm and the total number of
observations is n˜ instead of n. Taking logarithms we obtain
ln(L) =
n˜∑
i
ln
[
p(xi|θ)
1− P<(xm|θ)
]
=
n˜∑
i
ln[p(xi|θ)]−
n˜∑
i
ln[1− P<(xm|θ)],
(4.15)
which can be written as
ln(L) = −n˜ ln[1− P<(xm|θ)] +
n˜∑
i
ln[p(xi|θ)]. (4.16)
The second part of this Eq. looks familiar, as it corresponds to Eq. (4.13) for
the n˜ observations with values ≥ xm. However, the normalization term on
the left does not vanish (as it depends on the parameter vector) and aﬀects
the location of the maximum likelihood estimator. Therefore, we need to
ﬁnd the θ that maximizes Eq. (4.16). The standard ML estimator would not
be eﬃcient.
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4.6.2 Discrete Power-laws and Parameter Estimation
This presentation is mostly based on Clauset et al. (2009).
Discrete Power-laws
A power-law distributed variable x obeys the pdf
p(x) ∝ x−α, (4.17)
where α > 0 is the tail exponent with `typical' interesting values in the
range between 1 and 3. In many cases, however, the power-law only applies
for some (upper) tail region, deﬁned by the minimum value xm. While it
is common to approximate discrete power-laws by the (simpler) continuous
version, for our (integer-valued) data, we employ the more accurate discrete
version in the paper.24
In the discrete case, the cdf of the power-law can be written as
P (x) =
ζ(α, x)
ζ(α, xm)
, (4.18)
where
ζ(α, xm) =
∞∑
n=0
(n+ xm)
−α (4.19)
is the generalized or Hurwitz zeta function.
Estimation of α and xm
For a given lower bound xm, the ML estimator of α can be found by direct
numerical maximization of the log-likelihood function
L(α) = −n ln[ζ(α, xm)]− α
n∑
i=1
ln[xi], (4.20)
where n is the number of observations.25 For simplicity, we approximate
the standard error of the estimated αˆ (for αˆ > 1) using the closed-form
24 Clauset et al. (2007) show that this is necessary for data sets from the social sciences,
where the maximum value is usually only a few orders of magnitude larger than the
minimum, i.e. the tail is heavy but rather short. In such cases the estimated exponents
can be biased severely when using the continuous approximation.
25 Using a quadratic approximation of the log-likelihood at its maximum, Clauset et
al. (2009) also derive an approximate closed-form solution for the estimate of α ' 1 +
n/
(∑n
i=1 ln
[
xi
xm−0.5
])
. This can be seen as an adjusted Hill-estimator, see Hill (1975).
While we always report the exact ML estimator, we checked that the approximation is
typically not too bad.
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solution based on continuous data.26 Neglecting higher-order terms, this can
be calculated as
σ =
αˆ− 1√
n
. (4.21)
However, the equations assume that xm is known in order to obtain an ac-
curate estimate of α.27 When the data span only a few orders of magnitude,
as usual in many social or complex systems, an underpopulated tail would
come along with little statistical power. Therefore, we employ the numerical
method proposed by Clauset et al. (2007) for selecting the xm that yields
the best power-law model for the data. To be precise, for each xm over some
reasonable range, we ﬁrst estimate the scaling parameter using Eq. (4.20)
and calculate the corresponding KS statistic between the ﬁtted data and the
theoretical distribution with the estimated parameters. The reported xm and
α are those that minimize the KS statistic, i.e. minimize the distance be-
tween the observed and ﬁtted probability distribution. According to Clauset
et al. (2007; 2009), minimizing the KS statistic is generally superior to other
distance measures, e.g. likelihood-based measures such as AIC or BIC.
4.6.3 Goodness-of-Fit Test for the Estimated Distributions
Since the distribution of the KS statistics is unknown for the compar-
ison between an empirical subsample and a hypothetical distribution with
estimated parameters, we carry out a Monte Carlo approach. We sample
synthetic data sets from the estimated distribution, compute the distribu-
tion of KS statistics and compare the results to the observed value for the
original data set. If the KS statistic of the empirical data set is beyond the
α percent quantile of the Monte Carlo distribution of KS values, we reject
the pertinent distribution at the 1 − α level of signiﬁcance. In our results,
we indicate signiﬁcant ﬁts at the 5% conﬁdence level using asterisks. We
should stress that we carry out this (very time-consuming) GOF experiment
only for the distribution with the minimum KS statistic for each sample and
variable, respectively. This can be justiﬁed by the fact that, even though
other candidate distributions may not be rejected as well, they are clearly
inferior to the optimal distribution in terms of the KS statistic.
26 Clauset et al. (2009) also derive an (approximate) estimator for the standard error
based on discrete data, which is, however, much harder to evaluate as it involves derivatives
of the generalized zeta function.
27 See Clauset et al. (2007; 2009) for an extensive discussion.
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Fig. 4.14: Quarterly data, tvol. Complementary cumulative distribu-
tion functions (ccdf) in-tvol (top), out-tvol (center), and
total tvol (bottom) for all time periods on a log-log scale.
4.6.4 Distributional Properties of Transaction Volumes
Here we report the results using another important measure for interbank
networks, namely the transaction volumes (tvol). We use the same distribu-
tion ﬁtting approach as before, diﬀerentiating between in-tvol, out-tvol and
their sum (total tvol), respectively. Figures 4.14 and 4.15 show the ccdfs on
a for the quarterly and daily variables on a log-log scale. We should stress
that the minimum trade size on the e-MID market is 50,000 Euros. In order
to run our estimation procedure in a reasonable amount of time, we rescale
the tvol variables by a factor of 10−6 such that a transaction size of 50,000 is
represented by a value of 0.05.28 We then round the tvol variable towards the
nearest integer (otherwise the discrete candidate distributions could not be
accurately evaluated), again ignoring zero values. In this way, we restrict our
samples to relatively large transaction volumes with at least 500,000 Euros,
represented by positive integer values. Note that, besides the upward bias of
the data and the fact that the data now span several orders of magnitude, it
is again hard to visually detect linear decay over several orders of magnitude
in the ccdfs. We should also stress that we did not perform the GOF exercise
for the tvol variables, since it is too time-consuming in this case.
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Fig. 4.15: Daily data, tvol. Complementary cumulative distribution
functions (ccdf) in-tvol (top), out-tvol (center), and total
tvol (bottom) for all time periods on a log-log scale.
In Out Total
Period 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3
Exponential .1485 .1868 .1252 .1141 .1926 .1981 .1986 .1294 .1737 .2118 .1578 .1242
Gamma .0765 .0972 .0675 .0821 .0685 .0566 .0690 .0834 .0833 .0876 .0766 .0942
Geometric .1471 .1851 .1241 .1120 .1919 .1975 .1980 .1281 .1729 .2108 .1570 .1226
Log-normal .0274 .0253 .0276 .0340 .0319 .0344 .0310 .0357 .0231 .0248 .0224 .0259
Neg. Bin. .0686 .0876 .0604 .0753 .0599 .0489 .0598 .0766 .0751 .0779 .0685 .0880
Poisson .6552 .6878 .6423 .6253 .6780 .6785 .6728 .6618 .6803 .6971 .6715 .6527
Power-law .3587 .3324 .3643 .3836 .3416 .3320 .3490 .3774 .3678 .3406 .3693 .3897
Weibull .0499 .0648 .0442 .0602 .0427 .0355 .0482 .0590 .0536 .0561 .0496 .0698
Tab. 4.9: Daily data, tvol. KS statistic for the candidate distributions
(complete). Minimum values in bold. Signiﬁcance tests not
carried out.
Daily Data
Tables 4.9-4.11 show the results for the daily data. The complete dis-
tributions are now usually ﬁtted best by Log-normal distributions, whereas
the ﬁt of the power-law is very poor in general. The power-law parameters
are again very small, with typical values around 1.22, cf. Table 4.10 (top,
complete). For the tail observations, the best ﬁt again is always provided
by Log-normal distributions, cf. Table 4.11. Interestingly, the tail exponents
of the daily data are within the typical range of meaningful power-laws, cf.
Table 4.10 (top, tail), but the power-law is still not the best description of
28 Note that the maximum daily (quarterly) transaction volumes were 3.75bn (113.46bn)
Euros for in-tvol, 4.96bn (111.93bn) Euros for out-tvol and 5.32bn (146.06bn) Euros for
total tvol, respectively. For such huge numbers, the estimation procedure, in the numerical
optimization for the power-law parameters, tends to take a very long computation time.
Therefore, the results in this section should be treated with care, since the rescaling might
aﬀect our statistical analysis.
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In Out Total
Period 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3
Daily
Complete 1.23 1.24 1.22 1.24 1.21 1.22 1.21 1.22 1.22 1.23 1.21 1.22
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Tail 2.66 2.15 2.72 2.86 3.23 2.63 4.88 3.39 3.33 3.27 3.35 3.38
(.010) (.009) (.013) (.042) (.022) (.023) (.239) (.079) (.019) (.036) (.023) (.069)
Quarterly
Complete 1.13 1.15 1.13 1.16 1.14 1.15 1.14 1.15 1.12 1.12 1.14 1.14
(.002) (.004) (.002) (.006) (.002) (.004) (.003) (.006) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.005)
Tail 2.53 2.31 2.55 2.81 3.37 1.97 3.43 2.11 2.02 2.02 3.36 2.46
(.050) (.074) (.060) (.155) (.346) (.050) (.284) (.077) (.020) (.040) (.315) (.091)
Tab. 4.10: Power-law parameters and standard deviations, tvol. Val-
ues obtained via numerical maximization of the log-
likelihood for discrete data. Standard deviations (in
parentheses) approximated as (α − 1)/√T , with T be-
ing the number of observations. Top: daily data, bottom:
quarterly data.
In Out Total
Period 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3
Exponential .0752 .1339 .0720 .1270 .0306 .0851 .0442 .0887 .0315 .0547 .0201 .0782
Log-normal .0194 .0235 .0175 .0169 .0141 .0170 .0425 .0245 .0133 .0162 .0170 .0279
Power-law .0516 .0536 .0526 .0226 .0587 .0466 .0627 .0301 .0557 .0455 .0645 .0351
Tab. 4.11: Daily data, tvol. KS statistic for the candidate distribu-
tions (tail). Minimum values in bold. Signiﬁcance tests
not carried out.
the data. In the end, for the transaction volumes we ﬁnd no evidence in favor
of power-laws.
Quarterly Data
Tables 4.12 and 4.13 show the results for the quarterly data. The complete
in-, out-, and total degree distributions are now ﬁt best by Weibull, negative
Binomial, and Log-normal distributions, respectively. In many cases, these
distributions yield comparable KS statistics, but the clear advantage of the
Log-normal distribution for the daily data does not carry over to the quarterly
level in all cases. Similar to the daily estimates, the power-law parameters
are within the usual range of empirical power-laws. As before, however, the
tails are best described by Log-normal distributions. Therefore, while the
tails of the tvol variables are somewhat fatter compared to the degree and
ntrans variables, the power-law remains a poor description of the data.
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In Out Total
Period 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3
Exponential .1741 .1940 .1722 .1258 .3419 .3656 .3383 .3139 .1520 .1808 .1390 .0887
Gamma .0511 .0713 .0429 .0313 .0342 .0370 .0465 .0449 .0722 .0881 .0631 .0651
Geometric .1741 .1940 .1722 .1258 .3418 .3655 .3383 .3139 .1519 .1808 .1390 .0886
Log-normal .0619 .0486 .0626 .1075 .0610 .0635 .0566 .0969 .0332 .0212 .0316 .0810
Neg. Bin. .0491 .0701 .0404 .0314 .0298 .0319 .0417 .0414 .0712 .0867 .0626 .0649
Poisson .7128 .7366 .6989 .6848 .7579 .7574 .7516 .7264 .7139 .7277 .6969 .6907
Power-law .4030 .3888 .4106 .3765 .2730 .2752 .2910 .2930 .4733 .4614 .4545 .4588
Weibull .0202 .0378 .0165 .0462 .0308 .0334 .0260 .0585 .0447 .0529 .0430 .0566
Tab. 4.12: Quarterly data, tvol. KS statistic for the candidate distri-
butions (complete). Minimum values in bold. Signiﬁcance
tests not carried out.
In Out Total
Period 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3
Exponential .0855 .1380 .0759 .1476 .0961 .1529 .0567 .1563 .1071 .1434 .0721 .1508
Log-normal .0271 .0542 .0267 .0521 .0674 .0407 .0475 .0459 .0353 .0483 .0695 .0394
Power-law .0642 .0588 .0672 .0703 .0785 .0733 .0813 .0790 .0788 .0778 .0812 .0484
Tab. 4.13: Quarterly data, tvol. KS statistic for the candidate distri-
butions (tail). Minimum values in bold. Signiﬁcance tests
not carried out.
5. CORE-PERIPHERY STRUCTURE OF THE OVERNIGHT
MONEY MARKET: EVIDENCE FROM THE E-MID
TRADING PLATFORM
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5.1 Introduction and Existing Literature
Interbank markets allow banks to exchange central bank money in order
to share liquidity risks.1 At the macro level, however, a high number of bank
connections could give rise to systemic risk.2 Since it is well known that
the structure of a network is important for its resilience,3 policymakers need
information on the actual topology of the interbank network.
The experiences of the last few years have made policymakers aware of
the necessity of gathering information on the structure of the ﬁnancial net-
work in general and the interbank market in particular.4 One reason for the
previous scarcity of research on the connections between ﬁnancial institu-
tions is certainly the limitation of available data,5 the other reason being the
neglect of the internal structure of the ﬁnancial system by the dominating
paradigm in macroeconomics during the last quarter of a century.6
Recent research in the natural sciences has signiﬁcantly advanced our un-
derstanding of the structure and functioning of complex networks. Network
ideas have been applied to very diverse areas and data sets such as the inter-
net, epidemiology, ecosystems, scientiﬁc collaboration and ﬁnancial markets,
to name a few.
Most previous studies on the topology of interbank markets have been
conducted by physicists applying measures from the natural sciences to a
network formed by interbank liabilities. Examples include Boss et al. (2004)
for the Austrian interbank market, Inaoka et al. (2004) for the Japanese
BOJ-Net, Soramäki et al. (2007) for the US Fedwire network, Bech and
Atalay (2010) for the US Federal funds market, and De Masi et al. (2006)
and Iori et al. (2008) for the Italian e-MID (electronic market for inter-
bank deposit). Overall, the most important ﬁndings of this literature are:
(1) interbank networks are sparse, i.e. their density is relatively low,7 (2) de-
gree distributions appear to be scale-free (with coeﬃcients between 2-3),8 (3)
1 See Ho and Saunders (1985), Freixas et al. (2000) and Allen and Gale (2000).
2 Systemic risk is closely related to ﬁnancial contagion, see de Bandt and Hartmann
(2000), and implies that an idiosyncratic shock causing the failure of one or few institutions
may destabilize the entire system.
3 See also Allen and Gale (2000).
4 See Haldane (2009), Haldane and May (2011) and Trichet (2011).
5 See Mistrulli (2007).
6 See Colander et al. (2009) for a more general critique.
7 The density of a network is simply the fraction of existing links, relative to the maxi-
mum possible number of links. Ignoring the diagonal elements, the density can be calcu-
lated as M/(N2 −N), with M being the number of observed links and N the number of
active nodes (banks).
8 The in-degree is the number of incoming links, while the out-degree is the number of
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transaction volumes appear to follow scale-free distributions as well, (4) clus-
tering coeﬃcients are usually quite small, (5) interbank networks are close
to `small world' structures, and (6) the networks show disassortative mixing,
i.e. high-degree nodes tend to trade with low-degree nodes, and vice versa.9
This indicates that small banks tend to trade with large banks, but rarely
among themselves. Thus, we might expect the interbank network to display
some sort of hierarchical community structure.
In passing, many authors have indeed remarked that there seemed to be
some kind of community structure in the interbank network they analyzed.
For example, Boss et al. (2004) note that the Austrian interbank network
shows a hierarchical community structure that mirrors the regional and sec-
toral organization of the Austrian banking system. Soramäki et al. (2007)
show that the network includes a tightly connected core of money-center
banks to which all other banks connect. Thus there is some form of tier-
ing in the interbank market. The empirical ﬁndings of Cocco et al. (2009)
also show that relationships between banks are important factors to explain
diﬀerences in interest rates.
Identifying communities in networks is an important aspect and in this
paper we are concerned with the identiﬁcation of the set of arguably system-
ically important (core) banks. In order to do so, we estimate various versions
of core-periphery models in the spirit of Borgatti and Everett (2000).10 Sim-
ilar to De Masi et al. (2006) and Iori et al. (2008) we use data from the
Italian e-MID trading platform, which is a market for unsecured deposits vir-
tually covering the entire domestic overnight deposit market in Italy. Core-
periphery models have been applied in a number of interesting ﬁelds be-
fore, for example to identify the spreaders of sexually transmitted diseases
(see Christley et al. (2005)), in protein interaction networks (see Luo et al.
(2009)), and to identify opinion leaders in economic survey data (see Stolzen-
burg and Lux (2011)). To our knowledge, Craig and von Peter (2010) is the
ﬁrst and so far only contribution applying a core-periphery structure to an
interbank market. Applying this core-periphery framework to a data set of
credit relationships between German banks,11 their results speak in favor of
outgoing links per bank.
9 Quite interestingly, the conventional explanation of the scale-free degree distribution
is that of preferential attachment. Note that this is rather the opposite of disassortative
mixing.
10 Another interesting approach in using network-based measures for ﬁnancial regulation
is presented in Markose et al. (2010). The authors construct a so-called super-spreader
tax based on eigenvector centrality.
11 The authors use comprehensive statistics from the so-called `Gross- und Millionenkred-
itstatistik' (statistics on large loans and concentrated exposures) from the Deutsche Bun-
desbank. In Germany, ﬁnancial institutions have to report (on a quarterly basis) their
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a very stable set of core banks. Furthermore, they show that core mem-
bership can be predicted using bank-speciﬁc features such as balance sheet
size.12 In this paper we will apply the (unrestricted) discrete core-periphery
model, the (restricted) tiering model due to Craig and von Peter (2010) as
well as symmetric and asymmetric versions of a continuous core-periphery
model (hitherto not applied to interbank data) to a diﬀerent set of interbank
market data. Using a detailed dataset containing all overnight interbank
transactions in the Italian interbank market from January 1999 to December
2010, we ﬁnd that a core-periphery structure provides a better ﬁt for these
interbank data than alternative network models. The identiﬁed core shows a
high degree of persistence over time, consisting of roughly 28% of all banks
before the global ﬁnancial crisis and 23% afterwards. We can classify the
majority of core banks as intermediaries, i.e. as banks both borrowing and
lending money in the market. Furthermore, allowing for asymmetric `core-
ness' with respect to lending and borrowing activity considerably improves
the ﬁt, and reveals more concentration in borrowing than lending activity
of money center banks. We also shed light on the development during the
ﬁnancial crisis of 2008, ﬁnding that the reduction of interbank lending was
mainly due to core banks' reducing their numbers of active outgoing links.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 5.2 gives a
brief introduction into necessary terminology for the formalisation of (inter-
bank) networks, section 5.3 introduces the Italian e-MID interbank data and
highlights some of its important properties. Section 5.4 introduces diﬀerent
variants of the core-periphery model. Section 5.5 presents the results and
diﬀerent robustness checks. Section 5.6 discusses the ﬁndings and section
5.7 concludes. A set of appendices provides more technical details as well as
further robustness checks.
5.2 Networks
A network consists of a set of N nodes that are connected by M edges
(links). Taking each bank as a node and the interbank positions between
them as links, the interbank network can be represented as a square matrix
of dimension N × N (data matrix, denoted D).13 An element dij of this
matrix represents a gross interbank claim, the total value of credit extended
total exposure to each counterparty to whom they have extended credit of at least 1.5
million Euros or 10% of their liable capital to the Bundesbank. These reports include
outstanding claims of any maturity.
12 We cannot carry out such an analysis since we do not observe bank IDs, see below.
13 In the following, matrices will be written in bold, capital letters. Vectors and scalars
will be written as lower-case letters.
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by bank i to bank j within a certain period. The size of dij can thus be seen as
a measure of link intensity. Row (column) i shows bank i's interbank claims
(liabilities) towards all other banks. The diagonal elements dii are zero, since
a bank will not trade with itself.14 Oﬀ-diagonal elements are positive in the
presence of a link and zero otherwise.
Interbank data usually give rise to directed, sparse and valued networks.15
However, much of the extant network research ignores the last aspect by
focusing on binary adjacency matrices only. An adjacency matrix A contains
elements aij equal to 1, if there is a directed link from bank i to j and 0
otherwise. Since the network is directed, both A and D are asymmetric in
general. In this paper, we also take into account valued information by using
both the raw data matrix as well as a matrix containing the number of trades
between banks, denoted as T. In some cases it is also useful to work with the
undirected version of the adjacency matrices, Au, where auij = max(aij, aji).
As usual, some data aggregation is necessary to represent the system as a
network. In the following, we use quarterly networks. The next section sum-
marizes the most important properties of our data, more detailed information
can be found in Finger et al. (2012).
5.3 Dataset
The Italian electronic market for interbank deposits (e-MID) is a screen-
based platform for trading of unsecured money-market deposits in Euros, US-
Dollars, Pound Sterling, and Zloty operating in Milan through e-MID SpA.16
The market is fully centralized and very liquid; in 2006 e-MID accounted for
17% of total turnover in the unsecured money market in the Euro area.
Average daily trading volumes were 24.2 bn Euro in 2006, 22.4 bn Euro in
2007 and only 14 bn Euro in 2008.
Available maturities range from overnight up to one year. Most of the
transactions are overnight. While the fraction was roughly 80% of all trades
in 1999, this ﬁgure has been continuously increasing over time with a value of
14 This is of course only true when taking banks as consolidated entities. There are,
however, important examples of self-referential networks: the typical node in a connection
matrix of the brain represents a group of neurons; in citation networks authors cite articles
appearing in the same journal. See Boyd et al. (2010) for a discussion.
15 Directed means that di,j 6= dj,i in general. Sparse means that at any point in time the
number of links is only a small fraction of the N(N −1) possible links. Valued means that
interbank claims are reported in monetary values as opposed to 1 or 0 in the presence or
absence of a claim, respectively.
16 The vast majority of trades (roughly 95%) is conducted in Euro.
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more than 90% in 2010.17 As of August 2011, e-MID had 192 members from
EU countries and the US. Members were 29 central banks acting as market
observers, 1 ministry of ﬁnance, 101 domestic banks and 61 international
banks. We will see below that the composition of the active market partici-
pants has been changing substantially over time. Trades are bilateral and are
executed within the limits of the credit lines agreed upon directly between
participants. Contracts are automatically settled through the TARGET2
system.
The trading mechanism follows a quote-driven market and is similar to a
limit-order-book in a stock market, but without consolidation. The market
is transparent in the sense that the quoting banks' IDs are visible to all other
banks. Quotes contain the market side (buy or sell money), the volume, the
interest rate and the maturity. Trades are registered when a bank (aggressor)
actively chooses a quoted order. The platform allows for credit line checking
before a transaction will be carried out, so trades have to be conﬁrmed by
both counterparties. The market also allows direct bilateral trades between
counterparties.
The minimum quote size is 1.5 million Euros, whereas the minimum trade
size is only 50,000 Euros. Thus, aggressors do not have to trade the entire
amount quoted.18 Additional participant requirements, for example a certain
amount of total assets, may pose an upward bias on the size of the partic-
ipating banks. In any case, e-MID covers essentially the entire domestic
overnight deposit market in Italy.19
We have access to all registered trades in Euro in the period from Jan-
uary 1999 to December 2010. For each trade we know the two banks' ID
numbers (not the names), their relative position (aggressor and quoter), the
maturity and the transaction type (buy or sell). As mentioned above, the
majority of trades is conducted overnight and due to the global ﬁnancial cri-
sis (GFC) markets for longer maturities essentially dried up. We will focus
on all overnight trades conducted on the platform, leaving a total number
of 1,317,679 trades. The large sample size of 12 years allows us to analyze
the network evolution over time. Here we focus on the quarterly aggregates,
leaving us with 48 snapshots of the network.
17 This development is driven by the fact that the market is unsecured. The recent
ﬁnancial crisis made unsecured loans in general less attractive, with stronger impact for
longer maturities. See below. It should be noted, that there is also a market for secured
loans called e-MIDER.
18 The minimum quote size could pose an upward bias for participating banks. It would
be interesting to check who are the quoting banks and who are the aggressors. Furthermore
it would be interesting to look at quote data, as we only have access to actual trades.
19 More details can be found on the e-MID website, see http://www.e-mid.it/.
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The left panel of Figure 6.1 shows the development of the number of
active banks over time. We see a clear downward trend in the number of
active Italian banks over time (green line), whereas the additional large drop
after the onset of the GFC is mainly due to the exit of foreign banks. The
right panel shows that the decline of the number of active Italian banks
went along with a relatively constant trading volume in this segment until
2008. This suggests that the decline of active Italian banks was mainly due
to mergers and acquisitions within the Italian banking sector. The overall
upward trend of trading volumes was due to the increase of active foreign
banks until 2008, while their activities in this market virtually faded away
after the onset of the crisis.
The data show a trivial community structure in that foreign banks tend
to trade with each other preferentially, and so do Italian banks. Due to
the limited extent of trading between both components, and the smaller
number of foreign banks, we will focus on Italian banks only in our subsequent
analysis. This leaves a total number of 1,215,759 trades for the analysis.
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Fig. 5.1: Number of active banks (left) and traded volume (right) over
time. We also split the traded volume into money lent by
Italian and foreign banks, respectively.
Other important ﬁndings are:
• The e-MID network has a relatively high density compared to other
interbank networks investigated in the literature.20 See Figures 6.1
20 Note that the density in the German interbank network is smaller for two reasons:
ﬁrst, the number of active banks is much larger, so it is more likely to observe missing
links. Second, in our analysis we focus on overnight trades only, while Craig and von Peter
(2010) use aggregate credit volumes of all maturities (probably only with a small fraction
of overnight trades). It seems plausible that the probability of observing a link between
any two banks should be inversely related to the maturity of the loan.
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Fig. 5.2: Density of the network over time, calculated as Mt/(N
2
t −
Nt), withMt being the number of observed links and Nt the
number of active banks in the respective quarter. A Chow-
test indicates that there is a structural break after quarter
39 at all sensible signiﬁcance levels for the Italian banks. A
CUSUM-test also indicates a structural break, however, the
time series seems to revert towards its pre-GFC level.
and 5.2. For the density of the network formed by Italian banks, a
Chow-test and a CUSUM-test both indicate that there is a structural
break after quarter 39 (i.e. at the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis). Later
on, we will see that the core-periphery structure was also inﬂuenced by
the GFC.
• The aggregation period is important for economic applications as the
network structure is less volatile with longer aggregation periods. Since
the network is sparse, short periods will only give an incomplete image
of existing linkages, where many links between otherwise frequent trad-
ing partners may be dormant. In order to obtain a more comprehensive
and less random picture of existing links, a larger aggregation period
is required. We will, therefore, use quarterly data in the following (but
results are robust to somewhat shorter or larger aggregation periods).
• There is very small (at times even negative) correlation between the
banks' in- and out-degrees. Hence, the directed version of the network
might contain important additional information.
• The underlying distributions of in- and out-degrees are apparently not
scale-free at any aggregation level (including the daily level), cf. Finger
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et al. (2012). The same holds for transaction volumes.
• The network shows disassortative mixing patterns, so nodes with high
overall degree (number of connections) tend to connect with low-degree
nodes. We ﬁnd similar assortativity coeﬃcients for the relation between
in- and out-degree, so high in-degree (out-degree) nodes tend to connect
to low out-degree (in-degree) nodes.
In the next section, we will describe the diﬀerent versions of the core-
periphery model in detail.
5.4 Models
Core-periphery network models have been proposed ﬁrst by Borgatti and
Everett (2000). The basic idea is that a network can be divided into sub-
groups of core and periphery members. The discrete model partitions banks
such that core (periphery) banks are maximally (minimally) connected to
each other. The concept of discrete group membership can be extended by
considering the core and periphery as opposite ends of a continuum. The
continuous model overcomes the excessive simplicity of the discrete parti-
tioning, by assigning a `coreness' level to each bank. In the following we will
ﬁrst present the discrete model, with the tiering model proposed by Craig and
von Peter (2010) as a special case, and then move on to the asymmetric con-
tinuous model for directed networks due to Boyd et al. (2010). Throughout
the following we assume that a network cannot have more than one core.21
5.4.1 The Discrete Model
Formalisation
To identify the Nc core members among our sample of N banks, we
aim at sorting the binary adjacency matrix such that we have the core-core
region as a 1-block in the upper left part (of dimension Nc × Nc) and the
periphery-periphery region as a 0-block in the lower right part (of dimension
(N −Nc)× (N −Nc)). The idealized pattern matrix (PI) for a `pure' core-
periphery segmentation, then, looks as follows:22
PI =
(
CC CP
PC PP
)
=
(
1 CP
PC 0
)
, (5.1)
21 Everett and Borgatti (2000) include the possibility of multiple cores.
22 The diagonal elements will be ignored in all that follows, since the network is not
self-referential.
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where 1 and 0 denote submatrices of ones and zeros.
The CC-block contains the top-tier banks, while the PP-block contains
the periphery. Note that the oﬀ-diagonal blocks may be 1-blocks (each core
member connected to all periphery-nodes), 0-blocks (no connection between
core and periphery members) or something in between, depending on the
problem. Borgatti and Everett (2000) claim that only the diagonal blocks
are characteristic of CP structures and are thus the deﬁning property. We
will denote this version, without any restrictions on the oﬀ-diagonal blocks,
as the discrete model.
In some cases however, the underlying model explicitly dictates require-
ments on the CP and PC blocks. For instance, Craig and von Peter (2010)
propose a more strictly tiered interbank market than the benchmark discrete
structure. In this model, a key characteristic of core banks (top tier) is that
they intermediate between periphery banks. If at least a minimum level of
intermediation activity is required of a `core' bank, this means that CP and
PC have to be row- and column-regular,23 respectively, i.e. at least one entry
has to be non-zero in each row of CP and in each column of PC.
Optimization Problem
The discrete core-periphery framework amounts to assigning to each bank
the property of membership in the core or the periphery. This classiﬁcation
can be summarized in a vector c of zeros and ones of length N (the total
number of banks). The usual approach to ﬁnd the optimal coreness vector,
c, referred to as the minimum residual (MINRES) approach, is to ﬁt a pattern
matrix P = cc′, which should be as close as possible to the observed network
matrix A. This requires to identify the core banks, which are unknown a
priori.
We start by deﬁning a coreness vector, ordering the core banks ﬁrst and
writing the set of core members as C = {1, · · · , Nc}.24 Then we can measure
the `ﬁt' of the corresponding core-periphery structure as the total number
of inconsistencies between the observed network and the idealized pattern
matrix PI of the same dimension. Depending on the problem, the distance
involves certain restrictions on the oﬀ-diagonal blocks, CP and PC. The
optimal partition C∗ thus minimizes the residuals and gives the optimal set
of core banks.
Residuals are obtained by simply counting the errors in each of the four
23 See Doreian et al. (2005).
24 Note that in order to have a core, Nc has to be ≥ 2. Also note the diﬀerence between
C and c: C is the set of core banks and thus is a vector of dimension Nc, while c is a vector
of zeros and ones. Of course, both C and c carry the same information.
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blocks of Eq. (5.1) and aggregating over the blocks. The core-core block
should be a complete 1-block of dimension Nc, so any missing link rep-
resents an inconsistency (residual) with respect to the model.25 Likewise
any link between two periphery banks constitutes an error relative to the
benchmark. Obviously, we can introduce any constraints on the oﬀ-diagonal
blocks, so the tiering model can be easily implemented here as well: errors
in the oﬀ-diagonal blocks penalize zero rows and columns, because these are
inconsistent with row- and column-regularity, respectively. For example, a
zero column could be penalized by as many errors as there are banks in the
periphery (N −Nc).
For the general version of the discrete model with arbitrary oﬀ-diagonal
blocks, the aggregate errors in the individual blocks can be written as
E(C) =
(
ECC ECP
EPC EPP
)
=
(
Nc(Nc − 1)−
∑
i,j∈C aij 0
0
∑
i,j 6∈C aij
)
. (5.2)
The total error score (e) then simply aggregates the errors across the relevant
blocks, normalized by the total number of links in the network.26 Formally
this can be written as
e(C) = ECC + ECP + EPC + EPP
M
=
ECC + EPP
M
, (5.3)
with e(·) being a function of C since every possible partition is associated
with a particular value of e.
For the tiering model proposed by Craig and von Peter (2010), the ag-
gregate errors in the oﬀ-diagonal blocks can be calculated as
ECP = (N −Nc)
∑
i∈C
max(0, 1−
∑
j 6∈C
aij) (5.4)
and
EPC = (N −Nc)
∑
j∈C
max(0, 1−
∑
i 6∈C
aij), (5.5)
respectively, leading to additional non-zero entries in e(C).
The optimal partition C∗ is the set of core banks producing the smallest
distance to an idealized pattern matrix of the same dimension, i.e.
C∗ = arg min e(C) = {C ∈ Ω|e(C) ≤ e(C)∀C ∈ Ω}, (5.6)
25 The maximum number of possible inconsistencies in this block would be Nc(Nc − 1)
since the main diagonal is ignored. This upper bound is obviously never reached since
otherwise there would be no core-periphery structure.
26 Note thatM is the maximum error possible in a network consisting only of a periphery.
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where Ω denotes all strict and non-empty subsets of the population {1, · · · , N}.
It should be noted, however, that the discrete approach implicitly assumes
symmetry of the underlying structure (or irrelevance of the direction of links).
Therefore, in section 5.4.2 we will turn to a continuous core-periphery model,
which explicitly takes the directed nature of the network into account, char-
acterizing coreness by two vectors rather than one.
Implementation
Fitting the discrete and the tiering model to a real-world network is a large
scale problem in combinatorial optimization. Exhaustive search becomes im-
practical for large matrices, since the number of possible labeled bipartitions
increases exponentially with the dimension of the matrix. More precisely,
the number of nontrivial bipartitions (with both the core and the periphery
having at least two members) is 2N−2N−2. The term 2N corresponds to the
number of all possible subsets, while the negative terms exclude partitions
with only core or periphery banks. For example, with N = 10 banks there
are 1002 nontrivial possible bipartitions. For a system with N = 100 banks
there are already roughly 1030 partitions.
A number of algorithms have been applied to tackle such problems. We
will use a Genetic Algorithm (GA) to ﬁt both the discrete and the tiering
model.27 A GA uses operations similar to genetic processes of biological
organisms to develop better solutions of an optimization problem from an
existing population of (randomly initiated) candidate solutions. Typically
the proposed solutions are encoded in strings (chromosomes) mostly using a
binary alphabet, i.e. in our setting the strings have length N and consist of
ones and zeros, depending on whether a bank is in the core or periphery. We
use the rate of correct classiﬁcations (in terms of the error score) by a string
l, fl = 1 − e(Cl) as a ﬁtness function that drives the evolutionary search.
Details are explained in Appendix 5.8.1.
5.4.2 The Continuous Model
Basic Structure
One limitation of the partition-based approach presented above is the
excessive simplicity of deﬁning just two homogeneous classes of nodes: core
27 We cross-checked the results using the sequential algorithm applied in Craig and von
Peter (2010). Alternatives would be the Kerninghan-Lin Algorithm (Kernighan and Lin
(1970)), see Boyd et al. (2006) for an application, and Branch-and-Bound Programming,
see Brusco (2011).
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and periphery. Assuming that the network data consist of continuous val-
ues representing strengths or capacities of relationships (for banking data:
credit volumes or number of transactions), it seems sensible to also consider
a continuous model in which each node is assigned a measure of `coreness'.
Since a continuous measure of coreness allows for more ﬂexibility in captur-
ing the role of an institution, we apply this model to the valued matrix D of
interbank liabilities rather than the binary adjacency matrix A.
The usual approach in the symmetric continuous (SC) model is to ﬁnd
a coreness vector c, where 1 ≥ ci ≥ 0 ∀i, with pattern matrix P = cc′
that approximates the observed data matrix as closely as possible. Simi-
lar to the presentation of the discrete model, the optimal coreness vector in
the symmetric continuous (SC) model can be found using the MINRES ap-
proach.28 Again however, this method imposes a symmetric pattern matrix,
i.e. pij = pji ∀i, j. Thus, it is assumed that the strength of the relation from
i to j is the same as that from j to i. To overcome this restriction, we also es-
timate an asymmetric continuous (AC) core-periphery model, as introduced
by Boyd et al. (2010). This formulation involves two vectors, representing
the degrees of outgoing and incoming centrality for each node. For networks
of international trade, for example, the two vectors would correspond to ex-
ports and imports, respectively. In our setting, the two vectors correspond to
out- and in-coreness. Note that both the SC and AC model can be applied
to valued matrices, with binary adjacency matrices being just a special case.
Thus the continuous models might allow us to extract important additional
information from the directed, valued networks. However, a disadvantage of
the continuous models is that restrictions, such as the tiering model, can-
not be implemented. In the following, we will brieﬂy introduce both model
versions. More details on the AC model can be found in Appendix 5.8.3.
The Symmetric Continuous (SC) Model
The SC model will again be estimated by minimization of residuals. MIN-
RES seeks a column vector c such that the square matrix D is approximated
by the pattern matrix P = cc′. Ignoring the diagonal elements, this amounts
to minimizing the sum of squared diﬀerences of the oﬀ-diagonal elements, or
arg min
c
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
(dij − cicj)2. (5.7)
In the same spirit as with our optimization algorithm in the discrete case,
we use the proportional reduction of error (PRE) as our measure of ﬁt. PRE
28 An interesting alternative approach, based on the Kullback-Leiber distance, can be
found in Muniz and Carvajal (2006) and Muñiz et al. (2011).
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is deﬁned as
PRE(cc′|〈D〉) = 1− SS(D− cc
′)
SS(D− 〈D〉) , (5.8)
with 〈D〉 being the global average (across all elements, excluding the diag-
onal) of D and SS(·) is the sum of squared deviations of the oﬀ-diagonal
elements of the input matrix. Thus, maximizing the PRE is equivalent to
minimizing SS(D − cc′). Boyd et al. (2010) argue that the continuous
core/periphery model makes a reasonable contribution towards explaining
empirical structures if the PRE signiﬁcantly exceeds 0.5. Note that the re-
ported coreness vectors in both the SC and AC model will be standardized
by the Euclidean norm of the optimal solution vectors.
The Asymmetric Continuous (AC) Model
The idea of the asymmetric continuous (AC) model is to decompose over-
all `coreness' into `out-coreness' and `in-coreness' (denoted by ui and vi in
the following), respectively. Applying this distinction allows us to write the
objective function for the AC model as
arg min
u,v
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
(dij − uivj)2. (5.9)
The optimal coreness vectors can be determined by ﬁnding the roots of the
ﬁrst-order conditions of Eq. (5.9).29 The PRE of the AC model can be
deﬁned similarly as in Eq. (5.8) as
PRE(cc′|〈D〉) = 1− SS(D− uv
′)
SS(D− 〈D〉) . (5.10)
For both the SC and the AC models, we will, in order to adjust for the
skewness of the network matrices, log-transform the data matrix in the form
log(1 + D), where the factor 1 makes sure that zeros in the original matrix
remain zeros in the transformed matrix.30 Note that the split into in- and
out-coreness is germane to a singular value decomposition of our matrix D of
interbank liabilities. This similarity is exploited in the empirical estimation
of the vectors u and v. Our numerical approach for estimating these two
coreness vectors follows Boyd et al. (2010) and is detailed in Appendix 5.8.3.
29 This could be implemented by using standard algorithms for numerical optimization.
Here we used a trust-region algorithm.
30 We also tried to ﬁt the core-periphery models to the raw network matrices, however,
the high level of skewness in the data results in a very poor ﬁt in general. These results
are hardly comparable to those presented below, see Appendix 5.8.9.
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5.5 Results
This section presents and discusses the results from the diﬀerent versions
of the core-periphery framework. In the following, as noted above, we focus
on the quarterly networks formed by Italian banks only. Robustness checks,
using diﬀerent aggregation periods and sample banks can be found in the
Appendix.31 Recall that the discrete and tiering model use the (binary)
adjacency matrices A, while the continuous model uses the valued matrix of
transaction volumes D, as deﬁned in section 5.2.32
As a ﬁrst step, we compare the coreness vectors between the diﬀerent
models. It will become clear that the discrete and tiering model are almost
identical throughout. Later on, we show that the AC model contains impor-
tant information from the asymmetric nature of the network, since the in-
and out-coreness vectors are far from being perfectly correlated. Secondly, we
investigate the properties of the core/periphery banks. We ﬁnd that the core
is large compared to the ﬁndings in Craig and von Peter (2010), but also very
persistent over time. Due to the high network density, we ﬁnd that the error
scores are also much higher compared to the German market. In particular,
the model ﬁt deteriorates over time due to the GFC. Formal tests suggest a
signiﬁcant worsening of the ﬁt of the core-periphery model after the GFC,
pointing towards the breakdown some part of the core-periphery structure.
As a last step, we investigate the signiﬁcance of the results by comparing
the identiﬁed cores and the corresponding error scores to the cores obtained
from random and scale-free networks, calibrated to share similar properties
as the observed ones along certain dimensions. Here we ﬁnd that the identi-
ﬁed cores are signiﬁcant, i.e. the identiﬁed core-periphery structure is not a
spurious network property.
5.5.1 Model Similarity
Table 5.1 presents selected correlations between the identiﬁed coreness
vectors of the diﬀerent model versions. For each combination, we compute
the correlation between the (stacked) coreness vectors for the complete sam-
ple period. Note that the discrete and tiering coreness vectors contain only
binary values, while the in- and out-coreness vectors contain real numbers.
Obviously the correlation between the cores in the discrete and tiering model
31 Appendix 5.8.6 discusses the ﬁndings for other aggregation periods, most importantly
for monthly and yearly networks. Appendix 5.8.7 discusses the results when including
foreign banks to the analysis.
32 Appendix 5.8.8 discusses the results for the continuous model using the matrix con-
taining the number of transactions T. Appendix 5.8.9 discusses further robustness checks.
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is very high with a value of around .95.33 The same is true for the discrete
core and the out-coreness with a value of .73, whereas the correlation be-
tween the discrete core and the in-coreness is much smaller with a value of
.26.34 Core banks from the discrete model are therefore more likely to be
in the out-core of the continuous model as well, but not necessarily in the
in-core. This result seems rather surprising at ﬁrst, since for example the
results from Cocco et al. (2009) suggest that small (periphery) banks are net
lenders, which oﬀer their excess liquidity to a preferred set of large (core)
banks. Our analysis shows that at least in the present data set, the pattern
of interbank linkages is more complex: again, periphery banks lend money to
a relatively small set of selected core banks, but the core banks in turn tend
to redistribute this liquidity not only among the other core banks, but also
among a larger part of the periphery. Technically, we ﬁnd that the density
in the CP-block is on average three times higher than the density in the PC-
block (see Figure 5.6 below), so for most core banks the out-degree clearly
exceeds the in-degree.35 Therefore, it is not surprising that the correlation
between the discrete and the out-coreness is higher than the correlation with
the in-coreness. This shows that there is a considerable amount of asymmetry
in the network, also captured by the negative correlation of -.08 between the
in- and out-coreness vectors, cf. Figure 5.3. We see that these relations are
rather stable. Interestingly, the correlation between in- and out-coreness was
always the smallest of these combinations, turning negative after 12 quarters
and remaining so for the rest of the sample period. This hints towards the
existence of diﬀerent subgroups in the core.
In the following we present more detailed results for the discrete and
tiering model, then moving on to the continuous model.
33 Therefore, the correlations between the tiering core and the in-/out-coreness are not
presented here since they are very similar to those from the general discrete model.
34 Interestingly, we see that the correlation between the coreness vectors from the (sym-
metric) discrete and the SC model is only .7578. One might expect that this is partly
driven by the fact that the input matrix is valued, rather than binary in the continuous
case. Estimating the continuous model with binary network matrices, however, yields very
similar results, see Appendix 5.8.9, with a correlation of .7635. Thus, the main reason for
the low correlation between the two vectors lies in the objective function: the continuous
models approximate the complete matrix, while the discrete model focuses on the diagonal
blocks.
35 This also explains the small (at times even negative) correlation between individual
banks' in- and out-degree.
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Models Correlation
Discrete Tiering .9526
Discrete Out-coreness .7267
Discrete In-coreness .2567
Discrete Sym. coreness .7578
In-coreness Out-coreness -.0809
Tab. 5.1: Correlations between individual coreness vectors of diﬀerent
models. For each model, we stack the coreness vectors over
the entire sample period in a single vector. Then we com-
pute the correlations between each combination. Note that
the discrete and tiering coreness consists of binary values,
while the in-, out-, and symmetric coreness vectors contain
real numbers.
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Fig. 5.3: Time-varying correlations between diﬀerent coreness vec-
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Fig. 5.4: Absolute size of the core over time. A Chow-test indicates
that there is a structural break for the detrended time series
after quarter 10, while there is no evidence for a signiﬁcant
structural break after quarter 39. An additional CUSUM
test indicates that this break is signiﬁcant at all sensible
conﬁdence levels. We also note a signiﬁcant level of au-
tocorrelation in the detrended time series, while the ﬁrst
diﬀerence of the original time series is stationary.
5.5.2 Discrete and Tiering Model
The Size of the Core and Periphery
We saw that the identiﬁed cores in the discrete and tiering model are
highly correlated. In fact, Figure 5.4 shows that the sizes of their cores are
very similar over time. Note that the core in the discrete model is always
at least as large as the core in the tiering model. The reason lies in the
requirement that all core banks in the tiering model act as intermediaries,
which is not necessarily true for the discrete model, even though again the
vast majority of core banks acts as intermediaries in this case. Overall, the
diﬀerences between the two model versions consist of a few borderline cases.36
Note also the negative trend in the absolute size of the cores over time.
This is not surprising given that the number of active Italian banks has been
decreasing over time. Interestingly, a Chow-test indicates the existence of
a structural break in the (detrended) core sizes after quarter 10, with the
36 In cases where the row- and column-regularity constraints are binding, it may also
happen that core banks from the discrete model are part of the periphery in the tiering
model.
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trend going back towards its initial level in the post-GFC period.37 The
economic signiﬁcance of this result is, however, questionable as we see in
Figure 5.4 that a linear negative trend might ﬁt the entire sample period
quite well, and we know that the sharp drop after quarter 39 was due to the
GFC. Given the overall trend in the number of active banks, it seems more
interesting to consider the relative size of the core compared to the complete
interbank network. Figure 5.5 shows that the relative size of the core is
rather stable over time, ﬂuctuating around 28% before the GFC, and around
23% afterwards. A Chow-test indicates that there is a structural break after
quarter 39. However, under a CUSUM test this break is only marginally
signiﬁcant at the 5% level for the discrete model, and insigniﬁcant for the
tiering model. Thus, there is some evidence that the GFC has led to a
structural break in the formerly relatively stable structure of intermediation
in the interbank market. However, we also see a positive trend in the core
sizes for the last 3 quarters of the sample period, so that the relative core size
seemed to revert to its pre-GFC level. Not surprisingly, the size of the core is
highly correlated with the density of the network (cf. Figure 5.2). We should
note that relative core sizes are very high compared to the value of 3% found
for the German interbank market by Craig and von Peter (2010). This is
driven by the very high overall network density of above 20%, compared to
only 0.61% for the German market.38
The left panel of Figure 5.6 shows the densities of the complete network
and the core-core and periphery-periphery subnetworks over time. Since
results are virtually the same for both models, we only display those of the
baseline discrete model39 with rather stable values for the pre-GFC period,
but again with a structural break after quarter 39 for all time series in the
Figure. The density in the CC-block is at least 2.5 times that of the entire
network and at least 6 times that of the PP-block. The right panel of Figure
5.6 shows the densities in the oﬀ-diagonal blocks. As already mentioned, the
37 Iori et al. (2007) also mention this structural break in the Italian interbank network
in quarter 10, however, without conducting formal tests. They relate this breakpoint to
two events: (1) oﬃcial and market interest rates changed their trend from positive to
negative, (2) the ECB tried to support economic growth by increasing the amount of
liquidity provided.
38 Recall that the number of banks in the German market is roughly 1800, so the network
is at least 10 times larger than the Italian network. Thus it is not surprising, that the
density is much higher in the Italian case. Since the e-MID sample presumably contains
mainly large banks, our core might be the core of the overall banking network. See Figure
5.21 in Appendix 5.8.2 for a network illustration for one particular quarter.
39 Results from the tiering model are available upon request. We checked that the results
from the tiering model are statistically not distinguishable from the results of the discrete
model.
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Fig. 5.5: Relative size of the core over time. A Chow-test indicates
that there is a structural break after quarter 39 at all sensi-
ble signiﬁcance levels. An additional CUSUM test indicates
that this break is marginally signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
density in the CP-block is three times higher than the corresponding density
in the PC-block. These values are very stable over time, and we do not ﬁnd
evidence for a structural break.
The Structure of the Core and Periphery
To gain more insights into the structure of the network, Figure 5.7 shows
the fraction of intermediaries, lenders and borrowers in the complete network
over time. Here we deﬁne borrowers as banks with an out-degree of zero but
positive in-degree in a given quarter, whereas the reverse holds for lenders.
The remaining banks, with both positive in- and out-degree, are thus inter-
mediaries. We see that these fractions are relatively stable over time: most
of the banks (roughly 75%) act as intermediaries, a smaller fraction acts as
lenders (20%) and the remainder consists of sole borrowers. Interestingly,
the fraction of sole borrowers seems to increase signiﬁcantly after the GFC,
since we ﬁnd a structural break after quarter 39. This may hint towards
the entry of banks who use the market only to attract funds. In contrast,
there is no signiﬁcant structural break for the fraction of intermediaries and
lenders. Table 5.2 shows the transition probabilities for each strategy, with
It denoting that a bank is an intermediary in t. L, B and E stand for lend-
ing, borrowing and exit, respectively. The matrix shows, for example, that
with a probability of 88.45% an intermediating bank in t− 1 will also be an
intermediary in t. Note that the diagonal elements are largest, even though
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Fig. 5.6: Density of the entire network, CC/PP blocks (left), and
oﬀ-diagonal blocks (right). Individual Chow-tests indicate
that there is a structural break in the time-series in the left
panel after quarter 39 at all sensible signiﬁcance levels (see
also Figure 5.2). Additional CUSUM-tests indicate that the
structural breaks are signiﬁcant at all sensible signiﬁcance
levels, with the PP-density apparently containing an addi-
tional structural break around quarter 10. In contrast, we
cannot reject the hypothesis of no structural break in the
time-series of the right panel.
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It Lt Bt Et
It−1 .8845 .0752 .0190 .0214
Lt−1 .2971 .6508 .0009 .0513
Bt−1 .3661 .0164 .4590 .1585
Et−1 .0049 .0038 .0028 .9885
Tab. 5.2: Transition matrix: trading strategies. I, L, B, and E de-
note intermediary, lender, borrower, and exit, respectively.
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Fig. 5.7: Fraction of intermediaries, lenders and borrowers over time.
Individual Chow-tests point towards the existence of a struc-
tural break after quarter 39 in all time-series. Additional
CUSUM-tests, however, indicate that this structural break
is only signiﬁcant for the fraction of borrowers.
the borrowing strategy is less persistent over time compared to the other
strategies. This is in line with the observation of a more intense entry of sole
borrowers during and after the GFC.
Figure 5.8 shows the fractions of intermediaries, lenders, and borrowers
in the core and periphery of the general discrete model. Again these results
are very similar to those of the tiering model: the fraction of intermediaries
in the core is highest, while the fraction of intermediaries in the periphery
is second highest. As expected, only very small fractions of borrowers and
lenders are found in the core (none in the tiering model), while banks that
appear only as borrowers are a signiﬁcant fraction (about 30 percent) of the
periphery.
To elucidate the stability of these structural properties, consider Table
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Fig. 5.8: Structure of the core and periphery in the discrete
model. Fractions of intermediaries, borrowers and
lenders, in the core and periphery, respectively. Note:
ICore=intermediaries in the core, BCore=borrowers in the
core, LCore=lenders in the core. Similarly for the periphery.
Ct Pt Et
Ct−1 .8324 .1565 .0110
Pt−1 .0555 .9055 .0391
Et−1 .0012 .0104 .9885
Tab. 5.3: Transition matrix: discrete model. C, P and E stand for
core, periphery and exit, respectively.
5.3 containing transition probabilities of the state of a bank for the discrete
model. For example, the ﬁrst rows show the probabilities of a core bank
in t− 1 (Ct−1) being a core member in t, switching to the periphery (Pt) or
exiting the market (Et). There is some asymmetry in the Table, for example,
the probability of switching from the core to the periphery is roughly 15.6%,
while the reverse probability is only 5.5%. In particular, the diagonal entries
are very high with values above 80%, such that there is signiﬁcant persistence
(autocorrelation) in the group memberships.40
The above transition probabilities are aggregate values over the entire
sample period. To investigate the inherent structural stability, the values in
this matrix should be roughly constant over time. Figure 5.9 shows the time
40 Note that the structure is very stable despite the existence of a structural break due
to the GFC after quarter 39, cf. section 5.5.5.
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evolution of these values for the discrete model. We see that the elements
on the main diagonal are quite stable over time and very large in general.
However P (C|C) becomes smaller due to the GFC simply because a num-
ber of core banks become part of the periphery, which can be seen by the
increase in P (P |C) to more than 20%. Again we emphasize that we do not
observe banks' names, so we are unable to track for example bank mergers
and acquisitions.
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Transition probabilities: Discrete model.
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Fig. 5.9: Transition probabilities over time, discrete model. P (y|x) is
the probability of going from state x to state y.
Besides the overall structural stability, one might also be interested in the
stability of the system at the micro-level of bilateral connections. In order
to assess the stability of the link structure in the diﬀerent blocks, we use the
so-called Jaccard Index. This is deﬁned as
J =
M11
M01 +M10 +M11
, (5.11)
where Mxy is the number of relations with status x in period t − 1 and
with status y in the next period. It thus measures the similarity between
subsequent graphs, taking only links into account which were present in at
least one period. Social networks are usually considered to be suﬃciently
stable for values of J larger than .3, in which case the network is likely to
display recognizable structure.41 For the complete Italian interbank network
we observe an average Jaccard Index of .5302 (std. dev.: .0368).42 When
calculating the Jaccard Index for the diﬀerent blocks, we restrict ourselves
41 See Snijders et al. (2009).
42 See Finger et al. (2012).
5. Core-Periphery Structure in the Interbank Market 150
to those banks having the same status of being a core/periphery bank in the
two adjacent quarters.43 Figure 5.10 shows the results: the Jaccard Index
is largest for the CC- and the CP-blocks with average values of .6273 and
.6565 (std. devs: .0366 and .0380), respectively, i.e. two thirds of all links
are maintained over adjacent quarters. These values are roughly 1.5 times
larger than those in the PC- and PP-blocks, with average values of .4261 and
.4241 (std. devs.: .0471 and .0622), respectively. Interestingly, we do not
ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of a structural break due to the GFC in any of the
time series. Even though the values dropped for most of the time-series after
quarter 39 (except for the CP-block), the values tend to stabilize later around
the pre-GFC levels. This might indicate that many interbank relationships
tended to survive through the GFC.44
Overall, our calculations show that the outgoing links of core banks are
highly persistent, both with respect to the core and the periphery. Outgoing
links from the periphery are persistent as well, but to a signiﬁcantly lower
degree. Given that the Jaccard Index is independent of the density of the
network (non-existing links are ignored), these ﬁndings indicate that core
banks generally lend towards a large set of core and periphery banks. In
contrast, periphery banks are not only reluctant to create links among them-
selves, but also, given the relatively small density in the PC-block, trade with
a small set of core banks, which is not necessarily the same set in each quar-
ter. This ﬁnding is interesting, since the persistence in the PC-block should
be much larger, if periphery banks would have a preferred partner among
the core banks. These ﬁndings may, however, be driven to some extent by
the relatively small trading volumes of periphery banks (see below). In any
case, the asymmetry between the CP- and PC-blocks is remarkable and will
be discussed in more detail below.
Model Fit and Signiﬁcance
In this section we turn to a quantitative analysis of the error scores and
their signiﬁcance. When investigating the signiﬁcance of our results, we
compare the core sizes and error scores of the empirical networks with those
of network structures sharing similar properties along certain dimensions.
This analysis helps us evaluating whether the core-periphery structure oﬀers
a meaningful characterization of our data or whether the data rather generate
a `spurious' core by chance.
43 Given that the coreness vectors are highly autocorrelated, this is not a very restrictive
assumption, but it is likely to reduce some noise in the calculated numbers.
44 Cf. Aﬃnito (2011) and Braeuning (2011) for related evidence on the robustness of
lending relationships over the crisis.
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Fig. 5.10: Jaccard Index for the CC-, CP-, PC-, and PP-blocks over
time. Coreness is taken from the discrete model. Individual
Chow- and CUSUM-tests show no evidence of a structural
break due to the GFC in any of the time series. However,
the CP- and PP-blocks appear to contain a structural break
after quarter 10.
The left panel of Figure 5.11 shows that the error scores (fractions of
residuals) are on average roughly 42%, which is rather high compared to
the maximum value of 12% for the German interbank market reported by
Craig and von Peter (2010). These values are, however, way below unity, so
the core-periphery model is indeed a better explanation of the data than an
unstructured alternative consisting only of a periphery. We also see that the
GFC made the ﬁt somewhat worse, yielding an error score that is roughly
1.3 times the average score before the GFC, albeit with a declining trend.
A Chow-test and a CUSUM-test again indicate the existence of a structural
break after quarter 39 at all sensible signiﬁcance levels. The right panel of
Figure 5.11 shows that this structural break is mainly due to the increase
in the error score in the PP-block. In contrast, we ﬁnd no evidence for a
structural break in the error score of the CC-block after quarter 39, but after
quarter 10. Given that the relative core size has been signiﬁcantly smaller,
the overall picture is thus that some previous core banks have reduced their
interbank activities so strongly that they are assigned to the periphery after
quarter 39. We will investigate the eﬀect of the GFC in more detail in section
5.5.5.
In order to shed light on the signiﬁcance of the observed error scores, we
compute the average core size and error scores by generating 100 random
samples of particular network structures (see below) and compare the results
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Fig. 5.11: Left: Error score in tiering (blue) and discrete (green)
model over time. A Chow-test indicates that there is a
structural break after quarter 39 at all sensible signiﬁcance
levels. The results from an additional CUSUM-test are also
in favor of the existence of a structural break. Right: Error
score for the CC- and the PP-block in the discrete model.
For the CC-block there is a signiﬁcant structural break af-
ter quarter 10, while the PP-block contains a signiﬁcant
structural break after quarter 39.
to our ﬁndings above. The analyzed networks are:
• Erdös-Renyi (ER) random graphs, where a link is formed with proba-
bility p. The value of p will be set equal to the observed density of the
network. This network is completely random and we do not expect to
ﬁnd a convincing core-periphery structure in this case. The error scores
should be relatively high, since identiﬁed cores would be completely
spurious. Note that this is tantamount to a bootstrap test for the
signiﬁcance of our identiﬁed core-periphery structures, as the random
graphs could also be generated by random resampling of the empirical
links (with replacement). If the error scores of the core-periphery model
are below a certain percentage boundary of those obtained for the sam-
ple of random networks, we could exclude with a signiﬁcance level equal
to the inverse of that probability, that our results are spuriously ob-
tained from a completely random system of interbank liabilities. As it
turns out, all error scores are always way below the minimum obtained
for the random networks.
• Scale-free random graphs, with scaling parameter 2.3.45 Even though
we found the degree distribution not to be scale-free, see Finger et al.
45 In actual interbank networks, the observed scaling parameters vary between 2 and 3.
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(2012), most interbank markets appear to have a certain resemblance of
their degree distributions to a scale-free distribution. Reported scaling
parameters vary between 2 and 3, but are roughly similar for in- and
out-degree. We generate these networks using the approach of Goh et
al. (2001). Note that scale-free networks are assortative by deﬁnition,
since high-degree nodes tend to connect with each other. Therefore we
expect the scale-free network to have a much tighter core and signiﬁ-
cantly lower error scores.46
In the following we only discuss results from the discrete model to save
space.47 Most of the results were expected: all models show a structural
break due to the GFC. The actual error scores lie between those from a
completely random network (ER) and those of a scale-free network as can be
seen from the left panel of Figure 5.12, where we plot the actual error score
and the average error scores of the ER and scale-free networks (including plus
and minus one standard error for the simulated models). Not surprisingly,
the actual network is closer to a scale-free network even though the distance
seems to increase with the GFC.
The right panel of Figure 5.12 shows the core sizes for the actual and ran-
dom networks (again including one standard error for the simulated models).
We see that the observed core is signiﬁcantly larger than both the core of the
scale-free and ER networks. For the ER network, the core is spurious, while
it would capture the most highly connected nodes in the scale-free network
(although the core-periphery model would be a misspeciﬁcation of the overall
structure of such a network).
Overall, we ﬁnd that we can reject the hypothesis that our ﬁndings are
just artifacts of applying the core-periphery algorithms to random data, and
we also ﬁnd that the popular scale-free model could not have generated our
particular sets of identiﬁed cores and ﬁt of the model (error scores).
5.5.3 Continuous Model
We now move to the results from the continuous framework, mostly con-
centrating on the added explanatory power of the asymmetric version. We
have seen in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.3 that the in- and out coreness vectors
are mostly negatively correlated. Figure 5.13 shows a scatter-plot of the two
variables, explicitly linking the ﬁndings to the results of the discrete model.48
Here we take the value found by De Masi et al. (2006).
46 Interestingly, Craig and von Peter (2010) found that the error scores for the German
interbank market are signiﬁcantly smaller than for SF networks.
47 Again we note that the results are almost identical to those from the tiering model.
48 Recall that the coreness values from the continuous model are standardized values.
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Fig. 5.12: Error scores (left) and core sizes (right) in discrete model.
Actual and random graphs. For the SF networks we used
a scaling parameter of α = 2.3.
Obviously, core banks have on average a higher in- and out-coreness. Indeed,
we see a relatively sharp distinction between core and periphery banks. Core
banks (red) are typically characterized by a sum of their in- and out-coreness
above .2, while this sum is lower for banks assigned to the periphery. For
both categories, there might be a dominance of lending and borrowing or a
more balanced composition of their transactions. The systemic importance
of a bank, in terms of its in- and out-coreness, is therefore not identical in
general.49
In Figure 5.14, we show the time-varying autocorrelations of the two core-
ness vectors. The autocorrelations were calculated as the correlation between
two subsequent coreness vectors, using only banks that were active in both
periods. We see that both the in- and out-coreness vectors are highly auto-
correlated (average values: .8474 and .9186, respectively). We also calculated
cross-correlations between the two vectors, where In-Out (Out-In) is the cor-
relation between in-coreness in t− 1 (t) and out-coreness in t (t− 1). These
cross-correlations are signiﬁcantly lower with slightly negative average values
of -.0698 and -.0764, respectively. Thus, lagged values of one coreness vector
are not very informative for the expected value of the other coreness vector
in the next period.
An important question is by how much the ﬁt of the model improves by
using the AC model rather than the SC model. As a rule of thumb, Boyd et
al. (2010) argue that the PRE of the SC model should be at least .5 in order
to have a superior ﬁt to an unstructured distribution of activity. Here we
ﬁnd values around .2 for the SC model, but higher values of around .58 for
49 An example of a ﬁtted network matrix is shown in Appendix 5.8.4.
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Fig. 5.13: In-coreness vs. Out-coreness for all observations, by core
and periphery, as indicated by the discrete model.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
time
co
rr
e
la
tio
n
Time−varying auto−/cross−correlations in continuous model.
 
 
In−Core
Out−Core
In−Out
Out−In
Fig. 5.14: Persistence of coreness vectors. The plot shows the auto-
correlations and cross-correlations of the two vectors over
time. The autocorrelation is simply the correlation of the
coreness vector in t with the one in t − 1, using only the
banks active in both periods. The cross-correlations are the
correlations between in-coreness in t − 1 and out-coreness
in t (In-Out), and vice versa (Out-In).
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Fig. 5.15: PRE for the SC and the AC model, actual and random
graphs. A Chow-test indicates that there is a structural
break after quarter 39 at all sensible signiﬁcance levels for
the PRE of the AC model. The results from an additional
CUSUM-test are also in favor of the existence of a struc-
tural break. The PRE of the SC model appears to display
an additional structural break after quarter 10. For the SF
networks we used a scaling parameter of α = 2.3.
the AC model (cf. Figure 5.15).50 Similar to the discrete and tiering models
above, the ﬁt of the model deteriorates somewhat with the GFC, with lower
average values afterwards. In line with the previous ﬁndings for the discrete
and tiering model, the PRE of the AC model displays a structural break after
quarter 39 (based on a Chow-test and a CUSUM test), but not in the SC
model.
In order to check the signiﬁcance of the PREs, we use a similar approach
as in the previous section on the discrete and tiering model, however, here
we use the (valued) network of interbank liabilities.51 Figure 5.15 compares
the PREs of the actual networks with the mean values from 100 realizations
of random ER and SF networks (again with scaling parameter 2.3) minus
and plus one standard deviation. As expected, the actual PREs of the SC
50 Obviously the ﬁt has to be better in the AC model, since we have twice as many
parameters. Interestingly, the ﬁt is mostly more than twice as good as the ﬁt of the SC
model.
51 In this approach, we generated random ER and SF networks as explained above.
Then, we randomly assigned observed transaction volumes from the actual networks (log-
transformed) to the random ones. The results are essentially identical with and without
replacement. Here we present the results without replacement.
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and AC models signiﬁcantly exceed those from the ER networks, which are
very low in general. In contrast, for the SF networks, the PREs of the SC
model are close to the actual ones, while this is not true for the AC model.52
This ﬁnding underscores the observed asymmetries in the network, which
are absent from scale-free networks, where in- and out-degrees of individual
banks are highly correlated by construction.
In comparison with the closeness of the error scores of the empirical data
and their scale-free resamples in Figure 5.12, the consideration of the asym-
metries of the concentration of incoming and outgoing links shows the lim-
itations of the scale-free networks. While it appears reasonably similar to
a symmetric core-periphery framework, it falls back behind the asymmet-
ric continuous CP model at all levels of signiﬁcance. Since the ﬁt of the
two-dimensional continuous approach (AC) is way better than that of the
one-dimensional continuous approach (SC), we conclude that the directed
version of the model contains important information about the structure of
the interbank market.
5.5.4 What Deﬁnes a Core Bank?
In the following we will focus on the results from the discrete model.53
As a ﬁrst step, we calculate the correlations between the coreness vectors
and diﬀerent observable variables (degree, size, and trading activity).54 It
would also be very interesting to forecast the coreness vectors based on non-
network-related observable variables, e.g. balance sheet size. Due to the
anonymity of the data, such an analysis is, unfortunately, not possible.
Figure 5.16 shows the correlation between the discrete coreness vectors
and the in-, out-, and total degree (total degree is the degree from the undi-
rected version of the network), respectively. The correlation is far higher for
52 Note that the PREs of the AC model are always larger than those from the SC model,
both for the actual and the random networks (even though for the random networks
not always signiﬁcantly). This is driven by the higher number of parameters (degrees of
freedom) in the AC model.
53 Again the results for the tiering model are very similar and available upon request.
54 It would be interesting to analyze the interest rates charged in the diﬀerent blocks in
more detail. This is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. Here we just note that the
(volume-weighted) average interest rate charged in the CC-block exceeds that of all other
blocks (average value of 2.72% for the complete sample). Thus, it seems that core banks
price in the systemic importance of other core banks, while giving more favorable prices to
periphery banks (average value of 2.70%). Furthermore, the average interest rate charged
between periphery banks tends to be quite small as well (average value of 2.71%). Thus,
two periphery banks may grant each other more favorable prices as soon as they trade
with each other on a regular basis. Note that, due to the non-stationarity of the interest
rates, we checked the signiﬁcance by comparing the ﬁrst diﬀerences.
5. Core-Periphery Structure in the Interbank Market 158
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
time
co
rr
e
la
tio
n
Correlation between discrete coreness and different degree measures.
 
 
In−Degree
Out−Degree
Degree
Fig. 5.16: Time-varying correlation between discrete coreness and in-
degree/out-degree/total degree. Total degree is the degree
we would obtain from transforming the directed network
into an undirected network.
out-degree compared to in-degree, and the former has practically the same
correlation with coreness as the total degree. Hence, it is the distribution
of liquidity rather than its absorption, that identiﬁes the core banks in our
sample.
We constructed similar measures for the individual sizes and the number
of transactions per bank, see Figures 5.17 and 5.18, respectively. We proxy
the bank size by the transaction volumes in a particular quarter.55 Here,
in-size contains the total volume of borrowing transactions (per quarter and
per bank), out-size the total volume of lending transactions and total size the
sum of in-size and out-size. Similarly, the number of in-transactions (out-
transactions) is the number of borrowing (lending) transactions per bank.
The total number of transactions is the sum of the two. We ﬁnd that the
core banks are signiﬁcantly larger and more active than periphery banks (un-
reported). However, the size measure appears to be a less reliable indicator
than the simple number of transactions, since it is far more volatile. Both
measures, however, conﬁrm again the dominant aspect of the out-direction
(lending activity) for the core membership of a bank.
We also constructed the same ﬁgures for the continuous model, see Ap-
pendix 5.8.5. As expected, the two coreness vectors can be better explained
based on the directed version of the network. Most importantly, the correla-
tion with the total degree is smaller compared to the correlation of in-coreness
55 See De Masi et al. (2006).
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Fig. 5.17: Time-varying correlation between discrete coreness and in-
size/out-size/total size as deﬁned in the text.
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Fig. 5.18: Time-varying correlation between discrete coreness and
number of in- and out transactions. Total number of trans-
actions is the sum of the two.
5. Core-Periphery Structure in the Interbank Market 160
with in-degree and out-coreness with out-degree, respectively. Again, the
correlations with the size measures are highly volatile.
We conclude that all measures point towards the lending activity as the
more relevant aspect of core banks' participation in the market. The much
lower relevance of their borrowing activity, then, explains why in- and out-
coreness vectors in the asymmetric model are virtually uncorrelated.
5.5.5 What Happened During the GFC?
In this section, we provide a more detailed analysis of the eﬀects of a major
shock to the interbank network, namely the collapse of Lehman Brothers in
quarter 39. So far, our analysis shows that the GFC indeed had a substantial
impact on the network along many dimensions, in particular in terms of the
goodness-of-ﬁt of the core-periphery models. To investigate the eﬀects of
the structural break in more detail, we split our sample into a short pre-
crisis period (quarters 37 and 38) and a post-crisis period (40 and 41).56
Interestingly, despite the clear negative trend in the number of active banks
during the complete sample period (cf. Figure 6.1), the actual number during
the analyzed subperiod is relatively stable with an average value of 98 banks.
Thus the network sizes during this particular period are comparable, which
allows to compare diﬀerent network-related measures. As a ﬁrst step, we
will investigate network-related variables from a macro perspective. Then
we take a closer look at the behavior of one particular exemplary core bank
around the breakpoint.
As we have seen (cf. Figure 5.6), the GFC aﬀected the block-structures of
the discrete and the tiering model: Core banks trade signiﬁcantly less with
each other (density in the CC-block smaller), and so do periphery banks
(density in the PP-block smaller). In contrast, there is no evidence for a
signiﬁcant structural break in the densities of the oﬀ-diagonal blocks. Core
banks also tend to lend less money to the periphery (density in the CP-block
smaller), while there is no clear trend in the amount that peripheral banks
lend to the core, thus the periphery tends to maintain their links to the core
during and after the crisis. Given that the GFC, and the resulting tensions in
money markets, can be seen as the result of a crisis of conﬁdence, it comes as
no surprise that core banks tend to reduce their risk exposure by cutting down
the number of links going both to core and periphery banks.57 Concerning
56 Of course one could argue that the pre-GFC period should be further away from the
breakpoint, however, here we are particularly interested in the network changes right at
the phase transition.
57 Interestingly, the number of reciprocal links, i.e. the fraction of links pointing in both
directions, goes down due to the GFC. This is somewhat surprising, since we would expect
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the market activity, we ﬁnd that the total trading volumes (and also the
total number of trades) in the CC- and the CP-blocks dropped substantially
during the crisis, while it actually increased in the PP-block immediately
after the GFC but then dropped substantially. In contrast, after a sharp
drop of market activity in the PC-block right before the GFC, the total
amount of credit ﬂowing from the periphery to the core actually increased
after the GFC.58 Thus it seems, that the crisis mainly aﬀected the behavior of
core banks, which rather hoarded their liquidity than providing it to a large
number of other counterparties.59 In contrast, periphery banks tend to keep
(at times even expand) the number of outgoing links with core banks, while
reducing the exposure to the periphery. The ﬁndings on the Jaccard Index
of the PC-block (cf. Figure 5.10), however, indicate that periphery banks
do not necessarily lend money to the same core banks over time. Overall,
from the relatively stable Jaccard indices it appears that no major disruption
of the network pattern occurred (cf. section 5.5.2), but that the aggregate
volume of lending by core banks has declined substantially. Hence, most
of the network structure remained intact, but continued its operations at
a much lower level of activity. This ﬁnding speaks in factor of a positive
eﬀect of relationship lending that helped to prevent a complete collapse of
the interbank market after the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis (as suggested by
Aﬃnito (2011), and Braeuning (2011)).
To illustrate the generally observed tendencies, we picked the (core) bank
with the highest aggregate trading volume.60 During this period, the partic-
ular bank had an average in-degree of 30, while its average out-degree was
substantially higher with 64.61 These mean values, however, hide the dy-
namic development, since there was a sharp drop in the banks' out-degree
during the GFC (the maximum level pre-GFC was 80, the minimum level at
the end of the period is merely 32), while the in-degree actually increased
during the crisis (the minimum level pre-GFC was 15, the maximum level at
the end of the period is 45). In Figure 5.19, we split up the bank's links into
outgoing links to core and periphery banks, respectively, and the same for
the incoming links during the period under study. We see that the bank had
that bilateral relationship become closer in crisis times.
58 The increase in the number of trades in the PC-block after the GFC is even more
impressive, ending up above the pre-GFC level.
59 Interestingly, core banks lend more money than they borrow from the periphery, thus
the core is a net lender to the periphery.
60 In fact, this bank (ID number `IT0278') was in the core during the complete sample
period.
61 These numbers just underline the observed asymmetry between the CP- and PC-
blocks.
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Fig. 5.19: In- and out-degrees of bank IT0278, by core and periphery.
In-core gives the number of incoming links from other core
banks, In-periphery the number of incoming links from pe-
riphery banks. Out-core gives the number of outgoing links
to other core banks, Out-periphery the number of outgoing
links to periphery banks.
reduced the number of outgoing links, both with core and periphery banks,
but it had increased the number of incoming links, in line with the overall
tendencies.62 Interestingly, while the bank was a net-lender during most of
the sample period, we see that the bank actually reversed its strategy during
the GFC, since it became a net-borrower afterwards (see Figure 5.20). Thus,
the bank tried to attract liquidity, mainly from periphery banks, since core
banks became reluctant to trade with other core banks.
Summing up, we conclude that the GFC both aﬀected the behavior of
core and periphery banks: Periphery banks seem to have increased their
lending to the core, both in terms of the number of links and trading volumes.
In contrast, core banks have reduced their lending, not only to other core
banks, but also to the periphery. The decline in goodness-of-ﬁt of the core-
periphery structure is therefore mostly due to a loosening of the core. Core
banks activated a smaller number of their previous outgoing links. Hence
they started to hoard liquidity rather than distributing it in the system.
Therefore, it seems that core banks tend to rely on the liquidity of periphery
banks during times of distress, while in `normal' times they would more freely
redistribute liquidity in the complete system.
62 It would be interesting to see the quote data, rather than the transaction data. We
suspect, that many quotes are simply never executed during the GFC.
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Fig. 5.20: Transaction volumes of bank IT0278. In-transactions gives
the total amount of credit borrowed by the bank, while
Out-transactions gives the total amount of credit lend by
the bank to other banks.
5.6 Discussion
The majority of studies on the structure of interbank networks has hith-
erto concentrated on the distribution of degrees. Many authors mention the
ﬁnding of some form of community structure in the interbank market, sug-
gesting a tightly connected core of money-center banks.63 The ﬁnding of a
core-periphery structure in the Italian interbank market can be seen as a
special case of community structure,64 where the core is a tightly connected
part of the network, and the periphery is the loosely connected component.65
Even though we only know of only one other study in this regard, it may
well be that the ﬁnding of a core-periphery structure could be seen as a new
`stylized fact' of modern banking systems. As far as data are available, it
would be important to test this hypothesis in other interbank networks.
An important question is of course why we ﬁnd a core-periphery structure
in the interbank market. In the literature on social network analysis, two
main explanations for the emergence of a core-periphery structure exist: (1)
63 See Iori et al. (2006) and Soramäki et al. (2007).
64 Note that communities are usually deﬁned as very dense subgraphs, with few connec-
tions between them. The periphery is thus more of an anti-community.
65 We also checked several standard community detecting algorithms for the Italian in-
terbank network. The main ﬁnding is that, for the entire market, we ﬁnd two separate
communities consisting of foreign and Italian banks, respectively. Interestingly, it is im-
possible to split these communities further into smaller subcommunities. Thus it seems
even more remarkable that we ﬁnd a core-periphery structure in this market.
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`Superior' core members possess an intrinsic advantage over the `inferior'
periphery members, such that the core exerts power over the periphery.66
In order for a core-periphery structure to emerge, the advantage of the core
members must be reﬂected in attributes aﬀecting the linking behavior of
all agents.67 Then core agents would be able to translate their advantage
into a positional advantage in the social network.68 Transferring this idea
to banking networks, one encounters several problems. First, it is not clear
a priori which attributes might make core banks `superior' to the periphery.
We would also need to come up with an explanation why core banks share
attributes that periphery banks do not have. Note also that this deﬁnition
implies that it should be preferable for all banks to be part of the core, which
is not very plausible. For example, a small bank (in terms of its balance sheet)
would ﬁnd it hard to intermediate between other core banks, simply because
it does not command a suﬃcient amount of funds to do so. Therefore, this
bank will always prefer being in the `inferior' periphery, where it still might
intermediate between other small banks. Furthermore, the general ﬁnding of
disassortative mixing patterns in banking networks69 is not in line with the
power-based explanation, since core banks would then be reluctant to create
links with periphery agents. Nevertheless, if we deﬁne power as the ability
of inﬂuencing the market, it may well be that it is an important driver for
the emergence of a core-periphery structure in the banking network.
(2) Core members have a comparative advantage in gathering (and spread-
ing) information about other members of the network.70 Thus, informa-
tion costs are higher for periphery-periphery relationships compared to core-
periphery relationships (in both directions). For the banking network, this
would mean that periphery banks have an incentive in cutting down the
number of links to other periphery banks, maintaining only a few links to
core banks. Core banks on the other hand connect among themselves and to
periphery banks.71 This explanation would not only be in line with the disas-
66 See Persitz (2009).
67 For example, in a scientiﬁc network, the core agents are the highly productive agents
being cited by many others. See Mullins et al. (1977).
68 Persitz (2009) provides a formal model for a power-based core-periphery network. The
basic idea is that linking preferences are such that all agents prefer establishing links to
`superior' agents relative to `inferior' agents.
69 See Finger et al. (2012).
70 For banks, the comparative advantage may stem from economies of scope and scale,
but also from very frequent interactions on the market which small periphery banks usually
do not have.
71 Note that, despite the overall disassortative mixing patterns, the core-periphery struc-
ture indicates that we should actually diﬀerentiate between these patterns in the core and
the periphery: the periphery mostly shows disassortative mixing within itself, while the
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sortative mixing patterns, but also with the evidence in Cocco et al. (2009):
small banks, with limited access to international capital markets and possibly
limited investment/ﬁnancing opportunities due to their more locally oriented
business model, tend to rely on preferential relationships with (large) core
banks. Thus, core banks act as intermediaries between diﬀerent parts of the
periphery of the domestic banking system, resulting in indirect relationships
between peripheral banks. Note that this explanation is also in line with the
observed asymmetry between the densities in the CP- and the PC-blocks,
since they imply that periphery banks cut down their credit risk by focusing
on a few selected core banks, while they are prepared to borrow money from
a larger set of core banks.
Finally, we would like to focus on the potential implications of our ﬁndings
for regulators. It is well known that the structure of a network is important
for its resilience, hence policymakers should be interested in the actual topol-
ogy of the interbank network. For stress-testing exercises, it would, there-
fore, be crucial to use a topological description of the connections within the
banking sector that is both realistic and computationally tractable. Most
stress-testing scenarios have actually adapted an entropy-maximization ap-
proach for ﬁlling the unknown matrices of interbank liabilities.72 This means,
that given some overall statistics for the whole system, interbank credit is
spread as evenly as possible across the system73 An idealized core-periphery
structure amounts to pretty much the opposite in terms of concentration of
interbank liabilities. If the data were closer to the latter type of structure,
the entropy-based approach could give misleading results for the expected
aftereﬀects to shocks aﬀecting single institutions. If, as we believe, the core-
periphery structure turns out to be a stylized fact of the interbank mar-
ket, stress-tests should take this particular topology into account. Unknown
amounts of interbank liabilities could then be calibrated along the structural
features of typical core-periphery models for available data (like those of
the present paper and Craig and von Peter, 2011). As our results show, it
might also be important to take into account asymmetries in the borrowing
and lending attitudes of core banks. Even when comparing the eﬀects of
shocks between diﬀerent network models with some tendency of concentra-
tion of links, important diﬀerences might exist. For example, networks with
scale-free degree distributions are known to be robust with respect to ran-
dom failures, but fragile with respect to targeted attacks on the most central
core shows more of assortative mixing among its members, since core banks tend to connect
among themselves.
72 See Sheldon and Maurer (1998), and Upper and Worms (2004).
73 Note that this is equivalent to the benchmark against which the error reduction by
the continuous core-periphery model is measured.
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nodes.74 The usual mechanism to construct scale-free degree distributions
is that of preferential attachment, see Barabasi and Albert (1999), so high-
degree nodes tend to attract more links than low-degree nodes over time. As
described above, we did not ﬁnd evidence for scale-free degree distributions
in the e-MID data and also ﬁnd disassortative rather than assortative mixing
patterns. Comparing assortative to disassortative networks, Newman (2002)
shows that, for the same degree distribution, assortative ones are more robust
to targeted attacks compared to disassortative ones. Since an assortative net-
work possesses a whole set of nodes with large in- and out-degrees, i.e. many
connections across the entire network, the system is characterized by a cer-
tain degree of redundancy that makes it more robust under attacks on single
highly connected nodes. In contrast, the disassortative network is more sus-
ceptible to removal of high-degree nodes, which are not as tightly connected
as in the assortative case. Thus, removing high-degree nodes allows to attack
diﬀerent parts of the network.
In a somewhat related strand of research, Brede and de Vries (2009) show
that core-periphery structures might emerge from an evolutionary process
as a compromise between resilience (concentration makes the network more
vulnerable) and eﬃciency of a network (concentration creates short average
path lengths).75 From an economic point of view, the question would be
whether the self-organization of the interbank network into a core-periphery
structure creates important externalities so that policymakers should attempt
to shift the balance towards higher resilience and somewhat lower eﬃciency.
Of course, regulators should also be interested in the dynamics of a net-
work, when the breakdown of one node has knock-on eﬀects on other nodes.
This contagion eﬀect is for example investigated by Caccioli et al. (2011) for
diﬀerent network structures. The authors analyze the extent of contagion in
artiﬁcial banking systems after the random failure of individual institutions.
Their main ﬁnding is that the likelihood of contagion, i.e. the breakdown of
the entire system, is smaller for disassortative networks. Since in the latter,
high-degree nodes tend to connect with low-degree nodes, the failure of a
random node is unlikely to spread through the entire system. Conversely,
the random breakdown of a high-degree node will severely aﬀect other high-
degree nodes in assortative networks. Note that this is diﬀerent from the
aspect of vulnerability under targeted attacks. As a consequence, a disas-
sortative core-periphery framework might be more robust in `normal' times,
but more fragile under exceptional circumstances when key nodes are under
74 See Albert et al. (2000).
75 Note that the highest eﬃciency is realized in star-like conﬁgurations, while the highest
resilience is related to the avoidance of short loops and degree homogeneity. See also
Netotea and Pongor (2006).
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stress or withdraw from the market. Hence, the `coreness' translates to a
certain extent into `systemic relevance' of certain institutions.76 The GFC
seems to have been a major shock to the interbank network, as tests for
structural breaks indicate. The observation that the ﬁt of the core-periphery
models signiﬁcantly worsened with the GFC, might provide important infor-
mation per se on the endogenous reaction of the system to stress which could
be incorporated in stress-test scenarios. Furthermore the goodness-of-ﬁt of
the core-periphery framework might be seen as an indicator of tensions in
the interbank market, so that various statistics based upon such a framework
could be used as early warning signals of impending crises.
5.7 Conclusions
The main ﬁndings of our paper are the following: we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
core-periphery structure in the Italian interbank network for a sample period
from January 1999 to December 2010. The identiﬁed core is quite persistent
over time, consisting of roughly 28% of sample banks before the GFC and
23% afterwards (discrete model). Given the substantial diﬀerences in the
German and Italian interbank market data investigated by Craig and von
Peter (2010) and the present paper, e.g. in the underlying region and the
maturity structure of the credit relationships, the ﬁnding of a core-periphery
structure is unlikely to be a coincidence. We expect that other interbank
markets display a similar hierarchical structure, which might be classiﬁed as
a new `stylized fact' of modern interbank networks and actually concretizes
on a system level the role of money center banks. Going beyond the anal-
ysis of Craig and von Peter (2010), we also investigate the continuous and
asymmetric versions of core-periphery models and ﬁnd evidence for strong
asymmetries. In particular, overall coreness is mainly driven by the function
of provision of liquidity to large parts of the banking system by the core mem-
bers. Overall coreness is, therefore, largely identical to out-coreness, while
its connection to in-coreness is very weak. Regulators should be aware of the
fact that a bank which is part of the in-core but not of the out-core, may
play a completely diﬀerent role in the system than a bank with the reverse
strategy.
Formal tests favor the existence of a structural break in the last quarter
of 2008, the time when Lehman Brothers collapsed. We investigated this
time period in more detail and found that the deteriorating ﬁt of the core-
periphery structure in the post-GFC period is mainly due to the loosening
of connections in the core, particularly on the lending side. Furthermore,
76 See also Markose et al. (2010).
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it seems that during times of distress, core banks tend to rely on periphery
banks as an important source of funding, since other core banks are reluctant
to provide as much liquidity to other banks as in normal times.
Our ﬁndings provide some support for the view that the network struc-
ture is non-random due to the existence of preferential lending relationships.
This is in line with the results of Cocco et al. (2009), Aﬃnito (2011), and
Braeuning (2011). Further evidence in this regard is provided by Finger and
Lux (2013), who analyze the evolution of the banking network using the
actor-oriented approach by Snijders (1996, 2001). The general conclusion is
that preferential lending relationships at the micro-level lead to hierarchical
structure at the macro-level. An open question is why the interbank network
shows such a hierarchy. We argue that the comparative advantage of core
banks in gathering and distributing information about their counterparties
is likely to be a crucial factor.
In the future we plan to apply the model to other interbank data, in order
to evaluate whether the core-periphery structure is indeed a new stylized fact
of banking systems. Furthermore, it would be interesting to relate the results
to bank-speciﬁc variables, such as individual balance-sheet data. In any case,
this approach can be seen as a contribution to identifying the systemically
important banks in a quantitative way. We also believe that the methods
presented here could be an important tool for regulators since they allow
to reduce the complexity of large-scale network data, and to represent the
salient structural features of the complicated web of dispersed activity in the
interbank market in a compact way.
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5.8 Appendix
5.8.1 Genetic Algorithm
The GA maintains a population of L solution candidates and evaluates
the quality of each solution candidate according to a problem-speciﬁc ﬁtness
function, which deﬁnes the environment for the evolution. New solution
candidates are created by selecting relatively ﬁt strategies which are then
recombined through various genetic operators:
1. Reproduction: From the pool of current solutions, L copies are se-
lected (with replacement) randomly with probabilities depending on a
solution's relative ﬁtness, i.e. prob(reproduce solution j) = fj/
∑
i fi
with f being the ﬁtness function as deﬁned below (tournament selec-
tion).
2. Crossover: Copies from the reproduction step are randomly paired in
a mating process with each couple producing two oﬀspring via exchange
of genetic material. The simplest way is to select two copies randomly
and swap bits between both of them. Here we randomly select an inte-
ger in the range of [1, L− 1] and construct oﬀsprings by combining the
left of this position from parent one with that from the right-hand part
of parent two and vice versa. The cross-over operation is carried out
with probability picross, while with probability (1− picross) the oﬀspring
are unchanged copies of their parents.
3. Mutation: After exchanging genetic material, slightly diﬀerent solu-
tions are formed by altering each position within a string with proba-
bility pimut to the other value of the binary alphabet.
4. Election: The election operator avoids an overall decrease of ﬁtness
in the population by allowing only oﬀspring with a higher ﬁtness than
their parents to the new generation.
We also add an operator that we call `genetic engineering' (GE) to accel-
erate the convergence of the algorithm.77 GE selects the binary string with
highest ﬁtness value of the current population so far and tries to improve
its ﬁtness value as follows: we search the core member with the lowest con-
nection to the core in this partition (i) and the periphery member with the
highest connection to the core (j).78 Then we compare the ﬁtness of the
current partition with three alternatives: (1) ﬂip i's core membership from 1
77 See also Stolzenburg and Lux (2011).
78 This is done by computing the average connections with all core members.
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Fig. 5.21: Example for the core-periphery structure of the Italian in-
terbank network, 1999Q1. Red dots show core, blue dots
periphery banks. Dotted lines show directed edges from
one bank to another.
to 0, and j's core membership from 0 to 1, (2) only ﬂip i's core membership,
(3) only ﬂip j's core membership. Using the best of these alternatives, we
put the resulting string back into the evolving population. By using this
additional operation we can manipulate our population target-oriented and
do not have to rely solely on blind exploration of the search space by the
random evolutionary steps of `mutation' and `crossover'.
Summing up, the binary-coded GA has only two parameters picross and
pimut. Obviously, the ﬁtness function is the crucial element of the GA. In our
setting, the ﬁtness of each solution depends on the corresponding error score
e. Since the optimal solution would have zero errors, we simply take the rate
of `correct' classiﬁcations as the ﬁtness function, i.e.
fl = 1− e(C), (5.12)
with the error score deﬁned in Eq. (5.3).
5.8.2 Discrete Model: Illustration
Figure 5.21 illustrates the outcome of the estimation of the discrete core-
periphery model for the ﬁrst quarter of 1999. We clearly see that the core
banks (red dots) form the cluster of the most central nodes, with periphery
banks (blue dots) connecting to parts of this cluster.79
79 Note the high network density and the existence of only a single network component.
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5.8.3 Empirical Estimation of the Asymmetric Continuous (AC) Model
This section summarizes Boyd et al.'s (2010) approach for estimation of
the AC model.
Problem Formulation
We ﬁrst note the similarity between the optimization problem of Eq. 5.9
in the main text, and a Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) of a matrix.
SVD allows to decompose a matrix D{M×N} of rank r into
D = USV′, (5.13)
where U{M×r}, V{N×r} are real matrices with orthonormal columns, with
the columns corresponding to the singular vectors, and S{r×r} is a diagonal
matrix containing the singular values (ordered) on the main diagonal.80
For any k ≤ r, SVD gives the best (least-squares) rank-k approximation
of D, i.e.
D(k) = U(k)S(k)V
′
(k), (5.14)
with U(k) and V(k) as the ﬁrst k columns of U and V respectively, and S(k)
as the diagonal matrix formed by the ﬁrst k singular values.
Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) is deﬁned for rectangular matrices,
for which symmetry is not an issue, but it can also handle square matrices,
whether symmetric or asymmetric, as a special case.81 However, it does
require the presence of the diagonal elements of a matrix. Thus, by deﬁnition,
SVD can handle asymmetric data matrices.
Estimation of the AC model is again performed via minimization of resid-
uals (MINRES) taking stock of the proximity of the problem to a SVD. The
basic idea of MINRES/SVD is to use a rank-1 approximation of D, using the
ﬁrst singular value s and the ﬁrst singular vectors u and v: D(1) = usv
′.82
Since SVD requires diagonal elements, we use a SVD of rank 1 and, similar to
the MINRES approach, exclude the diagonal elements in the analysis. Thus,
our objective function for the AC model looks as follows
arg min
u,v
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
(dij − uisvj)2. (5.15)
80 U contains the eigenvectors of D D′ while V contains the eigenvectors of D′D. The
diagonal elements of S are the square roots of the non-zero eigenvalues of D D′.
81 See Stewart (1993) for an overview.
82 In the future it would be interesting to look at higher dimensional approximations.
This would allow splitting up the core and periphery even further.
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The normality constraints on u and v can be eliminated, such that we can
neglect the singular value s by absorbing it into the unconstrained vectors
u and v. Obviously, the solution is not unique, but without s the model is
even simpler, since we approximate D using only uv′, leaving us with the
objective function
arg min
u,v
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
(dij − uivj)2. (5.16)
The optimal vectors can be determined by ﬁnding the roots of the ﬁrst-
order conditions of Eq. (5.16). The original u, s and v can be obtained by
deﬁning s = ||u||||v||, with ||u|| = √∑i u2i being the Euclidian norm of u,
and then dividing u and v by their norms. The reported coreness vectors are
normalized.
Optimization Problem for MINRES/SVD
We could solve the problem of ﬁnding the vectors u{N×1} and v{N×1}
numerically by using standard optimization procedures. However, following
Boyd et al. (2010), the problem can be solved easier by setting the ﬁrst
derivative of Eq. (5.9) with respect to ui and vj equal to zero and solving
the resulting equations numerically.
More formally, this amounts to
∂L
∂ui
=
N∑
j 6=i
(dijvj − uiv2j ) = 0. (5.17)
Remembering that the diagonal elements in A equal zero, we can write this
as
N∑
j=1
dijvj = −uiv2i +
N∑
j=1
uiv
2
j . (5.18)
For each row i this equation has to hold, so we can write the set of equations
in matrix notation as
Dv = u.(−v.2 + v′v), (5.19)
where a dot indicates elementwise multiplication. The other set of equations
can be calculated in a similar fashion
∂L
∂vj
=
N∑
i 6=j
(dijui − u2i vj) = 0, (5.20)
leading to
N∑
i=1
dijui = −u2jvj +
N∑
j=1
u2i vj. (5.21)
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Now, this equation has to hold for each column j, which can be written in
compact form as
u′D = v′.(−u.2 + u′u)′. (5.22)
Consequently, the optimal vectors u and v can be obtained by solving Eqs.
(5.19) and (5.22) simultaneously. Using an appropriate set of initial values
(see below), the optimization is much faster than solving Eq. (5.15) directly.83
We should also note that we checked an alternative approach proposed
by Boyd et al. (2010), where we impute values on the diagonal and apply
the usual one-dimensional SVD to this matrix. The results from this ap-
proach cannot be distinguished from those presented in the following, so this
approach is likely to be more eﬃcient when working with very large networks.
Initial values for MINRES/SVD
The choice of the initial values is important in many numerical problems,
most importantly with respect to computation time. Here we follow the ap-
proach in Boyd et al. (2010) and impute diagonals to the data matrix ﬁrst,
then using the ﬁrst step in the reciprocal averaging method for computing
the SVD. The algorithm will then work on the original data matrix, without
diagonal elements.
Let ci, rj and t be the column, row and total sums of the matrix D, re-
spectively, excluding the diagonal elements.84 A single missing value at the
position dij could then be imputed by assuming independence. This leads us
to (ri + dij)(cj + dij) = dij(t+ dij) or solving for the missing entry
dij =
ricj
t− ri − cj . (5.23)
If all of the diagonal elements were missing, one could use this formula to
estimate each of the diagonal elements. However, this neglects the contribu-
tion of the other N − 1 diagonal elements to the total sum t. So a better
approximation would be to estimate the sum of all the matrix elements by
adding to t an estimate for the other N − 1 diagonal elements, the average
value of the oﬀ-diagonal elements, t/(N2 − N). After canceling the factor
N −1, the independence model for estimating the diagonal elements appears
as (rk +dkk)(ck +dkk) = dkk(t+ t/N +dkk) for each element dkk.
85 This leads
83 We have used a very similar approach for the SC model, where we can also speed up
the estimation by taking the ﬁrst derivative of Eq. (5.7) with respect to c and solving the
resulting system of equations numerically. See Boyd et al. (2010).
84 For simplicity, if these were zero the sums would remain unaﬀected.
85 There is a slight error in the version by Boyd et al. (2010), since they missed the d2kk
term on the right-hand side of the Equation.
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to
dkk =
rkck
t+ t/N − rk − ck . (5.24)
The reciprocal averaging method is analogous to the power method for com-
puting eigenvectors. It works as follows: choose initial vectors x0 and y0 to
be x0(i) = y0(i) = 1, i = 1, · · · , N. Then the iterative formulas
x˜k = Dyk−1, xk = x˜k/||x˜k||
y˜k = xk−1D, yk = y˜k/||y˜k||.
(5.25)
give a sequence of vectors such that xk and yk converge to the ﬁrst singular
vectors u and d, respectively. A good approximation for usv′ would be x2Dy′2.
However, we do not specify the singular value but absorb it into the vectors
u and d, which are now not normalized. Thus the initial vectors u0 and v0
are
√
sx2 and
√
sy2, where a good approximation for d is
d0 =
r
||r||D
c′
||c|| . (5.26)
5.8.4 Model Fit: AC Model
Figure 5.22 shows an example of a ﬁtted network matrix, where the matrix
has been sorted according to the individual sums of the in- and out-coreness
values. The Figure illustrates the typical asymmetry of the in- and out-cores,
since most of the core banks lend money to the periphery (out-core), while
there are fewer connections from the periphery to the core.
5.8.5 What Deﬁnes a Core Bank (in the Continuous Model)?
Figures 5.23-5.25 show the results for the continuous model. Obviously,
the two coreness vectors can be better explained based on the directed version
of the network. Most importantly, the correlation with the total degree is
smaller compared to the correlation of in-coreness with in-degree and out-
coreness with out-degree, respectively. Again, the correlations with the size
measures are highly volatile.
These results suggest that, in contrast to the ﬁndings of Craig and von
Peter (2010), total balance sheet size may not be as informative for explaining
banks' coreness as we might expect. When splitting the banking network into
in-core, out-core and periphery, we should rather focus on asymmetric ﬁgures.
Examples might be loans granted on the asset side of the balance sheet and
the size of the debt on the liability side. It would be interesting to investigate
this in other interbank markets in the future.
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Fig. 5.22: Example: Data matrix and approximation based on the
AC model for 2000 Q3, with warm colors indicating high
transaction values between individual banks. The upper
panel shows the log-transformed data matrix D after ap-
plying the MINRES/SVD approach and sorting the net-
work according to the coreness vectors. The lower panel
shows the MINRES/SVD approximation based on the AC
model, with the same ordering of the network nodes.
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Fig. 5.23: Time-varying correlation between in-/out-coreness and in-
degree/out-degree/total degree. Total degree is the degree
we would obtain from transforming the directed network
into an undirected network.
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Fig. 5.24: Time-varying correlation between in-/out-coreness and in-
size/out-size/total size as deﬁned in the text.
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Fig. 5.25: Time-varying correlation between in-/out-coreness and
number of in- and out transactions. Total number of trans-
actions is the sum of the two.
5.8.6 Changing the Aggregation Period
Here we brieﬂy discuss the results for other than quarterly aggregation
periods, by focusing on the results from monthly and annual networks. To
be precise, the typical element in A is aij = 1 if there was at least one trans-
action from bank i to j during the respective month/year.86 In both cases,
we expect comparable results as for the quarterly networks, however, with
certain diﬀerences. For example, given the fact that the activity structure of
banks is less stable for monthly compared to quarterly networks, we expect
the coreness vectors to be less stable over time. Furthermore, due to the
aggregation, the total number of active banks in one quarter will be at least
as big as the number of active banks in any of the 3 months in this particular
quarter. Therefore, we expect the relative size of the core to be somewhat
smaller for monthly data. For annual data, it is a priori not clear what might
happen to the coreness vectors. While we expect a larger core as compared
to the quarterly case (due to the reduction of noise and the relatively large
number of active banks per year), the volatility in the coreness vectors (over
time) could in fact be higher, given that annual aggregation makes it more
likely that two banks being active in diﬀerent quarters are being put to-
gether in a network where they in fact never could have interacted. Again,
the anonymity of the data set makes it impossible for us to disentangle these
eﬀects.
86 We do not expect signiﬁcant changes, if we used a higher threshold here, e.g. banks
might have to trade at least twice within a particular period to establish a link.
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Fig. 5.26: Comparison of the time-varying relative core sizes for dif-
ferent aggregation periods.
Figure 5.26 shows the time-varying relative core sizes (discrete model) of
diﬀerent aggregation periods for the entire sample period of 144 months. As
expected, the relative size of the core depends positively on the length of the
aggregation period, so the core is largest for yearly networks, consisting of
roughly 36% of sample banks before the GFC and close to 30% afterwards.
The structural break due to the GFC is clearly visible for yearly and quarterly
data. This is not so much true for monthly data, where pre- and post-
GFC average core sizes are 20% and 17% respectively. The average core
size appears to be relatively stable for monthly data, however with wilder
ﬂuctuations as compared to longer frequencies. Thus, there appears to be
substantial noise in the monthly networks, backing up our use of quarterly
data in the baseline scenario. Similar remarks apply to the error scores
in Figure 5.27. As expected, the high level of noise at higher frequencies
deteriorates the model ﬁt: the ﬁt is worst for monthly data, with the highest
error scores. Interestingly, at the monthly level, the GFC seems less like
a big shock as compared to quarterly and yearly data, since the error score
increases already before the GFC. In contrast, the ﬁt of the longer aggregation
periods drops with the GFC, which is most clearly visible for the yearly data.
In any case, it seems that the Italian interbank market shows a core-periphery
structure at all frequencies under study, even though for monthly networks
the noise level is rather high so that it is much harder to identify the core at
such high frequencies.
Concerning the correlation between individual coreness vectors from dif-
ferent models, we just note here that the correlation between the discrete
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Fig. 5.27: Comparison of the error-scores for diﬀerent aggregation pe-
riods.
and tiering model is roughly .8750 for monthly and .9918 for yearly net-
works. Thus, the results from the discrete and tiering model are very similar
in general, but for monthly data there may be some diﬀerences. While the
correlation between out-coreness and the discrete model is comparable for all
frequencies (around .73), the correlation with in-coreness depends positively
on the aggregation period.87 Thus, it seems that network becomes more sym-
metric for longer aggregation periods. This is conﬁrmed by the fact that the
correlation between in- and out-coreness is -.2126 for monthly data and .1383
for yearly data. Thus, at the yearly level, in- and out-coreness appear to be
positively related. In any case, the correlation between the two vectors is
rather small in absolute terms, so the asymmetric MINRES/SVD approach
captures the inherent asymmetry of the network at all frequencies.
5.8.7 Including Foreign Banks
Analyzing the network formed by foreign banks only, we see average error
scores around 45% before the GFC and values close to 90% afterwards. Given
that foreign banks' activity is rather unstable, due to the simple fact that
they have access to other sources of funding, it comes as no surprise that
foreign banks form a structurally diﬀerent separate subnetwork.
We also analyzed the complete network, with Italian and foreign banks.
Interestingly, most of our ﬁndings from the baseline scenario with Italian
banks only, remain unaﬀected. However, there is a clear upward trend in the
87 For monthly data the correlation between the discrete and in-coreness vector is roughly
.1578, while the value is .3861 for yearly data.
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error score over time which is driven by the rather unstable nature of foreign
banks' activity. Thus it seems justiﬁed to exclude foreign banks from the
analysis.
5.8.8 Continuous Model Using the Number of Transactions
As another robustness check, we ran the continuous model using the quar-
terly matrices containing the number of (directed) transactions between in-
dividual banks T, instead of the total transaction volumes D.88 We ﬁnd
very similar coreness vectors in both settings. For the SC model the corre-
lation between the vectors is .9618. For the AC model, the correlations are
.9594 and .9844 for in- and out-coreness, respectively.89 Quite interestingly,
it seems that the ﬁt (in terms of PRE) of the MINRES model in this case is
even worse compared to the values presented in the main text, while the ﬁt
of the MINRES/SVD model is slightly better than before. It not not quite
clear, why this is the case, but we should stress that all of the results here
indicate that the model is quite robust. Most importantly, it seems that
the conclusions from above also hold for alternative valued matrices, that
measure the intensity of bilateral relations in a meaningful way.
5.8.9 Further Robustness Checks
We performed additional robustness checks for the discrete and continu-
ous models.
• We estimated the discrete models using the correlation-based approach
of Stolzenburg and Lux (2011); there we used the correlation between
the observed data matrix and the pattern matrix constructed from the
coreness vectors as the objective function. Note that the correlation-
based approach can only be used for the discrete model in the case of
arbitrary oﬀ-diagonal blocks. We found very similar results compared
to the baseline scenario. In this regard, we also ran the discrete model
with valued networks (transaction volumes and number of transactions,
both log-transformed) and found very similar results compared to the
baseline scenario.
• We used the binary networks, rather than the valued ones, as input ma-
trices in the continuous models. The coreness vectors are very similar
88 Again we log-transform the data matrix to reduce the level of skewness, cf. section
5.4.2.
89 We also ﬁnd similar values for monthly and annual data.
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to the baseline case (correlation of above .93), however, with constantly
smaller PREs.
• We estimated the continuous models without log-transforming the data.
Due to the high level of skewness in the data (driven by many zeros in
the matrices), it is not possible to identify a sensible core for the trans-
action volumes. The coreness vectors are hardly comparable, with a
correlation of .4928 between the out- and .3829 between the in-coreness
vectors compared to the baseline scenario, respectively. Furthermore
the PREs are highly volatile over time. In contrast, using the num-
ber of transactions the correlations are .8510 and .7668 for the out-
and in-coreness vectors compared to the baseline scenario, respectively.
Also the PREs are comparable to the baseline scenario, however, with
extreme values around quarter 10 and 39, i.e. the two candidates for
structural breaks.
• We also estimated the continuous models using the correlation-based
approach. We ﬁnd identical results in both cases, however, the ap-
proach presented in the paper is preferable, since the computation is
much faster. We should note that the correlation between the pattern
and the observed matrices is always above .70 in the AC model, while
it may be as low as .37 for the SC model after the GFC.
6. TRADING STRATEGIES IN THE OVERNIGHT MONEY
MARKET: CORRELATIONS AND CLUSTERING ON THE
E-MID TRADING PLATFORM
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6.1 Introduction and Existing Literature
The global ﬁnancial crisis (GFC) has shown that the stability of the
interbank network is of utmost importance for the macroeconomy. Linkages
arising from bilateral lending relationships may lead to systemic risk on the
macro-level, see Haldane (2009). Therefore, regulators and policymakers
need to understand the structure and functioning of the interbank network
in more detail.
Approaches from the natural sciences have been used to investigate the
topology of networks formed by interbank liabilities. Examples for the Ital-
ian e-MID (electronic market for interbank deposit) include De Masi et al.
(2006), Iori et al. (2008), and Fricke and Lux (2012). Several `stylized
facts' of interbank networks have been identiﬁed, among them the ﬁnding
of disassortative mixing patterns, i.e. high-degree nodes tend to trade with
low-degree nodes, and vice versa.1. Quite recently, Fricke and Lux (2012) ar-
gued that this fact may be a key driver for the observation of a hierarchical
core-periphery (CP) structure in interbank networks, see also Craig and von
Peter (2010). Thus, preferential lending relationships between individual in-
stitutions may lead to community structure at the macro-level. While many
authors also note some other form of community structure in the interbank
network they analyze (see e.g. Boss et al. (2004)), Fricke and Lux (2012)
stress that apart from the CP structure, there is no community structure
whatsoever in the Italian e-MID network of interbank claims.
Based on these ﬁndings, we aim at analyzing the trading strategies of
individual institutions in more detail. For this purpose we use a detailed
dataset containing all overnight interbank transactions on the e-MID trading
platform from January 1999 to December 2010. Splitting the sample into
half-yearly subsamples, we deﬁne the (intra-) daily net trading volumes of
the individual institutions as the trading strategies and analyze the correla-
tions between them.2 We ﬁnd evidence for signiﬁcant and persistent bilateral
correlations between institutions' trading strategies. In most semesters we
ﬁnd two anti-correlated clusters of trading strategies, indicating that banks
tend to trade preferentially with banks from the other cluster. This ﬁnding
is both in line with the existence of preferential relationships, and with herd-
ing phenomena in banks' trading strategies. Interestingly, the information
whether a bank is a continuous net buyer or net seller appears to be the only
deﬁning characteristic for its group membership in this anonymous dataset.
1 See Cocco et al. (2009).
2 See Kyriakopoulos et al. (2009) for a similar approach. Comparable studies also exist
for the patterns of trading members in stock exchanges, see e.g. Zovko and Farmer (2007)
and Tumminello et al. (2012).
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This is in contrast to the ﬁndings of Iori, Renò, Masi, and Caldarelli (2007),
who performed a very similar analysis based on the e-MID data during the
sample period 1999-2002, and found two clusters containing mostly large
and small banks, respectively. We also highlight some problems related to
the deﬁnition of trading strategies. Overall, our ﬁndings are quite persistent
over time and appear to be largely unaﬀected by the GFC. We add further
evidence on the fact that preferential lending relationships on the micro-level
lead to community structure on the macro-level.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section 6.2 brieﬂy in-
troduces the Italian e-MID interbank data, section 6.3 contains the empirical
analysis and section 6.4 concludes.
6.2 Dataset
The Italian electronic market for interbank deposits (e-MID) is a screen-
based platform for trading unsecured money-market deposits in Euros, US-
Dollars, Pound Sterling, and Zloty operating in Milan through e-MID SpA.3
The market is fully centralized and very liquid; in 2006 e-MID accounted
for 17% of total turnover in the unsecured money market in the Euro area
and covers essentially the entire domestic overnight deposit market in Italy.
Average daily trading volumes were 24.2 bn Euro in 2006, 22.4 bn Euro in
2007 and only 14 bn Euro in 2008.
Available maturities range from overnight up to one year. Most of the
transactions (> 80%) are overnight, which is not surprising given that the
loans are unsecured. In August 2011, e-MID had 192 members from EU
countries and the US, of which 101 were domestic (Italian) and 61 interna-
tional banks.4 This composition is, however, not stable over time as can be
seen from Figure 6.1: The left panel shows a clear downward trend in the
number of active Italian banks over time, whereas the additional large drop
after the onset of the GFC (semester 18) is mainly due to the exit of foreign
banks. The right panel shows that the decline of the number of active Italian
banks went along with a relatively constant trading volume in this segment
until 2008.5 The overall upward trend of trading volumes was mainly due
to the increasing activity of foreign banks until 2008, which virtually faded
away after the onset of the crisis. Due to the cyclicality of foreign banks'
activity, we will focus on the Italian banks only. Additionally, for reasons
3 More details can be found on the e-MID website, see http://www.e-mid.it/.
4 Additionally, 29 central banks and 1 ministry of ﬁnance acted as market observers.
5 Thus, the decline of active Italian banks appears to be driven by domestic mergers
and acquisitions.
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explained below, we will only consider the relatively active banks within the
respective semesters.
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Fig. 6.1: Number of active banks (left) and traded volume (right) over
time. We also split the traded volume into money going out
from Italian and foreign banks, respectively.
The trading mechanism follows a quote-driven market and is similar to a
limit-order-book in a stock market, but without consolidation. The market
is transparent in the sense that the quoting banks' IDs are visible to all other
banks. Quotes contain the market side (buy or sell money), the volume, the
interest rate and the maturity. Trades are registered when a bank (aggressor)
actively chooses a quoted order. The minimum quote size is 1.5 million Euros,
whereas the minimum trade size is only 50,000 Euros. Thus, aggressors do
not have to trade the entire amount quoted. The platform allows for credit
line checking before a transaction will be carried out, so trades have to be
conﬁrmed by both counterparties. The market also allows direct bilateral
trades between counterparties. Contracts are automatically settled through
the TARGET2 system.
We have access to all registered trades in Euros in the period from January
1999 to December 2010.6 For each trade we know the two banks' ID numbers
(anonymous to us), their relative position (aggressor and quoter), the matu-
rity and the transaction type (buy or sell). We will focus on all overnight
trades conducted on the platform, leaving a total number of 1,317,679 trades.
The large sample size allows us to analyze the system's evolution over time.
Here we focus on 24 independent semi-annual subsamples.
In the following, we analyze the correlation matrices of the banks' trading
strategies. The ﬁnding of a core-periphery structure in the interbank network
6 A detailed description of the dataset can be found in Finger et al. (2012) and Fricke
and Lux (2012).
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indicates the existence of a hierarchical structure. Interestingly, we did not
ﬁnd any further community structure in the network using usual community
detecting algorithms. In this paper, we identify clusters of trading strategies
in a diﬀerent type of network based on the (intra-) daily trading patterns of
individual banks.
6.3 Empirical Analysis of Trading Strategies
6.3.1 Measuring Correlations Between Strategies
Even though the dataset is anonymous, each bank can be identiﬁed by
a unique ID-number, so we can observe the behavior of all sample banks
over the entire sample period. In the following, we will divide the dataset
into 24 half-yearly intervals (semesters) which are treated as independent
subsamples.7 In order to deﬁne the trading strategies we further divide each
semester into diﬀerent trading sessions. For example, Iori et al. (2007) use
a Fourier method to use continuous trade data, while Kyriakopoulos et al.
(2009) use daily data. Here we ﬁnd that each day in the sample period can
be naturally split into two trading sessions, during which a similar fraction of
trades occur on average.8 Figure 6.2 shows the fraction of trades by the time
of the day.9 For example, we see that roughly 25% of the trades occur between
9 and 10am. This is in line with the ﬁndings in Iori et al. (2008), and we
checked that this observation is in fact stable over the entire sample period.10
Based on these numbers, we split each day into a morning session (8am-12am)
and a afternoon session (12pm-6pm). In total, our sample contains 3,073
days, so we end up with 6,146 trading periods. Due to the heterogeneity
of the banks' trading activity, we restrict ourselves to the institutions which
were active in a fraction of at least θ = 50% of all trading sessions in a
particular semester.11 In this way, we focus on those institutions which were
relatively active over a signiﬁcant part of the sample period. Given the
negative trend in the number of active Italian banks, it is unavoidable that
the number of banks ending up in the sample is also decreasing over time,
see Figure 6.3.
7 Later on we will see that the subsamples are in fact not independent.
8 Note that we also checked that the results are not aﬀected by splitting each day into
3 or 4 trading sessions. However, it should be clear that the number of periods without
any activity is positively related to the number of subintervals.
9 The same remarks hold for the transacted volumes, yielding very similar results.
10 See Iori et al. (2007) for an identiﬁcation of the events that contribute to the intra-day
patterns.
11 We checked the results are qualitatively very similar for other values of θ.
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Fig. 6.2: Activity by time of the day, indicated by the fraction of
trades occurring at a certain time of the day (hourly inter-
vals).
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Fig. 6.3: Number of sample banks over time. For each semester, a
bank is in the sample if it was active in at least θT trading
sessions, with T as the total number of trading sessions in
the respective semester.
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Fig. 6.4: Examples of banks' trading strategies in the Italian inter-
bank market. Here we plot cumulative sums of particu-
lar signed strategies (1,-1,0) over the entire sample period.
The examples were not chosen randomly, but to illustrate
diﬀerent trading styles. The left panel shows a constant
buyer/seller, and the right panel shows a highly cyclical
trading strategy.
For each trading period and for each institution, we deﬁne the trading
strategy as the net traded volume in Euros. Net volume is the total buy
volume (money borrowed from other banks) minus total sell volume (money
lent to other banks). Thus, a bank with a positive (negative) net volume is a
net buyer (seller) of money. Banks with a zero strategy were either inactive
in the trading session or ended up with a ﬂat position after buying and
selling equal amounts.12 Figure 6.4 shows examples of cumulative (signed)
trading strategies for three institutions which were active during most of the
sample period. We see a substantial level of heterogeneity in the employed
strategies, with banks acting as continuous buyers/sellers (left panel) and
more complicated, possibly cyclical, patterns (right panel).
In the end, we obtain a strategy matrix S of dimension N × T , where
T denotes the number of trading sessions in a particular semester and N
the number of sample banks in this semester. Note that in each semester the
strategy matrix only includes transactions between the sample banks, thus ig-
12 We also deﬁned signed strategies (similar to the approach in Zovko and Farmer (2007)),
where we assign a +1, -1 or a 0 describing the strategies in a simpler form. However,
given that our network is closed, we work with the valued version since it contains more
information. A technical reason is that it may happen that a bank has the same strategy
in each trading session. In such a case, we cannot compute the correlation of this strategy
with other strategies.
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Fig. 6.5: Time evolution of Q = T/N .
noring transactions with other banks that might act relatively infrequently.13
In everything that follows, we will work with the normalized bank-speciﬁc
time-series (mean equal to 0 and variance equal to 1). For our sample pe-
riod, T ∼ 240, while N varies over time as shown above. In total, NT = 218
diﬀerent institutions are in the ﬁnal sample, but obviously not each bank is
active in each semester. Therefore, the ratio Q = T/N is not constant over
time as can be seen from Figure 6.5. We see that this ratio exceeds 1 for the
complete sample period, which is an indispensable condition to have mean-
ingful correlation estimates.14 However, the values are still quite low so we
can expect a non-negligible amount of measurement noise in the correlation
matrices.
From the strategy matrix St we can construct the N × N semi-annual
correlation matrices Ct between the institutions' strategies. Due to the nor-
malization of the strategies the correlation matrix can be simply calculated
based on the Pearson estimator
Ct =
1
T − 1StS
T
t , (6.1)
with ()T denoting the transpose of a matrix, see Laloux et al. (1999).
A color example of such a correlation matrix for the ﬁrst half of 2006 can
be seen in Figure 6.6. Dark colors represent high absolute correlations, with
13 In this sense, we work with a closed network of banks.
14 For a set of N time series of length T , the correlation matrix contains N(N−1)2 entries
which have to be determined by NT observations. If T is not very large compared to N ,
the empirical correlation matrix is to a large extent noisy. We should also note that many
results from random matrix theory require Q ≥ 1, see below.
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Fig. 6.6: Example of a correlation matrix after applying the cluster-
ing approach for the ﬁrst half of 2006. Left: raw correlation
matrix. Right: ﬁltered matrix. Warm colors represent posi-
tive correlations, cold colors negative ones. White indicates
uncorrelated strategies.
warm and cold colors indicating positive and negative correlations, respec-
tively. As will be explained in more detail below, the left panel shows the
raw correlation matrix after applying the clustering approach and the right
panel shows the ﬁltered correlation matrix with identical ordering. In both
cases, the two (anti-correlated) clusters are readily visible, with the level of
noisy correlations signiﬁcantly reduced in the ﬁltered matrix. We will show
below that similar observations hold for most semesters.
As a ﬁrst rough formal test for the signiﬁcance of the computed corre-
lations, we use a t-test assuming normally distributed disturbances. Later
on, we will provide more thorough signiﬁcance tests, but even this simple ap-
proach is already quite suggestive. Figure 6.7 shows the fraction of signiﬁcant
correlations at the 5% level, among all correlations, over time. Obviously,
these values are quite large, with an average value of close to 50% which
clearly exceeds the 5% we would expect randomly with a 5% acceptance
level of the test. In the following, we will provide a more detailed analysis of
the correlation matrices, mostly in terms of their eigenvalues.
6.3.2 Structure in the Correlation Matrices
In this section we investigate the eigenvalue spectrum of the observed
correlation matrices. Note that since the correlation matrices are symmetric,
all eigenvalues are positive real numbers, see Bouchaud and Potters (2003).
We denote vi as the (normalized) eigenvector corresponding to the ith eigen-
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Fig. 6.7: Fraction of signiﬁcant correlations over time, based on a
standard t-test testing the signiﬁcance of the correlation co-
eﬃcient at the 5% level.
value λi,
15 where the eigenvalues are sorted from largest to smallest, such
that λ1 ≥ λ2 · · · ≥ λN . By deﬁnition, an eigenvector is a linear combination
of the diﬀerent components j = 1, · · · , N such that Cvi = λivi. Thus, λi is
the variance of the correlation matrix captured by the weighting based on
the corresponding eigenvector.
Time-Persistence of Correlations
As a ﬁrst step, we investigate whether the observed correlations are stable
over time. This is helpful for the dynamic analysis, since we expect trading
strategies, and thus the corresponding clusters, to be quite persistent. In this
way, the time-persistence of individual correlation pairs oﬀers a ﬁrst test for
spuriousness, since spurious correlations are not likely to persist in time. In
contrast, if the correlations are persistent, then the clusters of institutions
are also likely to persist in time.
Since we can track individual institutions over time, we can test whether
the (time-varying) correlations between institutions' trading strategies are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In total, we have NT = 218 institutions in
our sample. Therefore, we have to evaluate the signiﬁcance of (N2T−NT )/2 =
23, 653 relationships. Given that two sample banks may be active in diﬀerent
semesters, several of these correlations cannot be evaluated. Nevertheless, for
15 We drop the time-indices in most of the following to save notation. It should be clear
that we have a correlation matrix for each semester, and thus time varying eigenvalues
and eigenvectors.
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all institutions jointly belonging to the sample in at least two semesters, we
can check whether the observed correlations are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero using a simple t-test assuming Gaussian residuals.16
Doing this, we ﬁnd 3,203 signiﬁcant combinations at the 5% signiﬁcance
level, i.e. a fraction of roughly 10% of all correlation pairs is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. This value is way above the 5% level we would expect to
occur in a purely random fashion.17 Hence, a large number of the correlations
between individual banks' trading strategies are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero over the sample period. We can therefore expect any identiﬁed clusters
to persist over time.
Time Evolution of the Largest Eigenvalues
For a set of inﬁnite length uncorrelated time series, C would correspond
to the identity matrix with all eigenvalues equal to 1. If the time series are of
ﬁnite length, however, the eigenvalues will never exactly equal 1, see Zovko
and Farmer (2007). In fact, the distribution of the eigenvalues in the case
of iid Gaussian time-series is known. Below, we will use this information
in order to detect signiﬁcant clustering by ﬁnding eigenvalues signiﬁcantly
larger than the predicted values. As a ﬁrst step, however, we focus on the
absolute and relative size of the eigenvalues over time. Since
∑
i λi = N , we
can standardize the observed eigenvalues to make the values comparable over
time. Figure 6.8 shows the dynamics of the ﬁve largest eigenvalues, both in
absolute terms (left panel) and standardized (right panel).
Note that the dynamics of the largest eigenvalues (absolute value) are,
in qualitative terms, quite similar to the number of sample banks in Figure
6.3. Except for the beginning and the end of the sample period, the relative
importance of the leading eigenvalues is rather strong with values around
15-20%.18 Thus, we might expect at least the largest eigenvalue to carry
important information on the structure of the correlation matrix.19 Given
16 Note that this is a joint test also on the autocorrelation of observed correlations, since
highly volatile values are unlikely to be signiﬁcant.
17 Here we disregard those correlation pairs between banks that were never jointly active.
Taking this into account, increases the fraction of signiﬁcant correlations to roughly 20%.
18 However, we should stress that these values are surprisingly small compared to the
ﬁndings of Iori et al. (2007), where values around 45% were found.
19 Note that the ﬁrst eigenvalue monitors information about the primary cluster in the
correlation matrix, both in terms of size and its average correlation. The subsequent
eigenvalues carry information on subsequent clusters, see Friedman and Weisberg (1981).
Given that the sum of the subsequent eigenvalues is of comparable size as the leading
eigenvalue, we also checked whether we can extract additional clusters from these. How-
ever, we found no evidence in this regard, so in most of the following we will focus on the
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Fig. 6.8: Absolute (left) and relative (right) size of the ﬁrst 5 Eigen-
values of C over time. The relative size normalizes the ob-
served eigenvalues by their total sum N .
that the following eigenvalues are quite stable (both in absolute and relative
values), most of the variation of the absolute values of the leading eigenvalues
is due to changes in N . However, we also see that the relative size of the
leading eigenvalue is not stable over time. A large part of this variation is
likely to be driven by the instability of the trading strategies (and the trading
clusters) at the beginning and the end of the sample period.
While the eigenvalues give us a macroscopic description of our network
in terms of the variance, investigating the leading eigenvectors allows us to
understand how much a particular principal component aﬀects the original
variables. Below, we will use information from the leading eigenvector to
deﬁne the trading clusters.20
Random Matrix Theory and Eigenvalue Density
Here we test the signiﬁcance of the observed eigenvalues based on results
from random matrix theory (RMT). It is well documented that the eigen-
values of a correlation matrix can be used to separate true information from
noise. The null hypothesis of uncorrelated strategies translates itself to the
assumption of iid random elements in the strategy matrices, which gives the
leading eigenvalues only.
20 We also performed several bootstrap-tests on the signiﬁcance of the largest eigenvalues.
For example, we randomly reshued buy and sell periods for the institutions, constructed
the correlation matrix and compared the resulting eigenvalues with those from the observed
correlation matrices. The results are comparable with those based on RMT as detailed
below, and are available upon request.
6. Interbank Trading Strategies 194
so-called randomWishart matrices or Laguerre ensemble of RMT, see Laloux
et al. (1999).
The basic idea is to compare the observed eigenvalue frequency distribu-
tion with a hypothetical one obtained from the correlation matrix for N iid
Gaussian random variables of length T . More formally, for N random uncor-
related variables of length T , in the (thermodynamic) limit T,N −→∞, with
Q = T/N ≥ 1, the density of the eigenvalues p(λ) is given by the functional
form
p(λ) =
Q
2piσ2
√
(λmax − λ)(λ− λmin)
λ
, (6.2)
with
λmaxmin = σ
2(1 + 1/Q± 2
√
1/Q), (6.3)
where σ2 being the variance of the time series, which is equal to 1 due to
the standardization, and λ ∈ [λmin, λmax]. Equations (6.2) and (6.3) deﬁne
the well-known Mar£enko-Pastur (MP) distribution of eigenvalues from iid
Gaussian random variables.21. Empirical values falling outside the interval
deﬁned by Eq. (6.3) are likely to carry important information about the
system. Note that the closed-form solution is only a limiting result and, as
shown above, the parameter Q changes over time. Consequently, the pre-
dicted eigenvalue density under the null changes from semester to semester.
Therefore, we run separate tests for each semester, where we compare the
observed eigenvalue densities to the range of the eigenvalues under the null,
which can be calculated by using the observed Q in Eq. (6.3).
Figure 6.9 shows an illustrative example of the results of our analysis.
There we compare the actual eigenvalues (black bars) with the range pre-
dicted by RMT (red area). We see that the bulk of the eigenvalues lie within
the range of the MP distribution. However, in this particular semester, 5
eigenvalues are outside the upper limit of the MP distribution, with one
very large eigenvalue, one of medium size and the remaining eigenvalues of
comparable size. The results are comparable for most periods, usually con-
taining 5 or 6 eigenvalues signiﬁcantly larger than those predicted under the
null.22 This is further evidence for the non-random structure of the correla-
tions between trading strategies, even though we have to bear in mind that
both N and T are quite small, such that there may be small-sample biases.23
Nevertheless, the largest eigenvalue is usually substantially larger than the
21 See Mar£enko and Pastur (1967).
22 Note that there are often also values smaller than the predicted λmin, which we will
not comment on in the following.
23 We found comparable results for other aggregation periods, e.g. yearly data, and other
selected samples, e.g. other values for θ. Thus, we are quite conﬁdent that the results do
not depend crucially on these issues.
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Fig. 6.9: Comparison of observed and predicted eigenvalues from the
MP distribution, for semester 9. Black bars indicate ob-
served eigenvalues, the red block shows the range of the
predicted distribution, as deﬁned in Eq. 6.3.
theoretical prediction, cf. Figure 6.10. Thus, in most of what follows, we will
focus on the largest eigenvalue and the corresponding leading eigenvector.
In the next section we ﬁlter out the noisy component of the observed
correlation matrices. This will allow us to identify the clusters of trading
strategies more convincingly.
Filtering the Correlation Matrices
The presence of a well-deﬁned bulk of eigenvalues in agreement with the
MP distribution suggests that the contents of C are highly aﬀected by noise.
In other words, those eigenvalues outside the predicted range are likely to
contain substantial information about the underlying community structure,
i.e. those components we are actually interested in.24 In the following, we will
therefore ﬁlter out the noisy component from the correlation matrices, using
the approach of Kim and Jeong (2005). Similar approaches for correlation
matrices between stock returns can be found in Laloux et al. (1999), Plerou
et al. (2002), and Livan et al. (2011).
With the complete set of eigenvalues and eigenvectors, we can decompose
24 In the future, it would be very interesting to use the approach of Livan et al. (2011)
and set up a factor model that might be able to reproduce the observed eigenvalue spectra.
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Fig. 6.10: Relative size of the largest eigenvalue compared to λmax,
as deﬁned in Eq. 6.3.
the correlation matrix C as
C =
N∑
i=1
λiviv
′
i, (6.4)
where vi and λi deﬁned as above. Because only the eigenvectors correspond-
ing to the few largest eigenvalues contain the information on signiﬁcantly
non-random structure, we can identify a ﬁltered correlation matrix for these
groups by choosing a partial sum of Eq. (6.4), denoted as Cg. Thus, we
posit that the eigenvalue spectrum of the correlation matrix is organized
into a group part deﬁned by the largest eigenvalues, and a random part con-
taining the bulk of small eigenvalues consistent with the MP distribution. In
this regard, we should stress that this is slightly diﬀerent for the correlations
of stock returns, where the ﬁrst eigenvalue is usually an order of magnitude
larger than the rest. The corresponding eigenvector is simply the `market'
itself, containing roughly equal components on all stocks with most compo-
nents having the same sign.25 In our case, we did not ﬁnd evidence for such
a `market' vector, since the distribution of eigenvector components contains
a roughly equal number of positive and negative eigenvalues. In this regard,
we calculated the inverse participation ratio (IPR) deﬁned as
Ik =
N∑
j=1
[vkj ]
4, (6.5)
25 See for example Plerou et al. (2002).
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with vkj being the jth component of the kth eigenvector. Here, the IPR
serves as a measure for the distribution of eigenvector components. For the
case of (1) identical components in eigenvector k, Ik will take the value 1/N ,
while for the case of (2) one component equal to 1 and the remainder equal to
zero, Ik takes the value of 1.26 Additionally, it is often useful to compare the
results to the IPRs of (Gaussian) random matrices. Figure 6.11 shows the
results: The blue (green) line shows the (log) of the IPR for the eigenvector
corresponding to the largest (smallest) eigenvalue, while the red line shows
the value for the eigenvectors from a Monte-Carlo simulation using random
correlation matrices with the same dimensions.27 For the sake of complete-
ness, we also plot the benchmark of identical components in the eigenvectors
(turquoise line). Quite surprisingly, we see that the leading eigenvectors are
actually very close to the random case, whereas this is not true for the small-
est eigenvectors which consist of signiﬁcantly less equal components.28 If
anything, it seems that the leading eigenvectors are somewhat closer to the
benchmark case of identical components as compared to the random case.29
We can write the correlation matrix as
C = Cg +Cr =
Ng∑
i=1
λiviv
′
i +
N∑
i=Ng+1
λiviv
′
i. (6.6)
Note that the calculation of Cg involves a choice on the number of leading
eigenvalues relevant for its calculation. Here we simply use the leading eigen-
vector only (Ng = 1), but the results do not depend on this assumption.
30
In the following, we will always show the results for the raw and the ﬁltered
correlation matrix.
26 See e.g. Plerou et al. (2002).
27 The results are average values from a Monte-Carlo experiment based on 100 simula-
tions.
28 This result shows that eigenvalues smaller than the theoretical lower limit might con-
tain information not captured by the largest eigenvalues only. The investigation of these
eigenvalues would be an interesting avenue of future research.
29 In the end, it appears that the eigenvectors, even those corresponding to those eigen-
values exceeding the theoretical threshold, show IPRs which are similar to those of random
correlation matrices. This result, surprising as it may seem, should be interpreted with
care, since we will see below that these seemingly random eigenvectors display a substantial
level of autocorrelation in the signs of their components.
30 Note that we use the ﬁltering technique to illustrate the clusters graphically (as in
Figure 6.6. Since we identify clusters using only the leading eigenvector, the results will
not be aﬀected by taking other eigenvalues into account as well.
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Fig. 6.11: Inverse participation ratio (logarithm) for the ﬁrst and last
eigenvector over time. The plot also shows the results for
random matrices and the case of equal components.
6.3.3 Clustering of Trading Behavior
We have both shown that the correlations between banks' trading strate-
gies are quite persistent and that a number of eigenvalues of the correlation
matrices signiﬁcantly exceed those predicted in case of completely uncorre-
lated strategies. Thus, there is some evidence in favor of clustering, i.e. non-
random structure, in the correlation matrices. However, we have also seen
that there is a substantial level of noise in the correlation matrices, which
is why we constructed ﬁltered correlation matrices, based on the signiﬁcant
eigenvalues and their corresponding eigenvectors only.
In this section we will show that the components of the leading eigenvec-
tor allow us to identify clusters of trading behavior.31 We usually ﬁnd two
clusters of banks, with highly correlated strategies within the clusters, but
anti-correlated strategies between the clusters. This ﬁnding suggests that
the banks in one cluster tend to trade in similar directions and their coun-
terparties are usually from the other cluster. At ﬁrst sight, this result may
seem trivial, because in the money market there is always one buyer and one
seller, so some banks will necessarily have correlated strategies. But what is
surprising is that the clusters are rather large (compared to the number of
sample banks) and persist over time. Thus, banks appear to have preferred
counterparties in the market, which they turn to repeatedly when they are
31 We also use hierarchical clustering techniques, which yielded very similar results. One
important disadvantage of these techniques, however, is that they remain silent about the
optimal number of clusters.
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willing to trade. We will discuss the meaning of the clusters in more detail
below.
Clustering Based on the Leading Eigenvectors
Our clustering approach consists of dividing the leading eigenvector into
positive and negative components. Components with equal sign end up in
the same cluster,32 i.e. the indicator for the group membership of bank j
(gj) can be deﬁned as
gj =

1 if vj1 > 0,
−1 if vj1 < 0,
0 if j was inactive.
(6.7)
We do this for each semester individually, and the results for one particular
semester were already shown above in Figure 6.6. For most periods we ob-
serve similar patterns, with two relatively large groups with anti-correlated
strategies, and a third group containing the remaining banks which are
mostly uncorrelated with the rest and therefore have no clear strategy in
this particular semester. For some semesters, the usefulness of the ﬁltering
approach is more obvious than for the example above, cf. Figure 6.12 for
the ﬁrst half of 1999. In this period, it is hard to identify any structure in
the raw correlation matrix, even after reordering the indices according to the
leading eigenvector. In contrast, the ﬁltered correlation matrix shows a sim-
ilar structure as the example above, however, with one of the groups being
rather small.
6.3.4 Time-Persistence of Clusters
So far we have only looked at the structure of the correlation matrices
for each semester individually, ﬁnding that there is in fact evidence for non-
random structure in the matrices. Here we aim at assessing the persistence
of the identiﬁed clusters over the sample period. We already discussed the
time-persistence of individual correlation pairs in the trading strategies. Here
we check whether two sample banks tend to appear in the same clusters over
time. If so, this would be evidence for the non-spuriousness of the identiﬁed
clusters and therefore suggest that the identiﬁed clusters are meaningful. In
order to shed light on this issue, we construct a frequency matrix F, where
32 In principle, we could divide the clusters even further by using the next eigenvectors.
However, we ﬁnd that the usage of the leading eigenvector is already suﬃcient to identify
the large clusters.
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Fig. 6.12: Example of a correlation matrix after applying the cluster-
ing approach for the ﬁrst half of 1999. Left: raw correla-
tion matrix. Right: ﬁltered matrix. Warm colors represent
positive correlations, cold colors negative ones. White in-
dicates uncorrelated strategies.
each element fij ∈ [0, 1] contains the number of semesters that two banks
were in the same cluster minus the number of semesters that they were in
diﬀerent clusters, relative to the total number of semesters that the two banks
were jointly active.
Figure 6.13 shows the results of this exercise. The left panel shows the
raw matrix, the right panel shows the same matrix, but after reordering the
indices according to the size of the components of the leading eigenvector of
this matrix. The results are striking: the two clusters appear even for the
complete sample period since there are many large entries (in absolute terms)
in the frequency matrix. Hence, there is not only stability in the individual
correlations, but also in the group memberships of individual banks. Note
that this is strong evidence for the non-randomness of the half-yearly ma-
trices, so the identiﬁed clusters are indeed signiﬁcant. If group membership
was completely random, it would be impossible to observe this phenomenon.
Another way to investigate the persistence of the cluster memberships
is to construct a transition matrix of going from the one to the other clus-
ter. We ﬁnd that the two clusters contain those banks which mainly bought
and sold money (see below), respectively, so we label the clusters B and S.
Taking the possibility of exit into account (E), Table 6.1 shows for example,
that there is a probability of 68.32% that a bank which was in the buy clus-
ter in the last period (Bt−1) will remain in this cluster in the next period.
This is way above 50%, the level we would expect if cluster membership was
completely random (ignoring the possibility of exit). Note that the diagonal
elements in this matrix are largest, so there is a signiﬁcant level of persis-
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Fig. 6.13: Frequency matrix F, as deﬁned in the text. Left: raw
matrix. Right: after reordering.
Bt St Et
Bt−1 .6832 .2118 .1050
St−1 .1807 .6996 .1197
Et−1 .0272 .0331 .9397
Tab. 6.1: Transition matrix: B, S and E stand for buyer, seller, and
exit, respectively.
tence in the cluster memberships. This is also in line with the ﬁndings of
Fricke and Lux (2012), who show that there is a substantial level of persis-
tence in the banks' strategies (in terms of being intermediaries, lenders, or
borrowers) based on quarterly aggregates. We should also stress that, since
our clustering approach is only based on the sign of the components of the
leading eigenvectors, there are a number of elements in these which are close
to zero i.e. insigniﬁcant. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the proba-
bility of switching from the buy to the sell cluster (or vice versa) is also quite
high, with a value of 21.18%. This is driven by banks with less clear trad-
ing strategies, which might put them randomly in one or the other cluster.
On average, this eﬀect should vanish since the switching probabilities are of
comparable magnitude.
We checked that these results are very stable over time, cf. Figure 6.14.
Interestingly, similar to the remarks in Fricke and Lux (2012), there appears
to be a substantial reversal in the trading strategies in the second half of
2001 (semester 5), which Fricke and Lux (2012) identiﬁed as a signiﬁcant
structural break in many time-series of the e-MID dataset. Interestingly,
the GFC (starting around semester 18) is hardly visible, which is somewhat
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Fig. 6.14: Transition probabilities over time. P (x|y) shows the prob-
ability of going from status y to x. B, S and E stand for
buyer, seller, and exit, respectively.
surprising given that core banks tended to reverse their strategies during this
time.
6.3.5 A Closer Look at the Clusters
In this section we want to take a closer look at the individual clusters.
The usual interpretation of the ﬁnding of two anti-correlated clusters is that
banks in the same cluster have similar strategies (i.e. tend to trade in the
same direction), trading with banks in the other cluster. For example, Iori et
al. (2007) state that the two clusters contain large and small banks, respec-
tively, which tend to trade with each other. At ﬁrst sight, this interpretation
makes intuitive sense, since two strategies can only be positively correlated,
if the two banks tend to trade in the same directions during the same trading
sessions. Note that the statement during the same trading sessions is impor-
tant, a simple example illustrates this point: suppose bank A is a continuous
buyer during a single semester. With equal probability it buys 1 Euro on the
market or is inactive in a particular trading session. The cumulative trading
volume of bank A will therefore be a monotonically increasing function of
time. Now suppose that bank B is also a continuous buyer of money, always
buying 1 Euro when bank A is inactive. Again bank B's cumulative trad-
ing volume will be a monotonically increasing function of time. What does
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Fig. 6.15: Most anti-correlated (signed) trading strategies in semester
3.
the correlation of the banks' trading strategies tell us about their relation-
ship? By deﬁnition, the correlation between the trading strategies of the two
banks will be -1. Observed negative correlations may therefore be spurious,
in the sense that two strategies may turn out to be identical in terms of
the cumulative trading volumes, but not in terms of the individual trading
sessions. Quite interestingly, this fact has not been mentioned before and we
know of no paper that investigated the trading strategies in this detail after
identifying the clusters.33
To illustrate these points, consider Figures 6.15 and 6.16, where we show
the cumulative trading volumes (signed strategies) of the two most anti-
correlated banks in semester 3 and 10, respectively. Figure 6.16 shows the
usual pattern, namely one bank continuously buys money in the market,
whereas the other bank continuously sells money in the market, and the
banks tend to trade in the same trading sessions. In contrast, Figure 6.15
shows the case where banks with, in terms of the sign of the cumulative
trading volume, very similar strategies, end up in diﬀerent clusters simply
because they tend to trade asynchronously.
All in all, this indicates that we might not really measure what we would
like to measure using our deﬁnition of trading strategies. Since we focus only
on the relatively active banks, the eﬀect is likely to be small for relatively
large values of θ. In order to investigate this in more detail, we checked
that one cluster indeed contains banks that tend to buy most of the time,
while banks in the other cluster tend to sell most of the time. As another
33 Note that the continuous approach of Iori et al. (2007) also suﬀers from this problem.
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Fig. 6.16: Most anti-correlated (signed) trading strategies in semester
10.
robustness check, we calculated the correlation between trading strategies,
using only those trading periods where both banks were jointly active. While
this aﬀects particularly those cases where banks tend to trade asynchronously,
the general patterns observed in the baseline correlation matrices remain
unaﬀected. We also checked that the total trading volumes in the two clusters
are roughly equal, so the clusters indeed tend to trade with each other.
Nevertheless, the examples show, that our approach may at times not be able
to identify meaningful clusters. Summing up, the story is much simpler than
expected: the two clusters contain those banks with clear trading strategies
over time, i.e. mostly buying or selling money during a particular semester.
We also checked the results with respect to the CP model in Fricke and
Lux (2012), since it might be that one cluster contains the core banks (which
are similar across many dimensions and possibly even in terms of their trad-
ing strategies), and the other cluster contains the periphery banks. However,
we do not ﬁnd any evidence in this regard.34 Figure 6.17 shows an example
to highlight that there is apparently no relationship between the coreness
of banks in one or the other cluster. There we see the same (ﬁltered and
reordered) correlation matrix as in Figure 6.6, but with core banks explicitly
marked by a black dot on the main diagonal. There seems to be no relation-
ship between the core-periphery model and the trading clusters, since the
core banks are spread somewhat evenly over the network. However, given
34 Note that this is in contrast to the ﬁndings of Iori et al. (2007), since the coreness of
individual banks was found to be highly correlated with transaction volumes (as proxy for
bank size) of individual banks.
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Fig. 6.17: Relation between clusters and core-periphery model. Fil-
tered correlation matrix for the ﬁrst half of 2006, with core
banks highlighted by black dots on the main diagonal.
that core banks tend to act on both market sides, it should be clear that
the core banks usually do not appear among the most anti-correlated (buy
and sell) strategies. Similar results hold for other sample periods. Thus, the
structure of the correlation matrices is not driven by the core membership
of individual banks. This is not surprising, given that most core banks act
as intermediaries and tend to distribute money across the complete system,
rather than building up large positions in a continuous way. Therefore, core
banks are spread evenly across the correlation network.
It would, of course, be very interesting to relate our ﬁndings to external
information about the sample banks, e.g. using balance sheet data. However,
the anonymity of our dataset makes such an exercise impossible. It would be
interesting to carry out such an analysis in the future based on diﬀerent non-
anonymous datasets. In this way, the aim would be to model the behavior
of individual banks based on observable characteristics in order to come up
with realistic agent-based models of the interbank market.
6.4 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed the correlations in patterns of trading for
members of the Italian interbank trading platform e-MID. We showed that
there are signiﬁcant and persistent bilateral correlations between institutions'
trading strategies, and in most semesters we ﬁnd evidence for the existence
of two anti-correlated clusters. The two clusters mostly contain continuous
net buyers and net sellers of money, respectively. The clusters, in terms
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of the individual cluster memberships, are highly persistent. However, we
have also seen that there are certain problems related to our deﬁnition of
trading strategies. Additionally, we highlight some problems related to our
deﬁnition of trading strategies, since the observed negative correlations may
be spurious. The reason lies in the fact that two strategies may be identical
in terms of the cumulative trading volumes, but not in terms of the trading
time.
Our ﬁndings add further evidence on the fact that preferential lending
relationships on the micro-level lead to community structure on the macro-
level. Furthermore, despite ﬁnding no evidence of community structure in the
usual network of interbank liabilities apart from the CP structure, see Fricke
and Lux (2012), trading on the e-MID platform appears to be a relatively
structured process in terms of trading strategies. Given that each trade
involves two counterparties, i.e. a buying and a selling side, it may appear
trivial that we identify these clusters. However, the high level of persistence
shows that most banks tend to have rather stable trading strategies over
time, since they tend to appear in the same cluster over time, trading with
the same counterparties.
In the future, we need to explore the trading behavior of individual banks
in more detail, to understand the evolution of the interbank network in more
detail. The main aim is to build an artiﬁcial banking system, that allows to
test the eﬀects of diﬀerent regulatory measures in a laboratory setting. We
are still at the beginning of understanding the complexity of actual banking
networks.
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